The Committee met at DoubleTree By Hilton Crystal City, 300 Army Navy Drive, Arlington, Virginia, at 9:00 a.m., Ms. Martha Bashford, Chair, presiding.

PRESENT:

Ms. Martha S. Bashford, Chair
Hon. Leo I. Brisbois
Ms. Kathleen Cannon
Ms. Meg Garvin
Hon. Paul W. Grimm*
Mr. A.J. Kramer
Ms. Jennifer Gentile Long
Sgt. James "Jim" Markey (Ret.)
Dr. Jenifer Markowitz
CMIAF Rodney J. McKinley, USAF (Ret.)
BGen James R. Schwenk, USMC (Ret.)
Dr. Cassia C. Spohn
Ms. Meghan A. Tokash
STAFF:

Col. Steven Weir, USA, Staff Director
Ms. Julie Carson, Deputy Staff Director
Ms. Theresa Gallagher, Attorney-Advisor
Ms. Nalini Gupta, Attorney-Advisor
Ms. Amanda Hagy, Senior Paralegal
Ms. Patricia Ham, Attorney-Advisor
Mr. Glen Hines, Attorney-Advisor
Ms. Marguerite McKinney, Analyst
Mr. Chuck Mason, Attorney-Advisor
Ms. Meghan Peters, Attorney-Advisor
Ms. Stacy Powell, Attorney-Advisor
Ms. Stayce Rozell, Senior Paralegal
Ms. Terri Saunders, Attorney-Advisor
Ms. Kate Tagert, Attorney-Advisor
Mr. Dale Trexler, Chief of Staff
Dr. William "Bill" Wells, Criminologist
Mr. David Gruber, Alternate Designated Federal Officer (ADFO)

ALSO PRESENT:

Lieutenant Colonel Adam Kazin, U.S. Army, Policy Branch Chief, Criminal Law Division, Office of the Judge Advocate General
Lieutenant James Kraemer, U.S. Navy, Head of the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Policy Branch, Criminal Law Division, Office of the Judge Advocate General
Major Paul Ervasti, U.S. Marine Corps, Judge Advocate, Military Justice Policy and Legislation Officer, Military Justice Branch, Judge Advocate Division
Lieutenant Adam Miller, U.S. Coast Guard, Legal Intern, Office of Military Justice
Colonel Patrick Pflaum, U.S. Army, Chief, Criminal Law Division
Captain Robert P. Monahan, Jr., U.S. Navy,
   Deputy Assistant Judge Advocate General
   (Criminal Law) and Director, Office of the
   Judge Advocate General's Criminal Law Policy
   Division
Lieutenant Colonel Adam M. King, U.S. Marine
   Corps, Military Justice Branch Head, U.S.
   Marine Corps Judge Advocate Division
Colonel Julie Pitvorec, U.S. Air Force, Chief,
   U.S. Air Force Government Trial and
   Appellate Counsel Division
Captain Vasilios Tasikas, U.S. Coast Guard,
   Chief, Office of Military Justice
Colonel Lance Hamilton, U.S. Army, Program
   Manager, Special Victims' Counsel Program
Captain Lisa B. Sullivan, U.S. Navy, Chief of
   Staff, Victims' Legal Counsel Program
Lieutenant Colonel William J. Schrantz, U.S.
   Marine Corps, Officer-in-Charge, Victims'
   Legal Counsel Organization, Judge Advocate
   Division, HQMC
Colonel Jennifer Clay, U.S. Air Force, Chief,
   Special Victims' Counsel Division
Ms. Christa A. Specht, U.S. Coast Guard, Chief,
   Office of Member Advocacy Division
Colonel Roseanne Bennett, U.S. Army, Chief,
   Trial Defense Service
Commander Stuart T. Kirkby, U.S. Navy, Director,
   Defense Counsel Assistance Program
Colonel Valerie Danyluk, U.S. Marine Corps,
   Chief Defense Counsel
Colonel Christopher Morgan, U.S. Air Force,
   Chief, Trial Defense Division, Air Force
   Legal Operations, Joint Base Andrews
Commander Shanell King, U.S. Coast Guard, Chief
   of Defense Services
Ms. Janet K. Mansfield, Chief, Programs Branch,
   Criminal Law Division, Office of the Judge
   Advocate General for the U.S. Army

*Present by telephone
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9:02 a.m.

CHAIR BASHFORD: Good morning. I would like to welcome the Members and everyone in attendance today at the 13th Public Meeting of the Defense Advisory Committee on Investigation, Prosecution, and Defense of Sexual Assault in the Armed Forces, the DAC-IPAD.

Of the 15 Committee Members, 11 Members are present this morning and a twelfth Member, Judge Paul Grimm, will be joining us by telephone at ten o'clock this morning.

Two Members were not able to attend today, Major General Marcia Anderson, and Judge Reggie Walton.

The DAC-IPAD was created by the Secretary of Defense in 2016, in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, as amended. Our mandate is to advise the Secretary of Defense on the investigation, prosecution, and defense of allegations of sexual assault and other sexual misconduct involving
Members of the Armed Forces.

Please note that today's meeting is being transcribed. A complete written transcript will be posted on the DAC-IPAD website.

Today's meeting will begin with the DAC-IPAD's Data Working Group presenting the Fiscal Year 2018 conviction and acquittal rates for sexual assault in the military based on its collection of case documents from all military sexual assault cases closed during the Fiscal Year.

Next, the Staff Director will provide an overview of the Draft Department of Defense Report on Allegations of Collateral Misconduct Against Individuals Identified as the Victim of Sexual Assault. This draft report was submitted to the DAC-IPAD for its input by the DoD General Counsel in fulfillment of Section 547 of the Fiscal National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019.

Following the overview of the report, Service representatives involved in the report
drafting and data collection will appear before
the committee to answer questions about the data
and the report methodology.

Following the collateral misconduct
discussion, the committee will hear from three
additional Panels: the Services Military Justice
Division Chiefs, the Services Special Victims'
Counsel Program Managers, and the Services Trial
Defense Service Organization Chiefs. These
panelists will each respond to questions from
committee Members regarding their organization's
written responses to questions the DAC-IPAD
submitted in May on the topics of sexual assault
conviction and acquittal rates, the case
adjudication process, and the victim declination
to participate in the Military Justice process.
And I want to thank the people who responded
because those were very, very substantive
responses.

Following these Panel discussions, the
committee will receive a status update from its
Case Review Working Group and a presentation by
its Data Working Group regarding the Fiscal Year
2018 Case Adjudication Data Report Plan.

For the final session of the meeting,
the committee will deliberate on the DoD
Collateral Misconduct Report and the Services'
responses to its written questions.

Each public meeting of the DAC-IPAD
includes a period of time for public comment. We
have received no request for public comment for
today's meeting.

During the meeting, if a member of the
audience would like to make a public comment on
an issue before the committee report, please
direct your request to the DAC-IPAD Staff
Director, Colonel Steven Weir. All public
comments will be heard at the end of the meeting
and at the discretion of the Chair.

Written public comments may be
submitted at any time for committee
consideration.

Before we do the Data Review, though,
I want to thank everybody for being here today
and I think we'll start off with Colonel Weir.

We're ready for your remarks.

COL. WEIR: Okay, thank you, ma'am.

As the Chair mentioned, this Collateral Misconduct Study was a result of the National Defense Authorization Act, Public Law 115-232. And in that legislation, it set out the Secretary of Defense, acting through the DAC-IPAD, shall submit a report to the Congressional Defense Committees that includes the following information. And I am reading now from the legislation.

There are three requirements that this legislation put out. Number one, the number of instances in which a covered individual was accused of misconduct or crimes considered collateral to the investigation of a sexual assault committed against the individual.

So it's important to understand what a covered individual is. It's defined in this section. It means an individual who is identified as a victim of a sexual assault in the
case files of a military criminal investigative
organization.

    Number two, the number of instances in
which an adverse action was taken against a
covered individual who was accused of collateral
misconduct or crimes as described in paragraph 1.

    And number three, the third piece of
information that was required was the percentage
of investigations of sexual assaults that
involved an accusation or adverse action against
a covered individual as described in paragraphs 1
and 2.

    The Services were tasked with
gathering the requested information and that
information, in a draft report, was forwarded to
the DAC-IPAD in a letter from DoD General
Counsel, Mr. Paul Ney, on June 11, 2019. Mr. Ney
provided the draft report to give the DAC-IPAD an
opportunity to offer any additional information
or analysis and provide that feedback to the
Secretary of Defense.

    Mr. Ney has requested that the DAC-
IPAD reply by September 15th. The report is due to Congress on September 30th.

The DAC-IPAD Staff reviewed the draft reports submitted by each of the Services, to include the Coast Guard.

The Staff requested a meeting with the Service representatives and the individuals who were responsible for compiling the information in the draft reports. This meeting was held on July 9th in the DAC-IPAD conference room. The Staff requested this meeting so we could better understand the methodology behind the gathering of the information because it was clear that there were differences in methodology and definitions between the Services.

For example, the Army definition of accused is different from the Navy and Marine Corps definition. The Navy and Marine Corps only counted collateral misconduct committed by the victim if an inquiry into the collateral misconduct was actually initiated. We were told that meant a report of investigation was
The Army defined accused as a victim who may have potentially committed a UCMJ violation.

The Air Force had a slightly different definition but the Air Force did not require a separate investigation into the misconduct.

The Army had a very low number of sexual assault investigations for the time period April 1, 2017 to March 31, 2019 involving an Army victim. Based upon the experience with the case reviews and the courts-martial database, we knew that something was off. During the meeting we discovered that the Army only counted penetrative sexual assault investigations; whereas, the other Services counted penetrative and contact.

After the meeting, the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force sent us corrected numbers, which changed the percentages in their original draft report. As the Staff reviewed the percentages, it became apparent that the percentages perhaps did not accurately reflect
those victims who had been punished as a percentage of those victims who committed collateral misconduct. Instead, the Services reported the number of victims receiving adverse action out of the total number of sexual assault investigations involving Servicemember victims from their respective Services.

And so as a result of the report and the different methodologies, we thought it was important that the DAC-IPAD Committee have an opportunity to review the Services' report, which we've sent to you for your review, and also have an opportunity to deliberate and discuss, which is going to occur near the end of this public session, in order to compile a letter back to the Secretary of Defense.

And pending any of your questions, that's all I have right now.

CHAIR BASHFORD: Anybody have any questions for Colonel Weir?

Then we'll turn to Mr. Mason for your remarks.
MR. MASON: Good morning, ma'am.

You don't have to strap in this morning because I'm not as excited as I was yesterday. So, we are only going to cover just the conviction and acquittal rates. It's a couple of slides.

This afternoon, I cannot promise we will not be excited again because we are going to do all the data.

But for conviction and acquittal rates, the first chart that we have up is the outcomes for penetrative offenses that were referred to courts-martial. And I apologize, there's just the one slide that is only on the left-hand side of the room.

But if you look at the top line, that's the FY2018, when somebody had a referred penetrative offense, in 28.2 percent of the time, they were convicted for a penetrative offense. But the other extreme is 37.3 percent of the time, they were acquitted of all charges. So if they had multiple charges against them with the
most serious offense being the penetrative
offense, in 37.3 percent of the time, they were
acquitted of everything. And that is an increase
over FY17 when the overall acquittal rate for a
penetrative referred was almost 31 percent.

When you look at that same class of
cases, where it's a penetrative referred to trial
and then handled -- adjudicated by a Military
judge, the conviction rate for the penetrative
offense goes to 33.3 percent, which was
previously 28.2 for overall. And the acquittal
rate, though, dropped to 17 percent. So you have
a much lower acquittal rate when you're going
before a Military judge and it's a penetrative
offense.

Where it gets interesting is when you
now look at -- when it's adjudicated by a Panel
of Members, the conviction rate is 23.2 percent,
which is slightly lower than the overall rate,
but the acquittal rate is 59.4 percent. So
looking at this statistic, it might be safe to
say that if you have a penetrative case that is
preferred, you may want to have it adjudicated in
front of Members because your chances for
acquittal are much higher than if you go before a
Military judge.

And if you look, we have the numbers
for '18, '17, '16, and '15, the acquittal rate
bounces back and forth. So there isn't a true
trend that we can identify that it's going in one
direction or the other, only to say that in the
most recent year, the acquittal rate with Members
is much higher than it was in the previous year.

And now we want to look at those same
metrics when we're talking about a contact
offense that was referred to trial. And you have
a much smaller universe of cases but when you are
looking at convicted of a contact offense as the
most serious offense, it's almost 14.5 percent
and then the acquittal rate is 20.9 percent. And
just going back to when we were talking about
penetrative, it was 28.2 percent for a convicted
of a penetrative and the acquittal was 37.3. So
you had a higher acquittal rate, overall, for
penetrative than you are realizing with the contact offenses.

If you have a contact case that is adjudicated in front of a judge, you are at 14, almost 15 percent for a conviction for the contact and only 6.5 percent for an acquittal. But you have a much larger 78.7 percent that are convicted of some other offense.

So the contact sexual assault was the most serious offense they were charged with, one or multiples, and then there were other offenses, maybe an Article 92 or an Article 112a, something along those lines. They were found guilty of those, rather than -- more likely to be found guilty of those offenses than the sex assault or be completely acquitted.

And then when you look at it for Military Members, the overall acquittal rate, again, is much higher when you're dealing with Members. So the Military judge was realizing 6.4 percent overall acquittal rate for the contact. In front of Members, it was 46.7 percent
acquittal.

Interestingly though, the convicted for a contact offense with Members was almost 17 percent and it was 15 percent with a judge. So the Members are finding them guilty of a contact offense more than the judge is but the judge is finding them guilty of something and the Members are more likely to acquit.

So we wanted to just give you an overview of what's happening with penetrative and contact, so that you have that in the back of your mind as you are hearing your professionals today and you can ask their opinion of if they see this as a trend. Do they see this as a problem? Is this how the system should work?

We are not drawing any conclusions that it's right or wrong. We are just giving you what we actually know from our statistics in the system of what is happening at the trial level.

Thank you, ma'am.

CHAIR BASHFORD: Thank you, Mr. Mason.

I have a couple of questions.
On the contact offenses, where the Military judge was convicting a substantial number of non-sex offenses, would those charges, standing alone, have had to go to a general courts-martial?

MR. MASON: Without knowing the specific other offenses, I can't tell you. In our database we -- in order for a case to be in our database, it has to be either a penetrative or contact sexual assault but we also enter every other offense on the charge sheet.

So we could go through our database and look and say contact was the most serious sexual assault but was there an attempted murder or was there something else that was a rather extreme offense, a serious offense that would rise to the level of a general courts-martial.

We could tell you that. I just don't have it off the top of my head.

CHAIR BASHFORD: But things such as underage drinking or fraternization, would those have gone to general courts-martial?
MR. MASON: Not necessarily.

CHAIR BASHFORD: And can you just go back to your very first slide for a moment?

MR. MASON: Yes, ma'am.

CHAIR BASHFORD: So if you take the full acquittal rate for Fiscal Year '18 and convicted of non-sexual offense, I just can't really see the numbers that well. What's the total percentage then?

MR. MASON: Your total -- if you do convicted of sexual assault, any penetrative or contact sexual assault, you are going to be at 28 percent -- 29 percent. And then your acquittal --

CHAIR BASHFORD: Acquittal or conviction?

MR. MASON: -- it's going to be 70. Acquittal is about 70 percent.

CHAIR BASHFORD: Okay, so acquittal of any sexual assault --

MR. MASON: Yes.

CHAIR BASHFORD: -- even if you're
convicted of something else, is about a 70 percent rate?

MR. MASON: Yes.

CHAIR BASHFORD: Thank you.

MR. MASON: Yes, ma'am.

Are there any other questions for Mr. Mason?

MS. LONG: I have a question.

Mr. Mason, thank you. I'm just curious if there is any similarity in the civilian context for a judge or jury outcomes on cases that you know of?

MR. MASON: I am not aware of it. We have talked and when Kate is up speaking later, she can probably tell you about other studies that she's looked at with respect to the investigations and going forward.

MS. LONG: Right.

MR. MASON: We could probably look at the Sentencing Commission and see what metrics they're tracking to see if something would address it but I don't know of anything that is a
direct correlation to what we have.

    MS. LONG: Okay. And just to be clear, these -- this data tells you what's happening but it doesn't tell you why anything is happening.

    MR. MASON: It does not.

    MS. LONG: So that would involve further analysis.

    MR. MASON: Absolutely. And we can tell you these are the results and if you want to see the record of trial for these cases, we have much of the documents. We don't have the complete transcript but we can pull out what the Article 32 hearing report was. We can look at what the SJA advised. We can say that the convening authority decided to go forward or not. And we can tell you the way our database, because it's severely antiquated at this point, we aren't able to follow every specific charge on a straight line. It puts them into blocks and we have to then look within each block and try to marry up the lines to figure out the results for
each of those.

MS. LONG: Okay.

MR. MASON: But that doesn't mean we can't do it. It's just labor-intensive.

MS. LONG: Okay. And just one more question. Sorry, Chair Bashford.

I just -- I just want to make sure I understand this. So but when I'm looking at the Fiscal Year, though, I see the 37.3 percent of all but the other pieces, they are convicted of something.

MR. MASON: They are convicted of something. And we will have in the report, when this chart is published, it will say that the most serious offense referred to the courts-martial was a penetrative offense. However, if they were found not guilty of the penetrative but found guilty of a contact offense or assault and battery, then the assault and battery would be in that blue column, the 30.3. So we're saying yes, there was a conviction. It just wasn't for the penetrative.
MS. LONG: Okay, thank you.

MR. MASON: Yes, ma'am.

CHAIR BASHFORD: And Mr. Mason, I just want to make sure I understand. In order for the DAC-IPAD to do the best work at grabbing the data, you need a better database -- consistent. Is that correct?

MR. MASON: We actually need a legitimate database. We are using a SharePoint website. SharePoint was developed as a way to share documents. Because we are a document-based system and we have to have a legal document that we can look at and pull the information from, we take those and enter them into fields so that we can aggregate what we have. But then to get an outcome, the only way you can do it is do an Excel spreadsheet and sort by columns and count them.

So it's not a database. If you ask anybody that works in databases, this is not. It's a workaround. It has served remarkably well for its purposes. The JPP started this with
limited funds, limited people. I mentioned it to you yesterday, because of one person, we have one individual, Stayce, who has entered all 4,000 cases into our database. So she's read every one of those documents and then categorizes it and enters it.

But the only way we can do this going forward is with a legitimate database that you're able to track an offense, each individual offense as a unit, and then combine those units into the case, and then look at the cases out. We are unable to do that at this point.

CHAIR BASHFORD: And that would better serve the Members of this committee. Is that correct?

MR. MASON: It would better serve the Members of this committee and it would allow you to present the information to the Services, as customers, as well as to Congress, who has asked you to investigate this. It would allow you to actually do the job that you've been asked to do.

CHAIR BASHFORD: Thank you.
MR. MASON: Yes, ma'am.

SGT. MARKEY: Chair Bashford?

CHAIR BASHFORD: Yes.

SGT. MARKEY: Thank you so much for the information. I call you our Inspector Gadget with all the data. And we love it. You have to understand your information and be able to manage it.

Are you aware -- in the different branches of the Military, are you aware of any information management system or database that is able to track the information and report data, as you have presented to us today?

MR. MASON: There are systems within each Service that attempt to track courts-martial that are happening from beginning to end. However, and it's something I'll get into with the data report, we asked them to provide the cases to us so that we could add them to our database. We do not have the -- when a charge sheet is created, we don't have access to it at that point. We have to wait for them to provide
it to us. And the problem that we have run into
is the number of cases that the Services report
to us as being a valid case for the purposes of
our study, the actual responsive rate is nowhere
near what they think it should be.

So as an example, the Services gave us
774 cases in this past year that they believe are
a penetrative or contact sexual assault that was
resolved in that Fiscal Year. Only 574 of those
were actual cases that we could track. So 75
percent of what they told us were actually the
cases. The other ones that were reported were
maybe a child sex assault that we don't track, or
maybe it was a different Fiscal Year that just
happened to surface in their system, or they
duplicated and they told us the same name two or
three times.

Unfortunately, this year we ran into
an issue where we have a multitude of cases that
they were reported as being cases but they have
no documentation to back it up in their system.
So we have a name but we don't have an actual
case. So we don't know that it's actually a case and we can't count it.

So the short answer is no. There is not a system that I am aware of that can do what we are trying to do.

CHAIR BASHFORD: Thank you, Mr. Mason. I think we're ready for the Panel -- Service Panel on collateral misconduct. And that would be Lieutenant Colonel Kazin, Lieutenant Kraemer, Major Ervasti, Lieutenant Colonel Male, and Lieutenant Miller.

Good morning and welcome. Thank you for being here to share your perspectives on the collateral misconduct and the results of your studies. I'm going to start it off with one question and we'll see what the other Members have.

Do you all agree that you should be using the same definitions for the same terms as you're reporting data out? Because of some of your different definitions, the Army's figures showed a ten percent adverse action in collateral
misconduct and the Marine Corps showed a 92 percent adverse action, which seems absurd, until you realize you're talking apples and oranges.

So my question for each of you, and I guess we'll start with you, Lieutenant Miller, and go across: Do you think we should be using -- you should all be using the same definitions?

LT MILLER: Yes, ma'am, but I think this is just a function of the first time conducting this type of study.

CHAIR BASHFORD: And I noticed that Congress didn't actually give you very many definitions, I think, other than covered individual.

Lieutenant Male?

LT. COL. MALE: Yes, ma'am, uniform definitions would be useful.

MAJ. ERVASTI: Yes, ma'am, we agree it would provide a much more useful measure across the Services if there were uniform definitions. And our responses, for the Marine Corps anyway, would have likely been much different had the
term suspected of collateral misconduct been used instead of accused of collateral misconduct.

LT KRAEMER: I agree, as well, ma'am.

LTC KAZIN: Yes, ma'am, we generally agree that having universal definitions and there were attempts by Services to try to coordinate. This didn't actually come through like the Joint Services Committee but we basically got together and tried to hash out some of the distinctions of how the Services define things. But some of them are just cultural things of how the Service defines adverse information or adverse conduct and so there were some differences in those opinions. But we definitely made attempts to try to smooth out some of the differences, based on the lack of statutory guidance that was provided to us initially.

And so as I mentioned, it was the first time going through this iteration. We've definitely seen where the bumps are, and hopefully can smooth this process out, and clean up where there are distinctions and, also going
for the future, to get better data pulls.

MR. KRAMER: I'm sorry, Major, what
would be the -- I'm sorry, I can't pronounce your
last name. Is it Ervasti?

MAJ. ERVASTI: Yes, sir, Ervasti.

MR. KRAMER: What's the difference
between suspected of collateral misconduct and
accused of collateral misconduct? Sorry.

MAJ. ERVASTI: Yes, sir. So accused
of collateral misconduct, normally we think of an
accusation in the terms of a charge sheet or some
sort of formal accusation, where somebody is
being accused of something. Suspected would
include things like where a witness statement or
some other information came to the light of the
commander, where they could have been accused of
collateral misconduct but they weren't. And
that's where those numbers were not reflected in
the Marine Corps' or the Navy's responses.

MR. KRAMER: So they're treated
differently now?

MAJ. ERVASTI: No, sir, they're not
treated differently. They're just not captured in the numbers.

I think across the Services it's important to point out that when we analyze the numbers, we're all talking about a very, very small percentage of cases that we're dealing with in the first place. So for the Marine Corps' numbers, for example, 826 victims that we looked at, ten of them received any sort of adverse action.

Now, there were probably a higher number included where there was some sort of underage drinking or some sort of offense where the command could have taken action but there was no formal inquiry, no formal action taken. So we define those as being not accused of collateral misconduct because there was no accusation made.

MR. KRAMER: Thank you.

MS. LONG: And this is sort of maybe going out a little bit towards the end but I know that we're looking at this data for one reason but do the Services find this data important for
you, your work handling sexual violence cases?

Is it useful data to know if there are victims that are facing collateral -- consequences for collateral misconduct and what's happening to those cases, in terms of whether you feel you are improving justice, safety, or is this something that you just see as an exercise in people overseeing what you're doing?

LTC KAZIN: So from our point of view, it's useful in the sense, more of a policy sense, of when there are concerns about retaliation because retaliation is often linked to some sort of adverse action, of whether or not there is adverse action being taken against victims that might dissuade them from reporting.

And so separating social retaliation and social ostracism is one concept and looking at retaliation as in actual adverse act by the chain of command, knowing that overall the consistency amongst the Services of a very low percentage of actual adverse action helps us understand that yes, there are valid concerns
about retaliation but the reality of the overall percentages versus anecdotal stories tells a lot of those anecdotal stories are in the minority, in that one percent, and lets us focus more on what is probably the greater issue, which is social ostracism and how do we get after that to make that not a factor in victims coming forward to report.

CHAIR BASHFORD: Please go across and everybody answer.

LT KRAEMER: Absolutely, ma'am. I would agree with that as well. I think just having the data by itself is important. I'm sort of a proponent of that.

I also, as a victim advocate, too, I know it's important from that perspective because that's something that gets talked about as well, if you report sex assault, you know what kind of potential adverse consequences that might expose you to.

So I'm actually very glad that we took this time to get an answer on what the numbers
are on that.

MAJ. ERVASTI: Yes, I agree, as well, that it was very useful. And one trend that we hadn't been aware of before pulling these numbers is, at least in our case, is 70 percent of the victims who were -- received some sort of adverse action of collateral misconduct had had previous disciplinary action.

Say for example if a victim received an adverse counseling for underage drinking or some sort of offense, in 70 percent of the cases, there was a prior incident preceding the sexual assault. And that's important information for commanders because, from the commander's perspective, we can certainly see why it might be reasonable for them to feel like they need to take action but also understanding it from the victim's perspective as well. That certainly would be the toughest case for a victim to come forward and report having had previous adverse action in the past.

LT. COL. MALE: Yes, it's important
and we were glad to have the data. Certainly, we are all concerned and want to understand that there are circumstances that would dissuade a victim from coming forward because of the collateral circumstances.

LT MILLER: Yes, I think all the highlights have been discussed, at this point. The one thing I know it was valuable for the Coast Guard for was looking at a one-size-fits-all approach to collateral misconduct. But I think that was guided more by what was perceived instead of the actual numbers that we found because I think, as everyone here has stated, that the percentage of actual collateral misconduct is very low in comparison to what I think somebody who doesn't have access to these numbers would look at and say is happening because those are the cases that you do hear about the most.

So this gives actual data to drive policy decisions, as well as I think, as we've mentioned here, it reinforces the unit
commander's discretion and to address issues
where you might have other good order and
discipline issues that need to be addressed and
really can only be addressed in a very specific,
fact-specific scenario.

MS. GARVIN: Chair, thank you.

When you all were looking at what
constituted collateral misconduct, was there a
time frame that you were looking at in the data
that you gave? Was it coincident with the
alleged sexual assault? And then combining with
that, because I assume for most of you the answer
was yes, do you agree that you see sometimes
conduct that comes downstream after a sexual
assault that might be misconduct that could be
causally related potentially to the sexual
assault that would not be captured in these
numbers but could result in adverse action --
self-soothing behavior or self-medication later?

LT MILLER: Yes. It's a yes. So we
often had to look at whether or not -- how it was
captured in the investigation report initially
because that was our first pull. We went and got every case from the time period and identified that victim and pulled that -- and pulled that case.

In some of the cases we found, where the collateral misconduct was what was the impetus of the reporting. So we had an example of someone came up hot for cocaine and they were being processed for separation and adverse action, as is done under the Service regulations. And during that time period, during the administration of the adverse action is when the report came down.

So we considered that collateral because it was really very close in time and it could have been self-soothing or self-medicating to deal with the trauma. So that was captured in the overall numbers because we considered that to be collateral. That involves a little bit of judgment on our part because we could have just said well, it didn't happen until -- it didn't happen before, not after. So there's a little
bit of judgment there.

And in that particular case, the sexual assault was used as essentially mitigating evidence but they continued with the adverse action because it had occurred prior to the reporting. But the command used their discretion and said okay, we understand now that there was a sexual assault involved here and how that cocaine use might be related to that and they suspended all of the actions in it.

So at least the way the Army approached it was is that we looked at anything that was around that time period and then there was a specific -- you know we had each unit go through that case file and tell us hey, was this related to the misconduct or related to the sexual assault in any way, and we reported that back in our numbers.

LT KRAEMER: In the Navy, I mean all the collateral misconduct that we reported here was actually -- did have some direct coincidence with the sex assault. So it occurred, generally,
it was happening the same night, maybe just an hour, or during the assault. But that's not to say that we didn't also get, when we were collecting the data, we got some reports made from commands that didn't quite understand what we were asking for but they gave us reports of misconduct by the victim that happened afterwards that clearly had a connection to the sex assault. I mean you know the psychological trauma maybe led them to become engaged in substance abuse.

So we did actually -- we have that data but we didn't consider that to be collateral misconduct for the task here.

**MAJ. ERVASTI:** Yes, I agree as well. That would be incredibly useful data to have. And again, it wasn't included in the Marine Corps' numbers as well.

So we had a number of cases, for example, where we double checked what the command was sending us for numbers by pulling the records ourselves. In doing that, we would go through and see, for example, that the victim had been
NJP'd a month or two months after the report of sexual assault. So we would go back and say hey, double check this. Are you sure there was no punishment for collateral misconduct? And the command would come back usually saying yes, that was a totally separate incident. So, it was not collateral misconduct.

Now I do think having -- when we did go through all of those records, it was almost sad or heartbreaking to see the high percentage of cases where the person is being separated a year, six months after the report of sexual assault for something like a mental health condition or some sort of other underlying. So that is an issue that we did bring up and have addressed or at least decided that it warrants further study.

I do think that a study that looked at victims after they report a sexual assault, the percentages of them that six months, a year, two years down the road are separated or get out of the Service and what the reasons are that they
separate would be very useful and beneficial.

LT. COL. MALE: Thank you for asking the question, ma'am, because the temporal aspect is I think a key distinction between the definitions in the Services. The Air Force did something slightly different than the Navy in that we only included conduct that was happening at the time of the allegation that wasn't already known. Meaning, if it happened after, it was not included and then when we further reviewed our numbers, which were provided in supplemental -- by supplemental report, we also excluded that misconduct that was already known.

Our initial numbers were any misconduct that was happening, roughly, in the same course of the investigation but we excluded that misconduct that was already known because our understanding was that this study was to figure out if there's information that would dissuade a victim from coming forward. If the misconduct was already known, presumably, it wouldn't dissuade a victim from coming forward.
So for example, the Air Force had one victim who was already -- there was already a command-directed investigation for the misconduct. During the course of that investigation, a sexual assault was alleged, very similar to what the Army has described. But in that case, we excluded it because our understanding of the basis for the study was different.

LT MILLER: Yes, ma'am, I think that this would be of value but the Coast Guard did something very similar or identical to what the Air Force did, in that you had to have the sexual assault first in time and then the misconduct came next, so that the convening authority had to have been aware of both the sexual assault allegations as well as the misconduct for us to count it in our numbers.

We did not include anyone but the subsequent, what I would refer to as subsequent misconduct, did come up in certain cases.

Similar I think was the substance abuse, where
you had somebody several years down the road, either drugs or alcohol, and that was being processed for discharge and, through that, it came to light that there was a previous sexual assault.

But I think, as well, it would be very difficult in certain situations to understand you know what subsequent misconduct would look like, whether that is just a decline in performance or somebody that does get Article 15 punishment down the road, where what the actual causal link is to the sexual assault. I think when you look at separations, that might be easier but if you have a high performer and then all of a sudden their performance declines for them but they're still an average performer, or even slightly below average, you wouldn't be able to necessarily capture that that was directly related to the sexual assault like you would if there is the substance abuse aspect or -- thank you.

DR. SPOHN: So one of the things that we discovered when we looked at the data is that
the Services had a very different approach to what was called false reports, with the Air Force counting false reports as part of their data on collateral misconduct and the other Services did not.

So the question is: How did you define a false report? Did it require recantation by the victim or what was the -- what were the criteria you would use to determine that a report was false? And how did you make the determination that a report was false?

And do you think it's appropriate to consider issues of false report in collateral misconduct data?

LT MILLER: The Coast Guard, looking at our numbers, there were two incidents of false reports. One was actually from a third party that witnessed the sex act that was then discovered to be consensual during the course of investigation. And then there was another one where an alleged victim alleged sexual assault and it was determined that it was not a sexual
assault. Both of those numbers were included in our numbers, however, there was no adverse action taken for the false report, one, obviously, because it was a third party that perceived something that wasn't actually happening and the other instance, there just was no action taken. But both of those numbers were included in our collateral misconduct.

LT. COL. MALE: So it's difficult to know. I think what would be useful for us to know is whether a false allegation should or should not be included. It's logical that if the basis of the sexual assault allegation is found to be false, it wouldn't be collateral misconduct. So a recommendation would be to exclude that but certainly, goes back to the initial questions that uniformity in definitions would be useful.

At the Headquarters level, we didn't make a determination or define false allegation. We looked to whether there were circumstances or an allegation that there was a false allegation.
For the Air Force, there were five of those cases. In two of the cases, there were adverse action given. So that would have been at the command and the local servicing legal office whether they would have made that determination. So we left it at that.

We had additional cases where there were other false official statements that were not related to false allegations. We categorized those differently but we didn't make an internal definition of false allegation simply if there was a false official statement related to the sexual assault happening at all.

We also didn't include a similar but different question where there was a cross-claim of sexual assault. Those were a challenge. We had ten of those cases where there's an allegation of sexual assault and then the victim's collateral misconduct was that no, you sexually assaulted me -- or the accused, rather, said no, you sexually assaulted me. So we had a cross-claim. We found it challenging to count.
those. So we counted that as false official statement, not false allegation, whether it was a collateral -- I'm sorry -- we counted that as a sexual assault that was a cross-claim.

So we found those very challenging all relating to that question of false allegation.

MAJ. ERVASTI: And we did it the same way. So we did not attempt to get into the underlying merits of any one allegation.

We defined a false allegation as the command had taken action against that person, so either an NJP or a courts-martial for the false official statement.

We did have other cases. So there were five cases where a person was punished for making a false allegation and that was not included in the collateral misconduct report.

We did have other cases in the numbers that were included, where the timing and the nature of the way the incident was reported, led the commander to believe that taking action against that person was, nonetheless,
appropriate. For example, cases where say a person is pulled over for a DUI and then a month later at the NJP says you know I was driving intoxicated to flee a sexual assault that happened at an unknown location that I am not going to provide any statement to NCIS about. Cases like that, again, our position is we're not going to define that as false or true. We're not going to look at the merits of the allegation. We will support that victim in whatever way we can but the commander may, nonetheless, feel that it is appropriate to take disciplinary action against that person for the offense that was discovered by the command.

LT KRAEMER: So we looked -- we asked NCIS for data. So out of those total number of sex assault investigations that they handed us, they had a certain number of those where that investigation had sort of transitioned into an investigation for either perjury or false official statement against the victim. And then they had a case synopsis for each of those.
So then we took a look at a number -- five, I believe, in total. We looked at those and determined sort of what exactly were they investigating. Does this look like a false allegation of sex assault or was it just a false official statement that happened during the investigation?

If it was they determined that the false official statement or the perjury was actually tied to the allegation itself, we considered that to be a false report of sex assault. And then we looked at the case outcome and actually reached back out to the commands and asked them what adverse action did you take in those cases. We didn't consider that to be collateral misconduct. We just decided to include that in the report as an additional data point.

LTC KAZIN: So when we put our guidance out to the field on how to define collateral misconduct, we actually cited to the DoDI, to DoDI 6495.02, because they've got a
definition that is broadly defined as a victim
misconduct that might be in time, place, or
circumstances associated with the victim's sexual
assault incident.

And so false reporting is one of those
concepts that is it a true/false report, as in
someone is saying that it's not true, or is it
something not sufficient evidence? And so those
are two different things.

We identified eight cases out of the
154, where there was someone that received
misconduct that we identified as a false report.

 Typically, in CID reports, when we
close out a case, there is a distinction between
when we're closing it for insufficient evidence,
no probable cause, there is just not enough
evidence versus a false report.

So I would go back -- I would have to
go back and check those eight cases to see if
that's how they were classified in the report
themselves. But they were in the universe of
cases that we had pulled for that time period
and, because some would consider an allegation of false reporting to be collateral to the victim coming forward and making an allegation, I think that trying to get at the intent of seeing our people who are reporting sexual assaults somehow being punished and they're saying let's not, getting to that kind of concept of how many of those cases are out there. How many victims are being accused of making a false report? It is a useful data point and it seems to be a very low number.

MS. GARVIN: Yes. She asked me if I could take over.

MR. KRAMER: Thank you, Chair.

I have a question. I'm curious and it might make a difference to the victims. How does collateral misconduct come to light? And I can think of three ways, there may be more: the victim self-reports it and says you should know that something happened or later on tells; or the investigators uncover it somehow on their own; or the accused makes an allegation or says something
about misconduct.

So I'm curious about how the misconduct comes to light, generally, or maybe it's just all different ways.

LTC KAZIN: So many different ways they come to light. And if you look at the highest percentage of the ones that we saw were like underage drinking. Well, that's going to come out to light very early in the investigation, particularly if it's an alcohol-facilitated sexual assault. You're going to know how old everyone is and you're going to know everyone was drinking. So it doesn't really require self-reporting.

Sometimes it comes to light during the disciplinary proceedings. So, someone is being disciplined for fraternization and, during that disciplinary proceeding, they find they make an allegation during it of sexual assault. Sometimes it comes from third parties. It's just it can come -- which is why we threw a fairly broad net on the term accused.
And I agree, maybe suspected might have been better but the word accused has a very specific meaning in the code but we all know that accused in normal parlance just means that basically someone is telling you that you did something.

So because of the broad ways in which it can be reported, we tried to cast as broad a net as possible.

LT KRAEMER: I would agree with that. We didn't really look at how the collateral misconduct in each individual case came to light. We sort of, just for every single sex assault case, we contacted the command and just said hey, was there a collateral misconduct in this case; did you take adverse action? We didn't ask them how they learned about it, was it through the investigation, or some sort of independent command action.

MAJ. ERVASTI: And we approach it the same way. So it could have come to light in a number of different ways and we didn't break out
by and specify which way the command became aware of this collateral misconduct, other than to say, like we had discussed earlier, in about 70 percent of the time, the allegation of the sexual assault preceded the collateral misconduct. So it's those other 30 percent of times where the commander is already aware or tracking some sort of issue with misconduct and then the sexual assault allegation was made after that. So that's really the only way that we broke out that distinction.

LT. COL. MALE: I have nothing to add as to how collateral misconduct comes to light. And only just to emphasize an earlier point that we only examined it in light of the temporal aspect. So, just taking out those things that were already known that came to light as a command-directed investigation.

LT MILLER: I don't have anything else to add. We didn't look or break out how that report of collateral misconduct came about.

CHAIR BASHFORD: Since the number of
people that actually receive adverse consequences
seems to be quite low across the Services, that
would mean that the bulk of people don't receive
adverse consequences.

Are your Services tracking -- tracking
that in some way? Because I would think somebody
would then, if they are part of the whatever low
percent that received an adverse consequence
would say well, but this person also did underage
drinking and they got a pass; this is somehow
retaliation.

Let me start with you, Colonel Kazin.

Do you track that?

LTC KAZIN: We don't track it.

There's certainly guidance in our regulations
that commanders need to be cognizant of taking
action against the person who has alleged victim
of sexual assault. I believe it's in Army
Regulation 600-20 that often encourages to wait
until after all the other proceedings are done
with the sexual assault investigation and
disposition of those proceedings before
considering whether to take action.

It's also, by DoD requirement, held up to the special courts-martial convening level.
So we don't have company or even battalion commanders that are able to simply take action without going through some sort of higher review process.

So we haven't been tracking. A lot of times it doesn't happen because it's an exercise of prosecutorial judgment by what the commander, in association with what their judge advocate is saying. I see the larger issue here. In this particular case, I don't think any additional action is necessary. And that's where, again, we trust those special courts-martial level commanders to make that decision.

So we haven't been tracking it, outside of this right here, realizing that there's a very low percentage really of even those cases where there's an accusation. I mean of the 1200 cases that the Army identified, there's only 154 with the broadest net possible
identified as accused of collateral misconduct.

If you spread that across the size of our force, the Army being as large as and as spread out as it is, that's a very, very low percentage of even an accusation of collateral misconduct.

So it's not something that we've tracked right now but it's something that we're aware of and that's why I think that the withholding policy makes a lot of sense.

LT KRAEMER: So I concur with all of that. First, it's not something that we track, whether -- at least not now, if there's collateral misconduct sort of in the fact pattern of a particular case and whether a commander decides not to take action. We don't currently track that.

As far as you know tracking where adverse action is taken, obviously, now that there's an ongoing requirement to record that, we will be tracking that. In the Navy, as well, it was a very low number of cases in which it even happened. So it's not a significant thing that
happens.

MAJ. ERVASTI: I agree with everything that was said earlier. And the only thing that I'll add is the very low number of cases that we see would not include the informal type actions that might be taken by a squad leader or some sort of other leader. Say for example, informally counseling somebody or canceling their weekend plans as a response to collateral misconduct.

So it may be the case that victims might have a different perspective on our numbers than are reported because they might feel like adverse action was taken against them for collateral misconduct but it was something that was at a lower level that was not documented anywhere.

LT. COL. MALE: I would echo what's already been said by the other Services and also add, though, that even though as a policy there's a very low incidence of collateral misconduct and we tend to defer that to the end, at least
anecdotally, it's fair to say that we hear that
often victims want the collateral misconduct
addressed so that that's not an issue at trial.

So that's better addressed to one of
my colleagues in the trial division but that a
victim would want, say underage drinking, go
ahead and receive the punishment so that that's
not an issue and doesn't cast any doubt on the
accusation of sexual assault.

We don't formally track but, as a part
of the 140a uniform standards, we are adding
victim information into our case management
system. And so obviously, going forward for
purposes of this biennial report, we will track
and also we will be adding into our system
information about victims because, of course, all
military justice systems are accused-based at
this point and we're not tracking victim data but
we are interested to know both -- we have victim
information added officially and then any related
cases in the case notes.

So that is something that we're doing
as a result of the 140a Initiative.

LT MILLER: I think everything has
been hit. We are -- the Coast Guard is not
tracking in any type of real time, other than for
this report, collateral misconduct. And
currently, there's no specific guidance to
commanders. So I think that there is maybe some
ambiguity about what discretion does exist for
commanders to punish either for false reports or
collateral misconduct when there is a sexual
assault allegation.

MS. GARVIN: So going back to the very
start with you, Lieutenant Colonel Kazin, you had
said -- and thank you all for going down the
line, even when you're kind of saying I echo. It
really helps us understand. We don't assume one
Service agrees. So thank you for that.

Lieutenant Colonel, right at the
beginning, you had mentioned that you all had
tried to come up, definitionally, with some
common ground. And one thing that you noted was
that there was some differences of opinion of
those and like some cultural differences. And
then you said, for example, adverse. You gave
that as the example of maybe cultural differences
of definition.

And I just wondered if you could maybe
tell us just a little bit more what you meant by
that specific example.

LTC KAZIN: Sure. So almost everyone
agrees that Article 15 is adverse, and that an
administrative separation is adverse, or a
courts-martial is adverse. But in terms of a
reprimand --

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Microphone.

LTC KAZIN: I apologize.

So everyone agrees on certain
definitions of adverse Article 15, courts-
martial, administrative separation proceedings.
But things like non-punitive letters of reprimand
that are filed or not filed, so if you don't file
it, it's not considered adverse under certain
Army regulation definitions; it's the equivalent
of a counseling statement. But a soldier on the
ground considers it to be adverse to them if they
get a negative counseling statement or if they
get a negative comment in an evaluation. And we
consider negative formal evaluations to be
adverse information in their personnel files.

So that's where there might be some
differences because some things are handled at
the lowest level. It's what we try to do. It's
not adverse under any systems definition but it
might be perceived as adverse action against a
victim.

CHAIR BASHFORD: I think we're at our
time. I want to thank you all for coming. And
we're going to hold you, two years from now,
you're going to use the same time frame for the
same group of sexual offense, and you're going to
use all the same definitions. Correct?

Okay, great. Thank you so much.

And we'll now move on to our next
Panel. And I believe Judge Grimm has joined us
on the line. Is that correct? Judge Grimm, are
you on the line?
Okay, thank you for joining us this morning. We're going to be looking at the perspectives of Services' Military Justice Division Chiefs regarding conviction and acquittal rates, case adjudication process, and victim declination.

Thank you, Captain Tasikas, Colonel Pitvorec, Lieutenant Colonel King, Captain Monahan, and you've got a lot of light on that one, Colonel Pflaum. Thank you.

Meghan -- Ms. Peters.

MS. PETERS: Good morning. My name is Meghan Peters. For those of you who don't know me, I'm an attorney-advisor on the DAC-IPAD Staff. I'm just going to lead off with a question. The reference is the written responses we received from the Services in response to, I guess, a request for information that the committee sent previously. That's just for everyone's information.

And at the Chair's request, I will start off with the first question, which begins
for Article 32 preliminary hearings. Some Members of the committee have reviewed sexual assault case files indicating that the preliminary hearing lasted roughly 15 minutes because the Government called no witnesses. In those cases, trial counsel specifically provided the hearing officer with select documents from the investigative file for review.

Does the Article 32 Statute and its implementing rule, Rule for Courts-Martial 405, as currently drafted, provide an effective check against charges for which there is no probable cause?

CHAIR BASHFORD: Why don't we start with you, Colonel Pflaum?

COL PFLAUM: Sure. So I think it's safe to say that over the past several years, the procedural requirements of the Article 32 have diminished greatly. And one significant change is the statutory policy or the statutory change to eliminate the requirement for a victim to testify and as a result, in many cases, that's
the Government's most significant evidence.

And in those cases where a victim chooses not to testify, the Government is basically making its case based on the paper file.

And so I will say that those changes, over time, have reduced the procedural requirements of the Article 32 but I still think that it is a valuable check. First off, there is an experienced Judge Advocate looking at the case and at the evidence. There is also the opportunity for the defense to present evidence at the case. And I, as a former Staff Judge Advocate, have seen, even in those diminished proceedings, where an Article 32 officer will make notes or make findings that are relevant for me to consider and highlight to the convening authority when I am providing my advice on disposition.

So I think it has been -- was built into the system for a reason and I still think that reason exists currently.
CAPT MONAHAN: And I would agree with Colonel Pflaum but I would emphasize two points. First, that the Article 32, in its current form, still features a neutral and detached preliminary hearing officer providing advice to the convening authority, the Staff Judge Advocate, making a determination or recommendation as to probable cause. That is still value added.

And additionally under the current rules, R.C.M. 405(k) does give the defense, the victim, and the Government the opportunity to provide matters for the SJA, the convening authority, to consider that were not presented at the hearing itself. So there is an additional avenue in which information that is important to the determination of probable cause to be brought to the decision-maker who is the convening authority.

LT. COL. KING: I agree the Article 32 still performs a valid function. I think one thing that's not captured in the time lines that were mentioned, the 15-minute hearing, is that
these preliminary hearing officers are also
taking hours of video interviews with victims,
and other witnesses, or parties, and sometimes
even including the accused, where there is an
interrogation that's included.

So I think it's important when you put
the 32 preliminary hearing report into context
that it usually involves an interview with the
victim, a detailed interview with the victim,
that is usually an hour or two long that covers a
number of issues. So that's just an important
part that needs to be included in the analysis of
the preliminary hearing.

COL. PITVOREC: I will probably sound
like a broken record because I'm going to echo
many of the sentiments.

I do think that Lieutenant Colonel
King points out a really good point is that while
the hearing itself seems somewhat abbreviated,
that when you go back and look at the evidence
that is being reviewed and the time spent doing
that, sometimes you know victim interviews can be
four or five hours long, and they are reviewing
every bit of those, and they are all videotaped
now because the Military Criminal Investigation
Offices are videotaping both victim and suspect
interviews.

And so all of that stuff is being
provided and it's being reviewed by that
investigating officer. So while the content of
the hearing or the actual hearing may be very
abbreviated, I think that going through that
thorough investigation would take -- could take
hours and hours.

The other thing I would point out is
that oftentimes, I know the other Services do
this as well but, in the Air Force, particularly
with sexual assault cases or penetrative sexual
offense cases, we have sitting Military judges
that will be the preliminary hearing officer. So
not only are they neutral and detached, but they
are very experienced Military judges who have
been through the Military Judges Course, who
understand the probable cause standard extremely
well, who are able to then make a recommendation
to the Staff Judge Advocate that's well thought
out and well-reasoned.

    CAPT TASIKAS: I guess my view is that
the Article 32 has transformed itself from what
it originally had intended. And so in the
earlier intent, I think the Article 32 was more
of a tool for the defense.

    Yes, the IO was there to look at all
available facts and evidence and make an
impartial determination but it was a discovery
tool for the defense. And also the defense could
put on a very, very deliberate defense,
mitigation, and extenuating evidence as well.
That transformed in 2014, as we all know, and now
it's changed again a little bit in 2019.

    So from that standpoint, the original
purpose of Article 32 has changed. It's a
probable cause hearing. For those purposes,
alone, I think it's fine. Does it perfect the
Government's case? I don't think that's the
intent of the Article 32. It's put on as what is
necessary to get to PC.

Talking to some SJAs in the field, they are frustrated, as some of it is just a paper review and they do last as little as 15 minutes, where they just hand in, literally, the record of investigation. So from that standpoint, I don't think it's very helpful.

As far as the Government is concerned, it gives some notice to the defense.

So while there may be some other features that the other Services had talked about, I don't want to not highlight that there is some level of a paper shuffle. And I don't know how much more informed the convening authority and SJA are because of it because they can read the ROI as well.

CHAIR BASHFORD: Is the entire investigative file turned in? Are portions of it turned in? Is there a summary of it given to the 32 officer?

CAPT TASIKAŚ: So I just talked to an SJA yesterday about a particular case and it was
not adult sexual assault. It was child sexual
assault. And the Government put in a limited
amount of the ROI and, surprisingly enough, the
defense wanted the entire ROI submitted.

So I would say it depends on the
strategy and notion of the trial counsel itself.
So I think it's case-by-case.

I'm speculating, and I don't like to
speculate, I would assume that most of the time
it's just the full ROI but I couldn't be certain
for that.

COL. PITVOREC: For the Air Force I
know that we try to focus on the actual evidence
that's contained within the ROI. So we would
point to more of like the videotapes that were
done from the MCIO, as well as any statements
that are contained by witnesses that are not
present to testify.

But for us, the Office of Special
Investigations, their thoughts and feelings, and
the stuff that gets contained at the beginning of
the ROI, that does not go before the
investigating officer because I don't believe that's relevant.

LT. COL. KING: A similar response for the Marine Corps. In some instances, you may have an entire ROI that's presented to the Article 32 officer by the Government. But in some instances, we may look at a complete cell phone extraction that includes every text message that the accused sent for a one-year period. We wouldn't provide that entire enclosure to the investigation. We would pull an excerpt from it.

CAPT MONAHAN: And again for the Navy, it's case-dependent, similar to what the other Services have stated.

LT. COL. KING: And similarly with the Army, the Government puts on the evidence that they believe is relevant and helpful to obtain the probable cause. And there could be other parts brought in by other parties, to echo what the other Services said, but again, the Government typically starts with those key relevant pieces of evidence.
HON. BRISBOIS: So the Section 832(a)(2)(B), whether or not there is probable cause to believe that the accused committed the offense charged, that's the general provisions, giving the authority to the investigating officer. In some cases it's a Judge Advocate. Sometimes it's not a Judge Advocate with Judge Advocate advice. Sometimes it's a military judge or a military magistrate.

Regardless of the process, if there's a finding that there is not probable cause, that does not result in a dismissal without prejudice, does it?

COL PFLAUM: No, it does not. That's, in essence, a recommendation that would then go to the next level of convening authority, whichever convening authority appointed that investigation for their determination to the point that it's not binding on.

HON. BRISBOIS: So that's consistent throughout the Services?

COL. PITVOREC: That's correct.
HON. BRISBOIS: So it's really not a true preliminary hearing in the sense of my court, my federal courts or even the state courts, who have omnibus hearings or preliminary hearings, where the if the Government fails to show a probable cause, according to the judicial officer, the neutral detached hearing officer, the case is dismissed without prejudice. It can be brought back and renewed if further investigation gives a new basis but that's the end of the case. Right?

CAPT MONAHAN: So sir, in our system, that check is held at the Staff Judge Advocate level under Article 34 of the UCMJ. The Staff Judge Advocate of the convening authority would receive the preliminary hearing officer's report and if he or she determined there was no probable cause, that would be determinative.

HON. BRISBOIS: Is that consistent throughout the Services?

LT. COL. KING: That's correct, sir.

COL. PITVOREC: That's correct for the
Air Force, absolutely.

CAPT TASIKAS: As well as the Coast Guard.

HON. BRISBOIS: And the Staff Judge Advocate, however, though, is in the role of the legal advisor to the convening authority. So the Staff Judge Advocate is not, in a true sense, a neutral detached, as a magistrate judge would be or as a military -- because the military judicial system is a stovepipe standalone system, which their decisions, and their recommendations, or rulings cannot be adversely impacted on their careers. Correct? There's the independence built into the system.

CAPT TASIKAS: I think, if I may, the original idea I think of Article 32 and Article 34 was to ensure there weren't baseless charges that went to courts-martial. And then I'm talking again pre-2014. So taken together, those vehicles were to ensure, again, baseless charges or maybe like trivial charges that shouldn't see the inside of a general courts-martial anyways,
maybe a summary or NJP, those kind of protections were -- and so some of the features of the old Article 32 have carried over.

For example, the waiver still remains with the accused. So if the accused says I waive my right to an Article 32, of course that doesn't have to be accepted by the convening authority, but if they do that and then it's not required, then you don't have a PC determination under Article 32. It still resides with the convening authorities and the advice of the SJA.

The SJA's Article 34 advice is just to say hey, we have jurisdiction and there's probable cause; I believe these offenses were committed, and specification alleging the facts just to ensure the very basic aspects of a case go forward.

But the other features over conviction, or what form, and all those kinds of things, those are still reasonable determinations in the discretion of the convening authority with the advice of the SJA. It's just they're
different than the civilian context.

And so we tried to make an analysis to an analogize Article 32 with the civilian sector. I just think it's a different creature altogether, at least originally designed, and now it's kind of morphed into something else. And I don't think making a direct comparison is helpful.

COL. PITVOREC: I would agree, and I'd add a couple of points.

As a staff judge advocate I really tried very hard to evaluate the evidence that was presented at the Article 32 by the preliminary hearing officer. I tried to take a good fresh eyes look at what was going on.

As a staff judge advocate you are not, you are not personally involved in the court, so you are trying to pull yourself back and actually get a good perspective on not only what's going on in this particular case, but you should be reading into what's right for the good order and discipline of the unit that you are serving.
So, I think a staff judge advocate -- and sometimes that goes awry. Sometimes people get too close -- but the goal is really for the staff judge advocate, as they're advising a neutral and detached convening authority, to sit down and try to remain neutral and detached as well.

The other part of that is I know for the Air Force, and I believe for the other services, it's always a judge advocate who does an Article 32. It's always a judge advocate that's a preliminary hearing officer. And we try really hard to make sure that they have the right training and the right experience before becoming a preliminary hearing officer. But that's not always possible, given time lines and what's going on.

The staff judge advocate is not limited to the four corners of the document that is presented by the preliminary hearing officer. As you previously mentioned, the defense counsel, the trial counsel, and the SVC, or VLC for the
other services, the victim's counsel can provide additional information to the staff judge advocate that's going to the convening authority.

So, while the neutral and detached preliminary hearing officer gets evidence and can make a recommendation, the staff judge advocate is not limited to only that information that goes to the convening authority, and determining whether or not there's probable cause.

LT. COL. KING: Sir, the Marine Corps agrees with the position that the 32 preliminary hearing officers probable cause determinations should not be a binding decision. And it's important to look at both in a historical context in the role of the commander and the role of the SJA in that process.

The commanding -- the convening authority shouldn't abdicate their role in the process to the preliminary hearing officer. The SJA does have essentially the veto power with that probable cause determination. And they are in a position to look at the entire evidence for
a particular case, and also give the commander an informed decision.

And that's really what this process is designed to do. The Article 32 process is to help give the commander an informed decision on the evidence, and then the SJA also assists with that informed decision process.

I think the historical context is important because you look at the qualifications for the actual preliminary hearing officer. And in most circumstances, your staff judge advocate is going to be a more experienced judge advocate than the preliminary hearing officer. There are some instances where military judges have served as preliminary hearing officers, but that's not a requirement. And in that circumstance you may have a preliminary hearing officer that has less experience than the SJA, who is looking at the same evidence but is also using their experience to provide that commander with an informed decision.

CAPT MONAHAN: I echo that. But I
would also say there are checks in place that if either the convening authority of the staff judge advocate demonstrates less than official interest in the case, that individual can be disqualified from further participation in the case.

So, it is a complex system of checks and balances. And I would agree that although different, the federal civilian system and the military system are different, both have pathways to a binding determination of no probable cause there.

COL PFLAUM: And I will echo a lot of, a lot of the prior comments that my colleagues made in this. But the way, sir, I understood your question to start with that, that the staff judge advocate isn't somehow neutral and detached, they are, in essence, part of the prosecution. And it is true that the prosecution arm falls under supervision of the staff judge advocate.

But I think that the staff judge advocate is overall responsible for providing the
convening authority the advice on the military justice system. And they have an interest, and they have an obligation to advise that convening authority on those interests of discipline that might warrant prosecution, as well as justice and making sure that frivolous charges or baseless charges don't go to trial.

And so, I think the 32 informs that ultimate advice that that experienced staff judge advocate provides to that convening authority in making a decision to refer a case to trial.

And, again, the 34 advice, the advice under Article 34, 10 U.S.C. 834, is not just whether there's probable cause. That is, in essence, a low subjective standard of whether probable cause exists. The value and the key portion of the staff judge advocate's recommendation under Article 34 is the recommendation as to disposition. And so that's where the SJA is saying, yes, there's probable -- I mean, if there's a find by the staff judge advocate that there's no probable cause, that's
binding on the convening authority; the case can't proceed forward.

However, it's the recommendation where the SJA is advising that convening authority based on that experience, based on the full review of the case file in terms of what's the right disposition, whether it's referral to a court martial, or taking some other action.

HON. BRISBOIS: Thank you.

CHAIR BASHFORD: We're going to be asking some questions in a little bit about whether the 32 officer's finding of no probable cause should be binding. But I noted that in your introductory remarks these 32 judges were the most experienced, highly trained, very experienced military, experienced, had the right training, neutral and experienced until we start talking about whether their recommendation should be binding. And then maybe not so much.

(Laughter.)

CHAIR BASHFORD: So, my question for you before we get to that is if a finding of no
probable cause isn't binding, and if it's really
kind of a paper chase at this point, because I
believe very few complainants actually elect to
testify at the Article 32 these days, kind of
what's the point? Like, why not just, then just
go straight to the staff judge advocate?

If he's got access to more
information, like, why are we even, why are we
even bothering with having these very experienced
people taken away from their other duties to look
at hours and hours of video, and read through
hundreds of pages of paper.

Let me start with you, Captain
Tasikas.

CAPT TASIKA: Well, it's a good
question. And, again, I think I always like to
go back again to why the Article 32 came into
existence in the first place. And it was a check
of sorts against the awesome plenary authority of
the convening authority. Because it was not
necessarily open, but open. The accused had a
right to counsel, to cross-examine, to present
evidence, to even lay out a defense,
constitutional defense, mitigation, and
affirmative defenses.

And that was quite useful for the
convening authority because if there was a case
on the margins, they would want to have an
Article 32 to flesh those out. And maybe a case
would go away, if you will, because there wasn't
a strong inclination.

Now, with a probable cause
determination it's less helpful in that regard.
However, I think it does give some level of
protection to the accused again on those very
basic tenets of what they're looking for, the
scope of their current Article 32.

So, issues of, again, is a
specification actually a crime, is there
jurisdiction? You know, lately retirees have
become an issue of whether or not those are
jurisdictional issues. So there is just again a
floor that they're looking at, just a very basic
to ensure that a case going to the convening
authority has the very basic notions of jurisdictional and other substantive issues before they go forward with a crime.

I don't think it's there, again, to perfect a case for the government or for prosecution, it's just I think it's a very narrow protection, again, for the accused. So, in that regard it's helpful.

If we're thinking as being more broad or more expansive, then I would argue going back to the pre-2014 Article 32, which was very informative for both the defense and for the prosecution and convening authority.

COL. PITVOREC: So, I believe that the preliminary hearing officer does provide fresh eyes on a case. I think they can take a look at the form of the charges. They can recommend, particularly in penetrative sexual offenses, the greater offense, whether or not there's sufficient force, whether or not there's not force, whether it should be a lesser offense.

And I do believe that it still
provides the defense a forum to be able to
provide evidence. I think that is the unique
aspect of an Article 32 is that the defense has
the ability to provide evidence to the
preliminary hearing officer and, therefore,
really directly to the convening authority to get
whatever evidence that they deem is relevant and
necessary in making a recommendation as to
disposition of charges before the person who's
actually making that recommendation.

So, I do believe that it still has a
value to our system.

I will agree, however, that we've got
a lot more information in a prior iteration of
the Article 32. It was much more comprehensive.
We had a better idea what disposition of charges,
what the charges should look like, particularly
in an era where the charges themselves have
changed dramatically over the course of the last
probably I think 12 or 13 years. We've had many,
many changes to Article 120 over the course of
that time frame.
And so, having someone with fresh eyes look at it and make sure that you are looking at the right charge time frame for that particular iteration of Article 120 is important to look at.

LT. COL. KING: I agree. It does still have an important procedural function. The fresh eyes description is a good one.

I think that in addition to the points already mentioned, you have the ability to conduct a detailed charging analysis of this process. And focusing back on the informed decision for the commander, and providing the commander with an informed decision, the Article 32 also provides the staff judge advocate with a more informed decision. It provides a forum for the accused to present challenges to a particular charging theory, if there are charges.

So, the accused may not actually present a case, or testify, or call witnesses, but it does give the defense the opportunity to present challenges to the charges themselves. And it would enable the SJA to also have a more
informed decision.

There certainly can be some improvements, procedurally. In our written comments we mentioned that the ideal scenario would be to have a military judge serve as a preliminary hearing officer. We have not advocated for that military judge's recommendation to be binding.

But in certain cases in the Marine Corps where there is a complex charging theory, or if we're looking at some offenses that involve murder allegations or laws on complex allegations, we have brought in military judges to serve as the preliminary hearing officer. And in those instances we do feel that the commander and the staff judge advocate are provided with the most informed decision prior to referral.

CAPT MONAHAN: So, I believe that the system benefits in every case with Article 32, and that the defense and government can, depending on the facts of the case, derive a benefit from an Article 32 in its current
iteration.

With regard to the system, the current iteration of the Article 32 provides an opportunity for a qualified judge advocate to conduct a deep dive into the facts presented at the Article 32 preliminary hearing to include what is commonly submitted, several hours of investigative video, recorded interviews with alleged victims, witnesses, and sometimes the accused.

And that provides the preliminary hearing officer or PHO an opportunity to prepare a comprehensive charging analysis for the benefit of the staff judge advocate and the convening authority.

Now, if a case is particularly weak, whether or not the, whether or not the PHO's recommendation of, say, no probable cause is ultimately adopted by the convening authority, the defense can still gain a benefit from that comprehensive analysis because a well-written Article 32 PHO's report can oftentimes provide a
roadmap to an acquittal at a contested trial because it points out the flaws in the government's case, which a savvy defense counsel can use to his or her advantage.

But, in a particularly strong case I would argue that the government can use a well-written PHO report to its benefit because it can incentivize a guilty plea if a guilty plea is warranted under the facts, because the defense will see from a qualified, neutral and detached judge advocate laying out why the case is so strong against their client.

So, I do see that under, even under its current iteration the Article 32 does still provide benefits to all parties and, most importantly, to the system.

COL PFLAUM: So, I'm actually going to start by disagreeing with the marines on just one minor point, at my peril I believe.

(Laughter.)

COL PFLAUM: But just on the fact that whether you should have judges, a formal
requirement for judges on 32's if that rule was
taken away from that statement. And I think that
that is of value. And I've seen that in, for
example, perhaps a capital case or something
along those lines. But as a matter of practice,
I disagree with that, mainly from a logistics
experience, but also -- a logistics issue, but
also I don't think it's necessary

I think that, at least in my
experience, we had officers in the rank of major
who were judge advocates performing a PHO role.
And I think that they did a marvelous job, and
exactly what the Article 32 and R.C.M. 405 were
designed to get after. So, just on that point.

But I will agree with my colleagues
that it is still of value and on a number of
different levels. The first one is for me, as a
staff judge advocate, I benefitted from a formal
process by which the government presented its
case, the defense had an opportunity to present
its evidence. And that was given to me in a
report that I could then utilize in advising the
It's way too early in the full prosecution process to be, to be required to be binding. There's a lot of work that can be done. Like Captain Monahan referred to in his statement, after the 32, the case isn't complete at that point.

And, sir, you made the point that at the 32, if it were binding it could be dismissed with prejudice and the government could come back and try again. But that in the military process we require us going all the way back to the preferral process in cases, which could add time and delay.

Whereas, as Captain Monahan referred to, the government and/or the defense can take that 32 and fix the issues in the case and fix their case as it proceeds forward, as long as there's probable cause and the recommendation is to, is to dispose of the case by general court martial.

So, I do believe there's value.
was value to me in a formal process having a neutral and detached judge advocate look at both sides of the case, having the prosecutors bring their case to an outside party for evaluation, and getting that analysis by that officer.

DR. MARKOWITZ: So, some of you mentioned that while clearly there's value in this process, the process has changed. It's not what it used to be.

So, we've heard a couple suggestions about what you would like to see different. But from all of you, can you talk to us a little bit about recommendations to the 32 process that you would each like to see to make the process more meaningful?

And we can start with whomever.

COL PFLAUM: I can start. And I think that one, one issue might be to broaden the powers of the Article 32 officer to seek evidence that he believes, or he or she believes is missing in the case. I would start with that.

CAPT MONAHAN: And at the risk of
being unresponsive, I would say, I would remind
the committee that we are living in a time of
great change to the military justice system.
Just January 1st we instituted the Military
Justice Act of 2016, which is widely described as
the most sweeping change in the past 50 years to
the UCMJ.

So, I would be a voice of restraint as
far as great change, further great change to our
system to allow the years and recent decade or so
of changes to our system to play out so that we
can gather data before we make further
significant changes to the system.

But, of course, you know, I would not
be opposed to relatively minor changes at the
margins. So, I guess I'm a voice of restraint
for further great change.

BRIG. GEN. SCHWENK: So, our 25
changes start going 20, we should --

CAPT MONAHAN: General, I respect the
mission of the DAC-IPAD.

(Laughter.)
CAPT MONAHAN: But, in all seriousness, sir, I would respectfully counsel caution to further radical change to our system because every, every change of significance has second and third order effects that well-meaning people may not anticipate. And so that's all I'm saying, sir.

BRIG. GEN. SCHWENK: Okay. How about the Army's recommendation to go back to the days when the IO had the responsibility to go ferret out whatever the IO -- or the PHO, excuse me, the PHO had the legal authority to go ferret out whatever evidence the PHO thought the PHO needed in order to be able to write the report, instead of today having to beg the trial counsel to provide them the additional information? That doesn't seem like a very major change.

CAPT MONAHAN: I would tend to agree with you, sir.

BRIG. GEN. SCHWENK: Okay.

DR. MARKOWITZ: And for the record, I didn't find that to be non-responsive.
(Laughter.)

LT. COL. KING: At the risk of agitating Colonel Pflaum again.

(Laughter.)

LT. COL. KING: And I apologize, sir.

So, the recommendation on the military judge is certainly one that would require some study and some analysis logistically to see if it would be possible. We're a smaller service and have fewer cases to work with. But, so that is one that I think could use some analysis if that would even be feasible.

But some of the things on the margin for the 32 that I think we could improve or continue to improve are the capabilities to conduct remote proceedings, improve technology in our courtrooms that we could typically have these Article 32's, to perhaps open up the ability to call witnesses remotely that may not want to travel for a 32. That's one area that I think that we can improve the process.

And, it has gotten much better to hold
these remote proceedings. But it also, I think, can be improved in certain circumstances.

COL. PITVOREC: So, again, I'm just echoing a lot of comments. But I would like to point out that the current process that we have is a floor, not a ceiling. And so, I think that I think it's incumbent upon the services to push down to their young trial counsel that are presenting evidence that it doesn't have to just barely meet the probable cause standard.

And that's one of the things that we are constantly training our young judge advocates is, again, it's a floor, that you are building your case for probable cause. The government in and of itself, we should be transparent. We should be pushing evidence out there.

And just because the victim in a case can elect not to testify doesn't mean that there isn't buckets of evidence that either corroborates or doesn't that version of events. And so, to the extent that -- I don't know that perhaps changes on the margin -- and I definitely
agree that broadening the powers to seek
evidence, that there's a lot of stuff to include
digital evidence that's out there that would be
nice to be able to read -- but I do think that,
as the services, that we really need to be
pushing information down that says, look, just
because you can barely meet the probable cause,
or just because you have barely met the probable
cause, doesn't mean that's what this hearing was
intended to do.

And there's nothing wrong with adding
more evidence and letting people consider more
evidence in an Article 32 investigation. And we
really should be beefing that up I think
internally making those requirements. I don't
know that we need changes to the UCMJ, but I do
think that internally our services really should
be pushing down information that says that you
need to be doing better. You need to be adding
more evidence.

Just because it's a floor doesn't mean
that you just need to barely clear that. You
need to add what would be helpful to the convening authority to make that informed decision.

CAPT TASIKAS: I think it's a good question. I'll just add that I don't want to imply that people are lamenting about the current Article 32, I think it depends on where you sit, where you stand kind of adage. And so, if you are perhaps a trial counsel or an SJA, you find that very valuable.

But there was a policy determination a few years ago to change the Article 32 to take the equities of a victim in play and allow her to say into the system or see a case go to court martial because of the perceived notion of Article 32 as it was currently constituted, so, or back then anyway.

So, there's no perfect fix. I think what you do is, you know, there's pluses and minuses in every system, you just have to know what you're losing out by changing, and what you're gaining by what you're changing. So,
there's no perfect, I think, system.

You know, again, talking historically,

when the military first brought in lawyers, I'm sure the convening authorities and commanding officers weren't happy with that. And a few years ago, when the SVCs were brought in, a lot of people weren't happy with that. But now they're part of the system and part of our culture of the military justice system and they're facilitating a policy objective, if you will.

So, I wouldn't suggest that we change Article 32 just for changing it for lawyers, for convening authorities.

I think, and then one last point, I think the -- you know, going back prior to 2014, convening authorities would take those tough cases to Article 32 to flesh them out so they don't go to court martial if they were particularly weak cases. So, now you're going, just going to see more cases go to court martial and maybe get a higher acquittal rate. That's
just the reality of how it is.

And so, if you're willing to live with
that, then I think Article 32 is okay. If you
want to have Article 32 as more robust so you
don't have to go to court martial, then the old
system was probably better.

But, I wouldn't say better, I would
say it's different; right? And that's how I
would look at it.

CHAIR BASHFORD: Ms. Peters, we're
going to move on to Section 2. If people want to
come back and we have time, we just have a lot to
cover with this panel.

MS. PETERS: Yes. The next question
concerns the referral process. The Air Force RFI
response to the military justice division says
that when a victim wants to participate in the
court martial and the standard of probable cause
is met, a case will typically be referred to
court martial to allow the victim to have his or
her day in court.

How does this approach incorporate the
non-binding disposition guidance factors such as
whether the admissible evidence will likely be
sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction in
a trial by court martial?

And I would request, I think this
question is designed to have the Air Force
respond and then have the other services weigh in
on the weight they'd give to that factor, the
ability to obtain and sustain a conviction at a
referral.

COL. PITVOREC: Thank you. I know the
Air Force is the outlier on this because we work
at the probable cause standard, and the referral
standard, and take into consideration the wants
of the victim. And when we evaluate whether or
not that probable cause standard has been met,
and we have a cooperating victim we choose to go
forward.

I know that is not necessarily --
excuse me -- what every other service does. And
I respect that they have the right to differ in
their opinion.
What I would say to that is that we have a lot of cases that go forward and evidence is developed as we're going forward on that case. Evidence is accumulated. We are gathering information. And we are going out -- and, again, as I've mentioned before, that you should be corroborating every fact of consequence that you can that the victim asserts in her testimony.

And if you're doing that, you can get convictions in cases that you didn't previously think, that you didn't previously think were a slam dunk, or that -- or take into consideration that there was a probability or a high probability of a conviction. And so, if we are training our prosecutors to do their very best, and you have a credible, reliable victim that wants to participate, we feel strongly that the probable cause standard allows us to go forward in that case and give the victim the opportunity to say what they want to say in court before the military judge and members, and whoever else happens to be present.
CHAIR BASHFORD: Go through and see what the rest of the services say.

CAPT TASIKAS: So, I would like to think that our service is different. But I would suggest that probably the Air Force -- I mean the Coast Guard probably has a similar mindset with convening authorities. If you have a victim who is willing to participate in the military justice system and would like to see their case go to court martial, that is a huge, you know, ingredient in the convening authority's decision making process.

And then the conviction, the likelihood of conviction is important, very important, significant, but probably not determinative.

So, in that regard, I think it is a little problematic because convening authorities are not going to be second guessed if they send a case to court martial. They will be if they don't, especially if you have a willing participant in a court martial case.
So, there is a little bit of friction there that you cannot deny, you know, I think if you look at this objectively. And so those, you know, some outside observers may view that as problematic. Now, they get a fair trial and that's what, you know, they're entitled to, so in that regard it's a fair process. But there is certain factors in there that I think are maybe different in these type of cases than in others.

LT. COL. KING: I agree with the Coast Guard's perspective that the strength of the evidence is certainly a factor. It's an important factor. And I would say that the victim preference and the strength of the evidence in the sexual assault case are probably the two most difficult factors to weigh, considering the other Appendix 2.1 factors.

In a sexual assault case, kind of leaning towards moving forward to a court martial, such as the seriousness of an offense, leaning towards moving to a court martial.

And I also agree with Captain Tasikas
that in most cases, similar to the Air Force, in most cases where the victim wants to move forward and the evidence may not certainly result in a conviction, we're going to lean towards moving forward to a court martial. And a lot of that centers around the fact that determining the likelihood of a conviction is just so difficult at that stage of trial when you haven't seen sworn testimony at that point from any of the witnesses or the victim, and we're going to err on the side of moving forward in that circumstance.

Now, there are certainly some situations where you can look at the evidence and determine that it is very likely this is going to result in an acquittal. But, in sexual assault cases that situation is rare, it's very rare. So, we find ourselves in a similar position where we're going to move forward in most of those circumstances where we have a victim that wants to participate.

CAPT MONAHAN: So, I believe that the
likelihood of conviction, the likelihood that
there's evidence supporting conviction, which is
a factor in the Article 33 mandated non-binding
guidelines is a very important consideration for
convening authorities when they bring cases
forward because, as a system of justice, we
should take hard cases to trial, cases that may
not -- that, you know, it's not clear if a
conviction will be obtained or not, we should
take those hard cases to trial.

But on the other hand, cases that,
although meeting the probable cause standard,
have a very low probability of success, I think
that in the vast majority of cases it's not
advisable to take those cases to trial. And, if
we do take those cases to trial that have a very
low probability of success, then I believe that
if they inevitably result in acquittals, there's
no gain for the system.

I believe the Navy's VLC program in
their response has indicated that although all
victims are different, their VLCs in the field,
what we call our SVCs in the field, have when
queried said universally most victims feel a
negative emotional effect after full acquittal,
which is intuitively obvious. Right?

But then you look at the accused. And
I believe our defense counsel assistance program
representative might testify that many accused
who are found not guilty of a sexual assault
offense many times after that acquittal will
leave the service because they feel that the
service has turned their back on them through
this ultimate process.

And then, from a systemic process,
from a systemic standpoint I also believe that
it's inadvisable to take cases with a very low
probability of success to trial because those,
that case may consume vital resources that might
be otherwise dedicated to cases that have a
stronger chance for success.

So that's, those are my thoughts on
the matter.

COL PFLAUM: So, to start, first-off
from the Army's perspective I would not characterize it as a policy or an advised best practice in the Army that if there's probable cause and a victim wants to go forward that we go forward as a matter of course. Victim preference is, of course, a key consideration. It's listed in the non-binding disposition guidance. And it is a factor that weighs on SJAs in advisement to convening authorities as important to the convening authorities because there, in the interests of justice, the victim's views and desires matter and are important.

But that has to be considered in light of all of the other factors that others have articulated in determining whether to take a case to trial, of course the availability of admissible evidence to obtain and sustain a conviction. So that is -- it is there is no mathematical formula that I use or that I'm aware other SJAs use to say, you know, victim preference is, you know, 65 percent, et cetera. It's all provided in the package that's advised -
- brought to the convening authority to make a disposition decision on that case.

But that disposition, the decision to refer a case to trial is based on probable cause. And as we've articulated I think throughout, there is other evidence that's obtained. There are other investigative efforts that continue to take a case as that case is approaching trial. And one of those is input from the defense. And that's one factor that as this process is proceeding the defense does have a say in an adversarial process, and so they can choose to participate in Article 32 or they could not. But, certainly at trial they have evidence, they have a side of the story that comes out that affects, that affects conviction rates.

And so, as the referral decision, there is a need to consider all of the criteria in advising. But to just make a disposition decision solely -- well, to make a disposition decision there's a lot that can change after that initial disposition decision.
And I would be loath to advise a convening authority in a case where a victim wants to participate and the evidence is otherwise strong to not go forward because there is also a risk of criticism. I think as easily as there could be slides up there talking about conviction rates, there could also be slides up there talking about non-disposition rates to where a command has elected to choose some alternative disposition or to not try a case that someone else thought was otherwise meritorious.

COL. PITVOREC: I think we both want to add something. I just wanted to add that I think one of the things that we're seeing routinely these days is that the Special Victims Counsel and the Area Defense Counsel or the defense counsel on the case begin talking and discussing alternative dispositions that would not otherwise happen if we weren't referring cases to trial.

So, I do think that we have a high incidence of a discharge in lieu of court
martial. We have a high incidence of ideas of how the victims and the accused can both be satisfied with the process. But that only comes after referral. And I think that's an important factor.

I'm not saying the Air Force does it specifically to get to that, the idea is that we're going to trial, I think the reality is that there are alternate dispositions that are available that are sometimes used and utilized based upon that decision to go forward in the case.

CAPT TASIKAS: If I can add, the system is designed, again, for a military context. So why -- you know, we've talked about reasonable likelihood of conviction and a low probability of conviction. Those are easy calls. And there's ambiguity in between there. And we have a probable cause standard.

So, I would envision a convening authority under probable cause in a case of sexual assault to court martial because,
example, you have a very senior officer or commanding officer who is having an affair with a married subordinate, for example, and then there might be some issues with favoritism or fraternization. And if the person wants to break it off there is a coercive nature, just because it is the rank differential.

So, you would send that case for a court martial with the sexual assault allegation because you still have fraternization, you still have adultery. And that's why you have the probable cause standard for sexual assault.

Now, you may not get the conviction for sexual assault because it's somewhere between low probability and reasonable likelihood. You just, you may. You know, there's always a possibility. But the point is, is that those type of cases are where I think a military justice context is different than the civilian context of sending sexual assault cases to a trial. Those are the type of cases that the system is designed to ensure convening officers
or convening authorities have that flexibility to
display certain issues in their command culture
in a case, even though maybe the Article 120 is
not likely to get a conviction.

COL PFLAUM: And if I may piggyback on
that a little bit. Again, the trial and the
court martial system is the ultimate adversarial
fact finding process that we can utilize to get
after -- not get after, I think to look at these
very close, very difficult, very serious cases
and allow either a judge or a panel to look at a
full range of evidence in an adversarial process
to come to a finding of fact on a criminal
offense.

CHAIR BASHFORD: We jumped ahead a
little more than we had planned to. We're not
letting you off the hook on Article 32 quite yet.
But I think, Ms. Long, you had a question about
this section.

MS. LONG: I did. But it was raised,
so I'm going to ask a question. If you think
it's beyond the scope, I can keep it.
Because it's been raised many times, this term reasonable likelihood of conviction, which I'm curious what the, what the definition is that you're using. Because what the research tells us, and the experience is that this is an area where speculation typically takes over analysis. And as you sort of rightly pointed out when you describe your practice here, that determining a strong or a weak case is, could be subjective and can be based on how experienced you are analyzing things.

And I'm wondering objectively what is your test for determining that?

CHAIR BASHFORD: Starting with Colonel Pflaum.

COL PFLAUM: Yeah. I think you hit the nail on the head, ma'am. It is, it is inherently subjective. And it is based on our experience within the military justice system what we have seen in terms of how cases are presented, how evidence has been, has been received by the fact finder, what evidence can
get into trial. But, also, an evaluation of the
case file. Is there -- in overall evaluation of
the case, is there a readily available defense?
Is there inconsistent statements made? Is there
evidence in the trial that tends to negate guilt
or that cuts against a story?

And so, again, the reasonable
likelihood of conviction is in providing that
advice, the staff judge advocate is looking at
the entire case file, understanding the court
martial process, the dynamics of the particular
case. Because this applies in sexual assault, of
course, but also in every case that we try, to
make our best assessment. And it is that: it's
an assessment.

I don't think that there can be
necessarily a mathematical or scientific approach
to it, but our best assessment of the likelihood
of success at trial.

MS. LONG: And just in following up,
because you're saying with your experience in the
courtroom and your experience with your panels,
and that makes me think that it could be leading
to self-fulfilling prophecies of we put these
cases forward, our panels don't like them. And,
therefore, when we're assessing reasonable
likelihood of conviction perhaps this isn't a
case that should go forward, rather than
thinking, okay, looking at all of the available
admissible evidence, looking at the elements of
the case, should a reasonable, educated jury,
panel, determine someone's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, not will they based on our
experience.

I don't think you meant that but I
didn't -- I just wanted to make sure I understood
what you meant.

COL PFLAUM: I understand. No, I
think that, again, we are applying -- rather than
this specific judge or this specific panel, we
are applying. I'll say this, I have applied and
I believe others apply a standard of sort of what
a reasonable fact finder would -- how a
reasonable fact finder would come out on this
case.

MS. LONG: Would come out or should come out?

COL PFLAUM: I think that's a good question. Let me think for just a moment, but.

(Laughter.)

MS. LONG: And you can think. I don't want to determine --

MS. LONG: Yeah. No, I mean I think that's a tough question, right, because now I'm substituting my judgment for the fact finder. But I think, I think should come out is fair. But, again, that's not my call.

And, also, at that stage in the trial I have not heard all of the evidence, so I think it would be precocious a bit to suggest that I know everything at this point, that I'm providing advice to say they were wrong, they came to the wrong conclusion should they come to a conclusion opposite of mine.

MS. LONG: Thank you.

CAPT MONAHAN: And I would agree that
it is at its core a subjective standard. So it's
difficult to arrive at an objective standard.

But I, I would agree that a workable
objective standard would be looking at the
evidence, based on your experience, what should a
reasonable finder of fact return a verdict of.
And I think that would be a working, a workable
approach to the issue.

LT. COL. KING: Ma'am, I think when we
conduct our analysis and give recommendations to
the staff judge advocate, or when the staff judge
advocate gives the recommendation to the
convening authority, really the standard should
be factual and legal sufficiency to obtain and
sustain a conviction.

And so, yes, we're going to rely on
experience but we're also going to look at the
appellate case law where appellate courts do have
a factual sufficiency review that gives us the
ability to look at what facts might have been
reversed by the appellate court. And then, of
course, the legal sufficiency.
So, when you're dealing with some of the Article 120 offenses that -- where the charging theory is incapacity, looking in detail at whether or not a certain legal standard has been met for incapacity based on the fact patterns you have, and this really surrounds a lot of, some of the incapable of consent due to impairment by intoxication and situations where you may have a blackout that's involved.

And going to the actual case law to review the factual and legal sufficiency would be a standard that we're, that we should be focusing on as well.

COL. PITVOREC: I'm probably glad that the Air Force now just, you know, answered the question originally the way that he answered. And so, the idea of reasonable likelihood, I mean obviously that is not what we use, and I'm not saying that we shouldn't. I'm just saying that we look at the case in a much more clear-cut fashion and try to remain objective about what the probable cause standard means and, again,
looking to, you know, the desires of the victim in wanting to go forward.

But we do assess the credibility of the victim when making that recommendation. If there is a victim that is wholly, you know, contradicted by all the other evidence of the case, I mean, we're not, we're not blind to that. We don't just blindly follow the victim wants to go forward. We do assess the credibility of the victim and whether or not the victim is supported or contradicted by other evidence in the case.

But I do appreciate that we have a much more clear-cut standard that may be not as -- probably -- it's all subjective, but it's maybe not as falls to the subjectivity that, you know, reasonable likelihood of conviction is.

CAPT TASIKAS: I just think it's one of those things that if you're an experienced trial counsel, prosecutor, and you're kind of aware what you have. You know, I'm from Greek descent. My mom knows when the spanakopita is done because she's done it so many times, right,
and I don't. And I think when you see it from afar and see what you have, you can make those kind of -- to say subjective it's not just, you know, a layperson's perspective. They know the cases and are aware of what evidence they have to get to the reasonable doubt standard.

The variable is how people are going to hold up in court. Maybe you get an adverse ruling. Maybe the testimony of your key witness falls apart at the last second. Those things are a reality.

So if you're surprised, or from afar like where I am in policy in headquarters, I can almost kind of project the ones that are going to have an acquittal. There are some cases where I'm, like, that's a good case, that's going to get a conviction, and then something happens in the court and you're surprised by those.

And I think those are the reasonable likelihood that you think that the members should have come back with a conviction. For some reason they just didn't buy the argument the
government had. That happens. That's part of the system we have.

But to say that we don't tee up cases that we pretty much know we're not going to get a conviction, I think that happens in our system for sure. And I don't know, you know, that's just a policy call and a judgment call by the convening authority and allowed, the system allows for that, so.

MS. TOKASH: Many of you talked about other evidence that's presented to the staff judge advocate after the preliminary hearing. My question is, could you give some concrete examples of what type of evidence that might be and why prefer charges if you don't have that evidence prior to preferral?

CAPT TASIKAS: I'm going to defer to my colleagues. They might know a little bit more of that than I do from where I am in my experience.

COL PFLAUM: So, one example might be DFE. So, it might take a long to get DFE.
MS. TOKASH: And that's a digital forensic examiner?

COL PFLAUM: I'm sorry, digital forensic examination that might reveal evidence. There may be a discovery request that comes in at trial to tell the government to look in a particular place for evidence. And we look there and find some evidence, either inculpatory or exculpatory.

And another example that I just had and now I lost it. But anyway -- oh, witnesses that the defense may find that the government didn't have at the preferral stage.

So, as the defense starts to do their investigation they talk to witnesses that perhaps the government didn't find, didn't know about, didn't interview, and bring forward either sworn statements or eyewitness testimony that they didn't have at that time.

And so, I think that raises an important point. There are times where just because a case was preferred to trial does not
prevent an alternative disposition down the line
should the case change in a significant way. And
so, and actually I think this is raised -- and I
can't remember where it's raised in the written
products -- but the issue of delay in
investigation to adjudication of a case. And one
concern that I had as an SJA, and I still have in
our system, for many of the reasons that Colonel
Pitvorec raised, is if we wait till our case is
perfect at preferral we -- it can be perhaps too
long.

And by preferring, it triggers
processes that help us determine the right answer
on a particular case.

CAPT MONAHAN: And I agree. In the
electronic age, electronic evidence is something
that does take time to develop due to the demands
on the forensic examiners. Additional witnesses
may come to light as a result of that. And just
the ebb and flow of the trial process or the
pretrial process usually brings at least some
amount of evidence to the fore that was not
present at the time of preferral from our
perspective.

MS. TOKASH: And so, could that be a
reason that if a PHO finds, determines what I
consider a threshold constitutional issue of
probable cause, if a PHO finds no probable cause
could that possible be -- this additional
evidence could be, the SJA could reverse that no-
PC decision based on this additional evidence?

CAPT MONAHAN: Yes, certainly.

LT. COL. KING: In addition the
digital evidence, I've also seen evidence of
mental health of the accused to be something that
is still a matter that's pending at the 32
process. So, the R.C.M. 706 proceeding to
examine the accused mental capacity at the time
of trial where lack of mental responsibility
could be something that's pending.

And I think one important note is that
during the trial itself the defense does have the
ability to raise an issue to reopen the Article
32 process.
COL. PITVOREC: I think MJA, the Military Justice Act of 2016 actually changed the landscape a little bit. Prior to that, which just, obviously, we talked about earlier was implemented in January of this year, trial counsel does not have the ability to issue subpoenas until referral. And so, when you look at that landscape about how long it took before we could issue subpoenas in a case, that there were, there was so much information that you got but you only got it after the case was referred to trial.

And so, when we're talking about going out, especially with social media that requires a subpoena, so if you're looking at the victim's social media account, my children tell me that it's not Facebook, that it has to be Instagram because Facebook's for old people. So, I'm sorry if all of you have Facebook; we're all old.

But, you know, the Instagram account that's owned, you know, you have to reach out. We were limited to waiting until referral of the
case. So there's really no way to, quote-unquote, perfect a case prior to referral because you didn't have subpoena power.

And so, MJA 16 has changed that landscape but we don't know yet exactly what that's going to look like because all of those things have not yet been implemented. So, we're still waiting to see how that all plays out. But there's a lack of evidence that kind of comes in, that used to trickle in basically after referral. Obviously, when trying to make a probable cause determination that's not necessarily helpful. But knowing that it's out there, knowing that those -- you know, you can go out and see maybe not on Instagram but on Facebook, if you could see the post you could see what people are saying. It's just going back and getting, you know, that provider to provide that information. That's incredibly important.

MS. TOKASH: And so we, basically, have been reviewing cases -- at least the Case Review Working Group where we see this trend.
And, again, we don't know what it means, but we've seen a trend where the preliminary hearing officer finds no probable cause. The staff judge advocate says I disagree, there is probable cause. The CG refers to trial, and then it ultimately ends in an acquittal on the substantive offense of sex assault.

You know, so we're, I guess what we're really trying to find is the why behind there. And there's a lot of variables I'm sure.

CHAIR BASHFORD: If you could just -- because a lot of you said one of the reasons you don't want the either highly qualified or not so qualified Article 32 judge finding of no probable cause be binding is because so much information comes in prior to referral. You've talked about information that comes in post-referral, developed at trial.

If you could just focus on that one chunk of time, what would, what would come in that would take a no probable cause to a probable cause non-binding likelihood of success at trial.
referral decision?

I understand things can come in post-referral. Defense can come forward, I don't think there's anything stopping defense from coming forward pre-referral either. But could you just focus on that chunk of time in response to Ms. Tokash's question?

COL. PITVOREC: For the Air Force I think some of the things, like as I was saying before, the social media. So, if somebody goes to a social media page and does a print screen, that's not going to be provided to the preliminary hearing officer.

So, something that somebody may have posted on social media we may be able to look at it but that's not going to have the necessary parameters for the preliminary hearing officer to take a look at that and say, yes, that's something I can consider. It doesn't, it doesn't meet any of the standards.

But that's something that the staff judge advocate may be aware of. There are
different things throughout social media, different information, witnesses that were not available.

So, again, as we talked about before, we have a lot of -- we, I think all the services are still deploying at a high rate, and people are deploying and going overseas. To the extent that you cannot get them back or they didn't make a statement in the case that may have evidence, if they're willing to write a letter or provide evidence if the trial counsel is able to find them, or the defense counsel is able to find them and they're able to gather that evidence, they can provide that to the convening authority but that maybe not be something that would be considered by the preliminary hearing officer.

So, all of that kind of extrinsic evidence, if you will, can be gathered up and provided to the staff judge advocate and, therefore, to the convening authority in making that decision. But that may or may not be something that could be considered by the
preliminary hearing officer based on whatever the
rules of evidence that apply to that preliminary
hearing.

COL PFLAUM: Just one thing to offer
is at least under the new rules the, oftentimes
the 32 preliminary hearing officer doesn't have
the full benefit of the victim's testimony
because of their election not to participate in a
preliminary hearing. And that is the trial
counsel, the special victim's prosecutor
assessment of the victim may weigh in the staff
judge advocate's decision, and may sway their
opinion on probable cause different from the
Article 32 officer.

But I, actually, also too would be
curious -- and I don't have the data in front of
me -- to understand the number of cases, you
know, how statistically significant the
difference is in cases where the PHO found no
probable cause to where they did find probable
cause and then it still ended up as a result in
acquittal. And that's because of the wide gulf
that differs between probable cause and beyond a reasonable doubt.

And so, even in a case where there is, you know, again, the 32 PHO's determination that there is not probable cause is a strong signal to everyone involved in the process that this case is a difficult case and there are issues with it that everyone needs to look for. But just because there is probable cause found, does not equate to a conviction at a criminal trial because of the beyond reasonable doubt standard.

So, I'm a little bit, I would be concerned about, you know, signing -- anyway, I would just be -- that needs further study, from my perspective.

MS. CANNON: I hail from state court criminal defense. And we have preliminary hearings that are binding and can be overruled with legal process by the prosecution.

The concern I have with some of the things that you're pointing out as problems of proof availability at the 32 is that, if it were
binding, wouldn't you be inclined to be ready and take the time if you need continuances, and be ready with that information? We have media. We have all kinds of things that you're talking about available at the prelim.

And if it was binding, that might, one, get you already, and; two, influence this number of cases that you're dealing with post-32 where you're angst over it's close, it's weak, she should have a right or he should have a right to have his day in court or her day in court.

Meanwhile, there is a suspect that's having to deal with the consequences. And waiting for that trial when it could have gone at the 32 is something to balance.

So, the question I have is would a more binding effect at the 32 alleviate some of these concerns, as I've just described, and get rid of some of these weaker cases where you can turn to the victim and say, you know, we don't have anything more to provide to overrule that judge or that magistrate. Because if it's just
another set of eyes, that doesn't really help you make that decision, the decision is still in your lap.

So, your thoughts.

COL PFLAUM: I think that forcing the government to have its case in essence complete at the 32, I can't say that there is not value in that. Right? I mean, the obvious -- it appears to be common sense that the government should have its strongest case as early as possible.

I would be concerned about two things. And the first is, is the -- well, let me just, I think I'll say my concern is that that may be unnecessary delay in waiting until the -- it may cause unnecessary delay in waiting for that 32 to -- the case can continue to improve as it's working through the process. There is a value in, at least in the military justice system, of allowing a case to proceed versus waiting too long before an initial disposition decision.

CAPT MONAHAN: So, I certainly take your -- sorry.
MS. CANNON: I'm sorry.

CAPT MONAHAN: I'm sorry. I certainly take your point as far as it may, it may force the government's hand to have a better case to present prior to going to the 32. But I think if we were to go in that, go down that road it would negate the role in our system of the staff judge advocate who does currently possess the check, who holds, he or she holds the probable cause check in his or her hands.

And in our system, although we have, we do have qualified preliminary hearing officers serving in all of our cases, oftentimes they are not as experienced as the staff judge advocate. And so it might be more appropriate for the staff judge advocate to retain that role to serve as the probable cause check.

LT. COL. KING: Ma'am, I'll loop back around to answer your question. I'll loop back around to Ms. Tokash's question as well as to what additional evidence is a convening authority considering to sway them in that small window.
And in my experience I haven't seen new evidence really being the thing that might sway a convening authority to move forward. It's contrary analysis, contrary analysis by the prosecution who is working with the SJA to provide that informed decision.

So, I haven't seen many instances where there's evidence that's outstanding that comes in after the Article 32 that serves to sway the proceeding.

And so that moves over to your question, ma'am, that really if it was a binding proceeding then that process would require the convening authority to abdicate that role of making the ultimate disposition decision. And it would also cut the SJAs' informed decision and informed advice out of the process.

COL. PITVOREC: So, Ms. Cannon, you really have hit on probably every debate that we have had internally within our office probably for the last 5 years. Because this is a, it is a difficult decision.
And we talk about binding versus non-binding, whether or not it should be a military judge, whether it should be just an experienced judge advocate that has, you know, lots of military justice experience, and trying to get to the heart of that.

As many of you know, you put, you know, four lawyers in a room together you're going to have four different opinions. And so, but I think on something as important as probable cause, I mean, I would like to see cases that, that only meet the probable cause standard. I would like to see that disposition, or that the preliminary hearing officer's decision have more weight.

What I would like, really like to see is that staff judge advocates then take into consideration and then try to figure out really what's out there. I think MJA 16 is just so new right now. And we're still relying on the old version where there was just so much information and so much evidence that you didn't get until
after referral. And so -- or that you were actively trying to get.

But our 120-day standard is real. It is not a joke. We see cases dismissed --

BGEN SCHWENK: The 120-day standard is the speedy trial standard?

COL. PITVOREC: Yes, sir. Yes, sir.

My apologies.

We see cases all the time dismissed because you didn't meet the 120-day standard and then you have to start over from scratch, or the case goes away. Generally speaking, if you can show why the delay, but just pure like, oh, the government is still assembling its evidence, that's not sufficient.

So, so that the idea that they are trying to move the cases, and to get a preliminary hearing, to get an Article 32 investigation you have to have preferred charges. And preferring charges is the trigger, unless the person is in pre-trial confinement. And sometimes they are. So, you're moving fast. And
you don't have the ability to delay beyond while you're waiting for a forensic examination of a cell phone, or for subpoenas to go out to various places that you haven't yet received.

So, there's lots of stuff that comes in that you're waiting for. But if you say we're not waiting for that, we can't, we can't wait to do a 32, we have to get moving because the military judge is checking. There's a tick, tick, tick on that clock. And if you're not showing what you're doing to further that case along, it is in all likelihood your case may go away. And it could be a no kidding win, it could be a no kidding win for the defense in a case that should have been a win for the government.

I do understand where you're coming from. I'm a three-time defense counsel. I understand that. You know, the Article 32 process I think is a good one in trying to moot that out. But right now the way -- and I do think that it's a good way. The staff judge advocate who has the benefit of knowing what's
going on, who has maybe additional evidence says -- and again, just disagrees with the PHO, I think you have to give them that benefit.

And there really is no mechanism right now for then coming back in and saying, oh, well here's all this extra evidence, because by then the clock has ticked to a point where that case is going to go away because of speedy trial.

CAPT TASIKAS: I go back to my earlier comments about the original idea of an Article 32 was to protect the accused from the plenary authority of the convening authority. And so, the idea of having an open forum with cross-examination, be able to provide evidence, to make sure there wasn't baseless charges that were going to go forward, or a valid defense that was going to go forward. And so, now we're in this moment where we're trying to push the Article 32 into something else that's more civilian-like, which is great.

And the question I have then is, you know, if we continue to make the military justice
system more civilian-like, then why do we need a military justice system? And so, again, if you gain something, you lose something.

Under our system, jurisdiction over the accused is status of their service, you know, active duty. So, the more time we have in our system, the more time we have somebody under our laws. So, I think already now we have a system that's taking a little bit too long under what it was originally envisioned. And the more process we have, the more likely these cases are going to take even longer. You have an accused who's been in the service for a long period of time. So, I would not want to have that.

And then the other idea, again, is while these systems operate wonderfully in peacetime in CONUS, we still have to envision a system that can operate in armed conflict in foreign venues. And so that is a very important facet of our system, that it's mobile, it's not just here in time of normalcy, if you will, so.

MS. TOKASH: I think it was
interesting hearing about kind of the abdication of the SJAs' responsibility if -- I don't like using the word binding or non-binding, I like looking at probable cause as a threshold -- it's a constitutional issue, right. I would hope we would all agree about that.

And so in a way it's inherently binding or it should be inherently binding because it's a basic constitutional issue. So, I don't think from a comparative standpoint that the 93 U.S. attorneys, you know, nationwide feel that every time a grand jury votes to bill or no-bill a case, their responsibility is being abdicated. And that decision is resting with, I mean, I have a pig farmer from Chautauqua County sitting on my Tuesday grand jury. And we vest the PC determination in him, and in the school teacher from Erie County, and in American citizens all across the country.

So, you know, why can't the military trust a judge advocate to make a determinative, binding threshold issue on probable cause at the
preliminary hearing?

   And I, I would like to tip my hat to
at least the Navy and the Marine Corps who
acknowledged in their answers that, if it were
binding, this would afford due process
protections to the accused. And shouldn't we all
be concerned about due process?

       I mean, I think that that's really,
you know, the heart of the issue when it comes to
this. It's not about changing things or taking
things away, it's really about making things
better. Isn't that what we should all be working
toward?

   CAPT TASIKAS: I think the issue is
then the present nature of the probable cause
standard of Article 32 is when the PHO finds no
probable cause for a specification, and now does
that bar the convening authority from taking NJP
action, administrative action?

       That's very important. I think, like,
to tie the hands of the convening authority from
all other action, because the no probable cause,
whether it's a 120 or Article 92, is a lawful
general order whether the person was absent from
their duty, or sleeping on post. That's a very
important factor.

So, maybe you can't get a conviction
or court martial, but I sure want to have the
ability to take that person to Article 15. In
our system it's preponderance of -- Article 15 is
preponderance. For other services it's
reasonable doubt, I think. But that's a policy
determination.

And, again, so I would be, I would be
careful because having the Article 32 be a
jurisdictional process in our system would be
problematic. And then if there are defects in
Article 32, those are issues that can be raised
at appellate level, and then a case is
overturned.

I just think that the nature of the
Article 32 was not envisioned to be something
like that. I agree with you that the -- you
know, we all want due process. But this is
military due process, it's different than
constitutional due process. And so there is,
there is -- they go hand in hand but it's
slightly different.

LT. COL. KING: And I would just
offer, ma'am, that there is a judge advocate that
is put in this process to determine whether or
not probable cause is met. It's just, it's the
staff judge advocate, not the preliminary hearing
officer.

So, if the staff judge advocate says
there's no probable cause then the commander
cannot prefer the charge.

MS. TOKASH: Right. And I'm just
point out if the preliminary hearing officer
who's also a lawyer tethered to a bar, who is
licensed by a bar, I mean why cannot, why can't
that opinion be determinative, I'd like to use
the word determinative of the constitutional
issue of probable cause. That's really only what
I'm getting at.

LT. COL. KING: Yes, ma'am.
CHAIR BASHFORD: I have two final questions. And then I'm going to delay our break for 5 minutes if the staff has anything.

My two questions are, again, there's been talk about how things would abdicate the role of the commander in making the decision. But, realistically, if the staff judge advocate has said there is probable cause, how often does the commander feel comfortable in saying I'm not going to forward it, I'm not going to refer this to a general court martial because, if my understanding is correct, that has to go up to the Secretary?

Has that ever happened that you know of where the staff judge advocate has said, yes, PC, and the commander in exercising his role has said, but I'm not going to refer it? That's one question.

Then second is how often are members -- administratively discharged after an acquittal on a sexual assault charge?

Let's start with you. I realize
they're completely unrelated, but.

COL PFLAUM: And, candidly, I don't know if the Army has collected data on the Secretary of the Army review after a convening authority's decision to not refer after a staff judge advocate's advice to refer.

I, anecdotally, I believe that it is exceedingly rare because it is a check on that convening authority's exercise of his discretion to understand that that decision will be reviewed by a higher level. So, I do believe that it's exceedingly rare.

And to your second question, ma'am, if you could reiterate your second question?

CHAIR BASHFORD: After a full acquittal of a sexual assault charge, how common is it for the member to be administratively discharged from the service?

COL PFLAUM: So, and again based on Army regulations, if there is a full acquittal, absent other evidence or other misconduct, that would be a barrier to administrative separation
for that particular offense. So, that would be rare.

Would they be separate, might they be separated for other misconduct that they commit, or other bases, again I don't specifically have the data for that.

CAPT MONAHAN: And to answer the second question first, I believe we have similar policies in the Navy.

To the first question, I'm not aware of any case in which a, in which an SJA found probable cause and make a recommendation to go forward to trial, did a general court martial convening authority go to the Secretary of the Navy and request -- or not refer, thereby triggering a policy of having to go to the Secretary of the Navy.

LT. COL. KING: I'd agree that the first question it's very rare. I do know that it has occurred. But in the instance where I've seen it happen there was an additional victim preference that was provided after the Article 32
process, and after the actual probable cause finding was made prior to preferral. There was a small period of time in there.

And then for the administrative separation, I agree with Captain Monahan that the service regulations do prohibit acquittals moving forward for enlisted personnel. For officers, after an acquittal there can be a show-cause separation proceeding, but I have not seen that occur after an acquittal for a sexual assault.

COL. PITVOREC: Ma'am, to go to your first question, there's a -- the staff judge advocate's recommendation is not limited to just whether or not there's PC. That, it's PC and then a recommendation, a couple of other things, but a recommendation of whether or not to go forward.

In the Air Force we have not had a convening authority. We have had staff judge advocates say there is PC but I do not recommend that you go forward for the following reasons, and lay out the reasons. And then the convening
authority did not go forward.

We have not had the situation, to my knowledge, where they said, yes, PC, yes, go forward, and then the convening authority said, no, I'm not going forward. We have not had to go to the Secretary as of yet.

To your second question on administrative discharges, in the Air Force an acquittal or the underlying basis, the underlying facts that led rise to the acquittal cannot serve as the basis for an administrative discharge. However, again, like the other services, if there is other underlying misconduct, and I have seen subsequent misconduct then trigger an administrative discharge.

I would also -- and I guess this is not really the era for this because if there is, if there is a conviction of any sort of sexual offense it automatically requires a discharge from the court martial. But in a prior lifetime as a defense counsel we had, I did see convictions of a sexual offense that then did not
receive a discharge, but then that could not be used as a basis to trigger an under other than honorable conditions discharge. They were limited to getting a general discharge for that member.

CAPT TASIKAS: I have the same sentiments for both questions. I think the issue going back, though, about the policy of an acquittal goes back to the Article 32. And if you find no probable cause in an Article 32, that has triggering repercussions for administrative avenues. So, I would envision a system -- and I don't mean to go back -- but that if you find no probable cause in an Article 32 that's binding, that the commanding officer would be barred from taking other administrative actions.

And that's not a system I think we would want.

But as far as directed to your questions, ma'am. I echo the same things that my colleagues do.

CHAIR BASHFORD: And we have time for
one staff question.

MS. PETERS: I'm sure it's a short answer but.

(Laughter.)

MS. PETERS: In practice, how do staff judge advocate's convey information contained in the Article 32 report to a convening authority?

Does the SJA summarize the Article 32 report orally, or does the convening authority get to read the Article 32 report?

And is there anything in the Manual or a service regulation that requires or dictates how the Article 32 information is conveyed to a convening authority?

COL PFLAUM: I'm going to start with that. So, the 32 report is in the file.

And I will say that in a case where there is a negative Article 32 officer finding, that's highlighted in my Article 40 -- or, I'm sorry, my Article 34 advice. So, it draws the convening authority's attention. And it is, it depends on the case and the convening authority
whether they read everything or whether I
summarize that for the convening authority.

CAPT MONAHAN: And I would agree. In
the Navy it's case by case. It depends on
variables such as the command, the convening
authority and the staff judge advocate how much
the convening authority reads and how much is
orally briefed to him or her.

LT. COL. KING: I would agree with my
colleagues.

COL. PITVOREC: Well, that was short
and sweet.

I think, generally speaking, in my
experience, staff judge advocates provide both
written advice and oral advice to the convening
authorities. And in my experience in assisting
three different convening authorities, they've
read every word of that Article 32 investigation,
the PHO's report, and had questions for me about
it and why they're different, if there is a
difference in the PHO's advice.

So, they are I think very, very
cognizant of what's going before them, very
interested in making sure that they make the
right decision for the right reasons. And I've
seen them be very thorough.

I had one convening authority that had
tabbed the 32 report so that we could go in and
sit and talk about it, and had questions about
different testimony back -- this was pre-2014 --
but very aware of what's going on. And very
interested to know why there is a difference.

CAPT TASIKAS: I would echo that.
It's exactly true. I think it's a very dynamic
process. In talking to the SJA's out in the
field, the convening authorities are very detail-
oriented. They read everything or near
everything, and they have a lot of questions.
This is definitely not just a routine oriented
exercise.

So, I would just suggest that it is
dynamic and a give-and-take, back and forth. And
they have to feel comfortable with the decisions
they're making.
CHAIR BASHFORD: Thank you all very much. I'm going to try to compress our break from 15 minutes to 10 minutes so that we can try to keep staying on track.

Thank you so much for coming.

(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went off the record at 11:39 a.m. and resumed at 11:53 a.m.)

CHAIR BASHFORD: Great, thank you very much for coming today. We're going to be talking about the perspectives of the services' special victims' counsel, victims' legal counsel program managers regarding conviction and acquittal rates, the case adjudication process, and the victim declination in the military justice process.

So, thank you, Ms. Specht. Specht, right? Colonel Clay, Lieutenant Colonel Schrantz, Captain Sullivan and Colonel Hamilton.

MS. SAUNDERS: So, I'm Terri Saunders, I'm one of the staff attorneys for the DAC-IPAD. To begin with, just as with the last one, we'll
begin by talking about the Article 32 process.

Some of the RFI responses, and they raise concerns that the judge advocates serving as preliminary hearing officers, lack extensive experience dealing specifically sexual assault cases.

Other responses indicated that due to the limited scope of Article 32, preliminary hearing officers do not have all of the information needed to make probable cause determination for their findings.

The overall assessment was that the staff judge advocate, who is more -- a lot more experienced, is in a better position to advise the convening authority on probable cause. Should a judge advocate -- and I have sat in as a hearing officer or served in that role -- have significant litigation experience on sexual assault?

CHAIR BASHFORD: Colonel Hamilton.

COL. HAMILTON: Ma'am, the ideal answer would be, yes, you would want someone with
the requisite skill set to go ahead and serve as the preliminary hearing officer. But unfortunately, that's not always the ideal case as we're structured with personnel throughout the Army.

However, I do believe that the best person for the final determination is the staff judge advocate because of his or her experience and the fact that they had additional resources available to them, starting with the special victims prosecutor, the senior trial counsel, the trial counsel, to advise what may have or may not have been raised during the 32 process. And then make the requisite advice and provide the requisite 34 advise to the convening authority.

CAPT. SULLIVAN: Good morning, ma'am. Yes, absolutely. The preliminary hearing officer should have extensive litigation experience.

The Navy just recently stood up a reserve unit of preliminary hearing officers to assist in that capacity, where we have prior active duty judge advocates who, in their
civilian capacity, work in some experience --

have extensive experience in litigation or maybe

a U.S. Attorney's Office. It might be

prosecution or defense.

However, unfortunately the numbers in

that unit just don't meet the need of the numbers

of preliminary hearing officers that we have. So

in that capacity, the Navy, next up is to use our

military justice career track folks who do have

extensive litigation experience to sit in that

capacity as the preliminary hearing officer.

However, again, based on the numbers,

they're not always available, depending on the

location. If it's a remote location or just

given then other needs for prosecution or defense

services, filling those roles with our limited

number of military justice career track

personnel.

LT. COL. SCHRANTZ: Yes, ma'am, we

agree. In addition to being a fully trained and

certified and sworn judge advocate to conduct the

hearing, it would be very important to the SJA to
examine and identify a PHO that has the experience and expertise and knowledge to adequately assess the evidence at the hearing.

        And the only one real key way to do that is the officers will know generally the background training and experience of potential PHOs that are out there. And the SJA would have the opportunity to assess whether or not that officer would be able to conduct a thorough and fair and well thought out hearing with a solid recommendation.

        COL. CLAY: And I would echo what has already been stated. Ideally it would be someone with extensive military justice and criminal justice experience.

        In the Air Force, we often use military judges, however, they are not always available. So a person with extensive knowledge of the system and criminal law would be ideal.

        But again, sometimes just because of the numbers and availability, they're not always going to be able to have either a judge or
someone with extensive military justice experience.

MS. SPECHT: For the Coast Guard, definitely, in a perfect world, they have litigation experience, they would have military justice experience. Unfortunately, the Coast Guard being as small as it is, there is just less opportunities for them to get that military justice experience.

So, if there were to be some sort of requirement, I think it would make sense for the Coast Guard to -- it just couldn't pull from a bench of experienced personnel, to at least require some sort of training on sexual assault. So, they would be aware of the nuances in sexual assault cases.

CHAIR BASHFORD: We heard a lot about the change in the Article 32, so post-that change, 2014, have any of you had clients testify in a 32? Let me just start with you, Ms. Specht.

MS. SPECHT: Yes, the Coast Guard has definitely had clients who have wanted to and
have testified at Article 32 hearings. In those instances that I can think of right now, they've actually desired the opportunity to speak, or they've thought that their attorney has been anxious for them to have that experience first, because of various reasons related to what's been relayed to them.

COL. CLAY: Similar in the Air Force, we have had some clients who have testified. Often it's to add additional information that was not in their original statement to law enforcement, or it would be beneficial for them to have the experience of sitting on a stand and going through the process of testifying.

Although I will say it's probably not the norm, it's a few outlier cases. And the majority of our clients choose not to testify.

LT. COL. SCHRANTZ: I'm not able to answer that right now, ma'am, I'm not aware of that. I know that my deputy who works for me, he came to be the VLC -- the deputy VLC, at the headquarters, previously served as the RVLC in
Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. And his experience and information, to me, was that his clients did not testify.

CAPT. SULLIVAN: Yes, ma'am, for the Navy we have had clients who have testified after consultation with their victim legal counsel, with the trial counsel, for the same reasons articulated by the other panel members.

COL. HAMILTON: Ma'am, I'm not sure I'm qualified to answer that question. I've been the program manager for a little over a month. However, from the SJA perspective, which I have been in the past, most of the client victims have chosen not to participate in the Article 32. But there have been some cases where they do.

CHAIR BASHFORD: We saw -- I don't know if you were here for that, I mean, there are pretty high acquittal rates. Either complete acquittal rates or acquittal rates on all the sexual assaults. And we certainly read from the victim representative perspective, how devastating that is. Whether they feel they
weren't believed or they went through this whole
process for nothing.

Given that, do you think there should
be a higher threshold other than probable cause?
There's the non-binding guidance, but to push a
case and to refer it to court-martial? Colonel
Hamilton?

COL. HAMILTON: No, ma'am, I do not
believe there should be a higher threshold.
Victims do not like full acquittals, obviously.
However, the process, I believe, has significant
protections built in. It's not only about the
conviction, it's about making sure the process
worked fairly, inevitably, for both the victim
and the accused, in that regard.

But the -- focusing on the victim and
their opportunity to participate with full
understanding of the potential consequences of a
full acquittal I believe is best for the victim,
in my experience. What I'm learning in the
process is their ability to know that they have
been validated and heard through the process as
significant for their healing. And that is
something that we need to protect.

CAPT. SULLIVAN: Yes, ma'am, I don't
think there should be a higher bar, however, I
think one of the other questions that we were
asked regarding the victims' expectations, given
the entire process and understanding at each
point in the process and the effects. And
although victims are emotionally devastated, some
of them are happy to have gone through the
process and to have seen it and to have
experienced that. That they feel like their
voice was heard ultimately by the trier of fact.
And others do not.

As you articulated at the end, they
feel like the system was not fair and that they
did not get a fair shake at it. But I don't
think that changing the standard would fix that.

LT. COL. SCHRANTZ: I agree, ma'am.
I don't think changing the standard would be
beneficial. But continuing to allow the victim
to participate and be educated and informed
through the process is what's most important.

COL. CLAY: And I would also agree that changing the standard would not be in the best interest.

Our clients often express that while they are disappointed or devastated, depending on the acquittal, often the way that they perceive how they've been treated throughout the entire process in their interactions with investigators and trial counsel, defense counsel, and other individuals involved in the process, that has a great influence in how they perceive whether or not they were treated fairly and given an opportunity to present to a finder of fact, that -- what happened to them. And then have it go through the process.

MS. SPECHT: I just reiterate exactly what everybody has said. I think there is value to victims to go through the process itself. There's points throughout the process. They have an opportunity to participate.

So, the idea that by making the
probable -- making a higher determination of probable cause would somehow alleviate the despair or the negative feelings with an acquittal, it's not really the right way to look at it. In the sense that they have an SVC or a VLC that's helping them the entire time sort of manage expectations and talk about success, aside from the ultimate conviction. And if they're working -- if SVC and trial counsel are working together, you can really help the victim understand that what the panel says is not definitive. Right? The value in going through this, what the panel says isn't necessarily what the victim actually experienced.

CSMAF MCKINLEY: I'll go. Thank you for your service.

After the acquittal, the victim -- how do you see the victim being able to adapt, go back to the unit, get back into the mission of that unit, and how many of them do you see that just throw their hands up and say, I'm out of here, I'm gone?
MS. SPECHT: Sir, it really sort of piggybacks on what I just said. I really feel like the quality of the response will lead to the recovery. So, if there was an engaged trial counsel, if there was a supportive command, if the victim felt all the way through that he or she was allowed to participate in meaningful ways, then I think the recovery process is much easier for them, regardless of what the panel might say.

No doubt again that there's disappointment there. But I don't see, across the board, victims throwing up their hands and saying, I'm leaving the service as a result of this.

COL. CLAY: Yes, and I would echo that. It's very individual. It's going to be up to that individual and how he or she perceives how they were supported and what's going on in their life, where they are in the recovery process.

So, it's very, very individual, very,
very specific. And in fact, even when there is a conviction, that healing process is not complete, they're still going through that. So an acquittal or a conviction is not necessarily closure for that individual.

As far as how many clients did we see choosing to separate, I don't have that data available.

LT. COL. SCHRANTZ: I agree, sir. And it's not just the importance of the expectation management and the care and advocacy for your client through the process, but it's also important to remember that that Marine is coming in the unit and that Marine is going to have, probably for an extensive period of time, then suffering through the process procedurally.

And so, as that unit is there supporting that victim through the process, that includes whatever the result of the trial may be. But where it really is going to be important, regardless of the outcome is the post-trial. Obviously with the impact that a full acquittal
can have, you're going to have to have some
leadership, some commanders, some NCOs take care
of that Marine and ensure that Marine's well-
being.

And similarly, the culmination of a
long process, even if it was a successful
conviction, is going to come with some
significant emotional challenges in and of
itself. The concluding this process that's been
dominating a large aspect of their life for so
long, it's important to remember that, in either
case, acquittal or conviction, that Marine is --
and service member, is going to need some
significant help and support afterwards.

As for the numbers of how many choose
to separate, I don't have those numbers, sir.

CAPT. SULLIVAN: And we likewise do
not have the numbers on -- I don't have the
numbers on how many choose to separate or how
many choose to remain. And some do choose to
leave. And as others have stated, it's important
for even those folks who do choose to leave, as
they're making that decision, that we provide them with the right resources in order to help them make that decision, make sure that they're cared for.

Afterwards, whether it be under the disability evaluation system or other resources available to those Servicemembers who do choose to leave and make that decision, with the help of the resources that we have.

COL. HAMILTON: I concur with what my colleagues have said. And I think the benefit to the way we're structured right now is the fact that there's an opportunity for some who choose to leave will go ahead and leave. Others will ask for a permanent change of station to get a fresh start somewhere else following it. Throughout the process or early in the process some have automatically requested an expedited transfer to be in a location that is divorced and separate from the horrors of where the incident occurred and the accused at that point.

So, those options are available to the
victims. And the other benefit is, that when they move someplace else, we've improved the process so that we've provided for very good warm hand-offs so that the physical, emotional well-being of the victims are taken care of at the new installation.

CHAIR BASHFORD: I know you said none of you had those numbers, but do you know if your services are tracking, and not just after court-martial, after filing a complaint, because a lot of the cases don't even go to referral, do you know if your services are tracking filing a complaint and fairly shortly after the resolution of the complaint, leaving the service? Ms. Specht?

MS. SPECHT: I don't believe so. I just got a head shake from my Captain.

(Laughter.)

COL. CLAY: I am unaware of tracking that information.

LT. COL. SCHRANTZ: I'm just not sure, ma'am, but I definitely can take that back and
research it for you.

CAPT. SULLIVAN: And, ma'am, I was
informed that we do not track that.

COL. HAMILTON: Likewise, like Ms.
Specht, I looked around to my support --

(Laughter.)

COL. HAMILTON: -- and got the same
head shake. We are not tracking those statistics
right now, ma'am.

CHAIR BASHFORD: Sure.

BRIG. GEN. SCHWENK: To go back to
Article 32's for a minute. What difference would
it make to your clients if there was no Article
32 at all? And whatever you would offer to a --
in a case if you had something to offer to a 32
PHO, instead you offered it to the SJA, would it
make any difference to your clients?

MS. SPECHT: Conceivably. I think
sometimes because SJAs are in the same area as
the victims, there is -- even though the SVC will
try to explain the process of, and the roles of
the military justice practitioners, I can
envision, I don't know this for sure, I can envision a victim embracing a PHO because they believe them to be the neutral, unattached, individual who is looking at all of the evidence by someone who's sort of a friend of the command, so to speak.

COL. CLAY: I think there is some value in the Article 32 in that the victim is able to attend and watch the proceedings.

BRIG. GEN. SCHWENK: All 15 minutes of it?

COL. CLAY: Yes. If there are evidentiary issues that come up, such as perhaps MRE 412 issues regarding past sexual history, the SVC is able to advocate on behalf of their client's privacy rights at that Article 32. And then have that PHO look at that issue and make an appropriate determination based upon the law and facts of that particular case.

And that they get a copy of the reporting at the end as well. So I think there is value to the victim to see that process in
work.

LT. COL. SCHRANTZ: Yes, sir, I agree. I think there's value as the line VLCs are sitting and working and explaining the process to the victim. The feedback from the field has been, the trust in the system, the thoroughness, despite the conversation earlier about it being a 15 minute paper drill, it is an additional step in the process where you can convey to your client that an independent officer with legal training is going to take a good close look at the evidence and make a recommendation and write a report.

With that said, I think some of the answers that we provided to some of the other questions highlight the importance to the client and some frustrations that can exist with delay, just to the overall system. And so, I think if there was a way, if there was a system in place that could help expedite the 32 process, or in your example, just to get rid of it all together, of course that would potentially shrink the
process. And that would be something that would
be appealing to a victim, potentially.

CAPT. SULLIVAN: Yes, sir. And I do
see value in it to the victim as far as requiring
that faith in the process as far as checks and
balances, that there is an analysis of the facts
of the hearing of the -- or after the hearing.
And there's another entity looking at the
charges.

Because sometimes the trial counsel
may not have presented to the victim all of the
information. And so then, getting that
transcript and getting the tape on having that
information helps them see the process as it's
proceeding forward.

COL. HAMILTON: Sorry, I absolutely
think there's value to it. I think it's the
first step toward healing for the victim.

Now, going through the process or
getting the information, reading it,
understanding what's going out there and the
finding of the preliminary hearing officer is
sort of an acknowledgment that something happened
even though it's a lower threshold of just
probable cause. Something happened. I think
that's crucial to victims and their healing.

CHAIR BASHFORD: So, one of you had
mentioned, and I just want to follow-up on that,
there's some frustration with the length of the
process. If there was a way of expediting the
length of the investigation, the process.

Do you have any suggestions to how
this process could be expedited without
sacrificing fact gathering? I'm going to start
with you, Colonel Hamilton.

COL. HAMILTON: I don't have a clear
answer for you, ma'am, on a way to expedite it.
Because I think if we attempt to expedite too
quickly we will rush things to the point where we
may not ensure justice is served. Either for the
victim or the accused.

So I think we -- the process, while it
has its flaws, is working. And I'm seeing the
mere fact that more victims are willing to come
forward and request SVC and engage in the process is significant from where remembering that the SVC program is, it hasn't even reached its five year anniversary for the Army. I mean, six year anniversary. We're in our fifth year now. The numbers and the increase that, of how many people are requesting SVC shows that the process is becoming more familiar and victims are more willing to engage in the process.

So, as far as a way to expedite it, I don't have an answer for your specifically, other than I know it's working for victims.

CAPT. SULLIVAN: And, ma'am, before I answer that question I'd like to go back to the last answer as well.

I think the Article 32 is also good for the victims in the case where there is no probable cause finding because, again, they're able to see that. The hearing, the analysis and the input. So I don't want it to be thought that we're only looking toward prosecution of the accused for the benefits of the victim's healing.
I think it also does help with the victims understanding of a no probable cause finding if there is a full -- the full Article 32 hearing in the sense that we have it now.

As far as speeding the process, I don't have any suggestions for that. I think our military justice folks have talked about that and suggestions on ways to change the system, once again, to expedite the process.

But I know we've all been working very hard at certain steps in the procedure to really get down those processing times as far as the trial counsel -- working on their prosecutorial merits memo, getting all those time frames shortened. But overall, Article 32, I don't have any good suggestions for you.

LT. COL. SCHRANTZ: Yes, ma'am, and I was the one that mentioned it but unfortunately don't have any recommendations --

(Laughter.)

LT. COL. SCHRANTZ: -- to fix it. But I mentioned it not -- just to be clear, not as a
critique of the military justice practitioners or
the commanders who were carefully considering
these cases, in which our investigating offices
are diligently and thoroughly investigating them.
It's very important that they do it. And
expediting it just for the sake of expediting it
would not be prudent for anybody's interest.

But I think for the VLCs, the reason
why I brought it up as an issue of length of time
and concern is, where the VLCs can be of great
value is to really thoroughly and proactively
communicate with their clients frequently, daily.
Weekly at least, sometimes daily.

Just to keep them informed so that
their clients know that the process is moving
forward, even though nothing is happening in the
courtroom or no statements are being provided
that despite the length of time, that the process
is moving in the right direction.

And the feedback from the field is, if
the victim's legal counsel do that with their
clients and keep them informed and keep in touch
with them, that they're satisfied and feel happy about the fact that they know that someone is still marshaling their case from beginning to end.

COL. CLAY: Similar to my colleagues, I don't have any specific comments from an SVC perspective. I know our military justice folks are working on ways to improve timelines. I know one initiative within our judiciary is to get our circuit trial counsel. Those are more experienced prosecutors, our special victims qualified prosecutors involved in the cases at base level early in the process to hopefully get better quality investigations earlier in the process to reduce those timelines of having to go back and look at other things that may have been missed during the initial look.

There are other things that they are working on to improve those timelines, while still getting quality investigation that looks at all the facts, to ensure fairness to everyone involved in the allegations.
MS. SPECHT: I can speak only for the Coast Guard, and it's sort of like what the Air Force was talking about. As I mentioned, the Coast Guard doesn't have a lot of experienced trial counsel. We don't have special victim's prosecutors, but what the Coast Guard is trying to do is build experience at two separate locations. But what has happened, sort of as a result to that, is that the investigation happens at the district level and then it's handed over to the people who are actually going to try the case.

So there's just not this ability to really integrate with the investigators. Really discuss what needs to be happening based on the people who are actually going to be prosecuting the case. So, I wish there was more overlap in the Coast Guard between investigators and trial counsel.

I also think that the way that the Coast Guard defines restricted reports, they put themselves in a bind because we have a lot of
third-party reports then, so you have a very uninterested, unwilling, victim having to go through the process. And if there was a way just to shut those down in the beginning, then resources could go towards those who are really integrated and interested in moving forward.

MS. GARVIN: Thank you, Chair. So, we've heard a lot this morning about if the PHO does no PC finding, right, so we come out and a hearing officer says no PC but the SJA can still find probable cause. What is the advocacy of VLCs and SVCs in that window of time?

If the PHO says no PC but the SJA has not found yet, what is a VLC, SVCs role?

CHAIR BASHFORD: Its awful that the Coast Guard and the Army --

(Simultaneous speaking.)

COL. HAMILTON: The role of the SVC, for the Army, during that time would be just communicating their clients interest and where, from their perspective, what their client is looking for through their trial counsel and the
prosecution team, who are the advisors to the SJA before he or she goes in and meets with the convening authority.

So, the SVC role is to communicate the client's wishes and desires through the prosecution team.

CAPT. SULLIVAN: And that is the role, to continue advocating on behalf of the victim and providing that information that the victim, victim's counsel, may have felt it was not fully vetted during the Article 32 or not brought up during the Article 32, communicating that information for the convening authority's benefit.

LT. COL. SCHRANTZ: Yes, ma'am. And for the convening authority's benefit it is the important point that VLC is going to continue to represent, advocate, communicate with, explain the process to the client.

And importantly, whether the PHO's determination was that there was probable cause or that it doesn't reach probable cause. It
assures, and the victim is assured that the
convening authority is going to know right up
until the SJA goes in and advises.

If the VLC is properly communicating
with the government and properly communicating in
the timely manner, the victim's wishes, the
victim will know that the convening authority is
considering their input right up until his final
decision -- or, her final decision.

COL. CLAY: It's the same process in
the Air Force, I don't really have much to add.

MS. SPECHT: Same with the Coast Guard
as well.

MS. TOKASH: Have any of you been
privy to what's been explained as this post-
preliminary hearing, additional evidence session
with the staff judge advocate?

If you have been in your role as a
special victim counsel or victim's legal counsel,
what are you telling the SJA and why could that
not have been presented to the preliminary
hearing officer?
LT. COL. SCHRANTZ: Ma'am, I've not been privy to that or discussed that with any of the -- our VLCs.

I think similar to what I've mentioned in my previous answer is, because the victim can't be compelled to testify at a 32 or provide a statement, it could be just a situation to where with proper communication the VLC is communicating with the SJA, right up until that moment the SJA goes into the convening authority.

MS. TOKASH: Doesn't that seem like you're trying get through the backdoor that which you're not able to get through the front, by having some type of ex parte communication with the staff judge advocate?

LT. COL. SCHRANTZ: Well, the victim has the ability to testify in a 32 if they elected to.

MS. TOKASH: Right. Assuming they don't --

LT. COL. SCHRANTZ: Yes.

MS. TOKASH: -- they still can have an
audience with the SJA, correct?

    LT. COL. SCHRANTZ: Well, the SJA is going to understand -- the victim's preference is a big part of this process. For all of us through the process is properly understanding at all times what the victim's preference is.

    And so, as an SJA, I would certainly want to know and verify at any given time, not necessarily by audience with the victim. In my role as a SJA I did not do that, but I would certainly make sure that prior to going in to meet with my commander that I was up to speed and could properly communicate to the commander what the current victim preference feeling was.

    CAPT. SULLIVAN: And, ma'am, I believe under the new rules, under 405(k), that defense has the opportunity to present additional information as well. So, it's pinned to that.

    And I haven't been privy to any of the conversations, and I don't know that the victim's legal counsel have taken that opportunity under the new availability of that, but I think more
defense has the ability to provide additional
information after the Article 32.

COL. HAMILTON: Ma'am, from the SVC
side of the house I have no experience regarding
it, but from the SJA side I've never met with the
victims.

The SVC, often represented by counsel,
would communicate through their trial team, trial
team would, you know, brief me on where, what the
victim is looking for, what the SVC is looking
for, the concerns they have or whatever other
evidence or information. But I also want to be
clear that I haven't had a case where there was
no PC finding, no activity from the preliminary
hearing officer that we switched going to the
convening authority. However, the information,
the communication comes through their trial team.
And the SVC to the SJA.

And while there would be an
opportunity, if the victim wanted to come and see
the SJA, I don't know of many cases, or if any, I
have never experienced any, where the victim
wants to come in and meet with the SJA. And if they did so, they would do so through the SVC. And there would be something rather significant that is virtually, you know, it would be novel.

COL. CLAY: Again, similar to my colleagues, I don't have any personal knowledge of these post-discussions with SJAs or others, as an SVC.

In my prior role as an SJA, I can tell you that I did get written matters through the trial counsel and the SVC, regarding the victim's preference on disposition, which would then be provided to the convening authority for his or her consideration.

MS. SPECHT: And just similarly, I've never known of a victim or an SVC to provide evidence that was not included as part of the ROI during the 32, it's really just victim preference, and that was afforded to the victims by Congress. So it's just them providing, again, saying I'm ready to move forward, I would like to move forward. It's not anything different than
what had already been provided, it's what's going
to the convening authority already.

MS. TOKASH: Thanks.

MS. CANNON: Is the victim advised if a 32 officer -- hearing officer, finds no probable cause, and if so, what, if anything, additional occurs to try and influence the SJA, if at all, in overcoming that lack of probable cause?

COL. HAMILTON: Ma'am, if the SVC and the VLC are doing their job the victim would know exactly the process and what the finding was. And that is, first and foremost in our charter in our mission to keep the victim informed of things going through the process.

As far as what would then -- what strategy, I cannot speak to that because I have no experience as far as what they would attempt to do to change the planning of a preliminary hearing officer or to influence the SJA, before going to the convening authority.

CAPT. SULLIVAN: And I think, as far
as the recommendation of probable cause, I think
I'm not directly aware of it, but I would imagine
that they would -- if there was any issue with
the actual hearing, any problem with the 32,
anything that was left out, then identify that to
the trial counsel. And we do -- the VLC do
inform the victim of the recommendation and the
decision by the convening authority.

LT. COL. SCHRANTZ: Yes, ma'am, the
victim would know the results and continue to
communicate and work with the victim's legal
counsel.

In terms of what next, I think just
close and proper work with the trial counsel, and
perhaps some additional information that may have
not been presented or conveyed properly or
communicated up to that point. You can do that
by communicating with the trial counsel as
they're preparing documents like case analysis
memos, prosecution merit memos, that they're
going to present.

COL. CLAY: Again, yes, the victims
would be informed of the PHO and SJAs recommendation. The only time that I have seen anything after that point would be if the SVC perceived, there were some legal error in the proceedings, and they might bring that forward for the consideration of both the SJA and the convening authority. But again, that's pretty rare that they would see that kind of error and then bring it to the attention of the appropriate individuals.

MS. SPECHT: Not really anything different to add, just similar to whatever has been gone on before. What the SJA is really concerned about is, is the victim still willing to move forward and what are the victim's desires.

COL. HAMILTON: Ma'am, if I could add to Colonel Clay and Captain Sullivan had mentioned. What we try to do is we try to get our SVC to have already been -- have already participated as a trial counsel or defense counsel or somewhere in the justice process
before becoming SVC.

So, if for instance, the SVC were in -- sitting in on a 32 and there was something that was wrong or missed by the prosecution team or the trial counsel, whose responsible for trying the case, and then the SVC, merely to ensure that his or her client's wishes were being -- or, wishes were being pursued or their rights being protected, would communicate that to the trial team. And then the trial team would then hopefully, if doing their job, which they are, take it to the SJA, which would then be contrary to, I guess the finding of the 32 officer.

CHAIR BASHFORD: Dr. Spohn?

DR. SPOHN: So, one of the findings of research on sexual assault case processing in the civilian context is that the victims willingness to cooperate in an investigation and prosecution of the case is one of the strongest predictors of whether the police will make an arrest, whether the prosecutor will file charges, and whether the case will result in a conviction.
And our case review, we've been reviewing cases that have been reported to all of the services, and we discovered that there's a very high rate of victim declination in these cases. And that it occurs at various stages in the process.

And many of you have just now mentioned the importance of the victim's preferences or the victim's willingness to move forward with the case. So, in your experience, what are the reasons that motivate victims to decline to cooperate after having made an allegation of sexual assault?

LT. COL. SCHRANTZ: Ma'am, the feedback from the field seems to indicate just a strong desire to put the issue behind them and move on with their lives and with their careers, while still acknowledging that something terrible happened. They do just a personal decision that they make on their own that they just want to move on. And it could be influenced by their close-knit team that they're a part of that's
supporting them through the process.

They do have -- whether or not it remains in the military justice realm or not, I think we have done a tremendous job in the military providing additional resources for victims of these types of crimes to recover and succeed with or without the military justice process.

It is important to some, but some individuals have just chosen to take the benefit of the resources that are available outside the military justice system and move on with their lives as quickly as they can.

COL. CLAY: And I would echo that. It's an individual decision. And the reasons are pretty much individual that -- in the person, and that a desire to move on and heal and get to a better place in their journey after experiencing a trauma. And also, we often see a desire to protect their own privacy through that healing process as well, as common issues. Although there are many different reasons and they're as
individual as the people involved.

MS. SPECHT: I'm going to mention again, just, I see a lot of times with the Coast Guard, because of the way that we define restricted reporting, so a lot of individuals are telling friends, and they never intended it to go to investigation, it gets reported and then they're sort of pushed forward. And so that's why they decline to prosecute.

CAPT. SULLIVAN: And the reasons for the Navy victims are similar. Every victim is unique, every case is unique, every case is different, and they have different motivations and different reasons for wanting to decline and move on. And as far as the resources, providing them with the resources, that they need to do that as very important for the services to do. So the restricted reporting is very helpful in that they're able to do that, to have those resources available to them without the need to report if they don't desire to participate in the process.
COL. HAMILTON: Yes, I think we covered just about everything that everyone has said. I think victims go through their own cost benefit analysis of pursuing and continuing on and what pain that would bring to re-live it or just move on, put it behind them. PCS to a new location, permanent change to a station or a new location, or expedited transfer, and heal in their own way. So it's too hard to know for sure all the different reasons.

CHAIR BASHFORD: Okay. I heard mention from the Coast Guard of third-party reports plus, because of the way you structured the inadvertent disclosures, but we've seen inadvertent disclosures in other services as well. They don't realize they're saying something to somebody who then has a duty to report.

In our third annual report issued last year, we advocated allowing, sort of, a clawback to change an unrestricted report back to a restricted report when that was not the intent of
the person, as to make such a report, or with a
third-party reports.

Are you in favor of that sort of
clawback provision and would you be in favor of a
third-party report, where the victim says, I
don't want anything to do with this, being able
to shut down the investigation rather than the
full talking to all the friends, the co-workers,
the supervisors, people in the barracks, et
cetera?

COL. CLAY: We've kind of done that in
the Air Force already. By policy, the Office of
Special Investigations, if they have no other
leads beyond what a victim can provide to them,
they will shut down the investigation.

So, we have given that option to
victims within the Air Force.

As far as shutting down an
investigation that is because of a victim's
preference, I think that's generally a good idea.
However, there may be those cases in which it's a
multiple victim case, in which it should be
investigated anyway because of the other
individuals involved with a particular case.

        CHAIR BASHFORD: I'm just going to
follow-up quickly on that because OSI wouldn't
know there's no other leads, other than the
victim, until they did a full blown
investigation, correct?

        Until they talked to everybody and
they were able to say, there's no other way of
getting evidence.

        COL. CLAY: Unless there's third-party
complaints or another victim came forward.

        LT. COL. SCHRANTZ: Ma'am, I support
that ability to clawback and while also retaining
some of the ability for the commander to act and
respond as needed. Obviously you'll always want
to continue to provide the resources needed for
the victim.

        Continue to allow the expedited
transfer ability and just try to get that victim
in a position to recover, adhere to what their
preferences are, but allow that victim to recover
from the assault.

CHAIR BASHFORD: And what about the
ability to shut down a third-party complaint
where the victim says, either I don't want to do
anything or nothing happened?

LT. COL. SCHRANTZ: The inadvertent
disclosure that then the third-party --

CHAIR BASHFORD: Some third-party
calls in and says, I know this person was
sexually assaulted and the victim either says,
no, it wasn't or I just don't want to talk about
it?

LT. COL. SCHRANTZ: I'd support the
victim, ma'am.

CAPT SULLIVAN: Yes, ma'am. And I
would support in the same manner.

The one issue that you identified
though is, a difficult question is, how do you
know if there are other victims, until you
investigate. So at what point do you stop that
investigation.

But I think, given the limited
resources that we have and given the interests of
the accused, that, unless there is really good
information as far as going down to a full
complaint, if the victim does not want to
participate and does not want to, any action on
the third-party complaint, we should provide them
with the resources and not pursue that.

COL HAMILTON: Ma'am, from my SJA side
I'm torn. I believe that failing to pursue to
remove a cancer or a problem within the
organization will have a negative impact on good
order and discipline.

So, being able to just shut it down
based on the victim poses a problem. And I was
just split. Let me go back to this in a second.

But from, now we're in the SVC side of
the house, the one thing I loathe is to have to
re-victimize the victim already. And empowering
the victim to, with the expedited transfer and
being able to shut down the investigation does
help with that person's healing.

However, when you look at it in the
sense that, which was the note I received, some type of recruiter malfeasance or basic training malfeasance and then the victim says, I don't want to participate when you're talking about a drill instructor or a recruiter who may have the tendency to repeat.

And then by not going forward to ensure good order and discipline is there, we have put others in harm's way. And so it's, I think it's a double-edged sword and I don't know that I have a very clear answer for you.

I don't like re-victimizing victims, but I also want to remove problem individuals from the formation because that is what degrades good order and discipline and effects all of us.

MS. SPECHT: I would agree with Colonel Hamilton. I think the command has, needs to have the ability if there is some pervasive issue that is happening within their command. Again, Coast Guard being very small, it can really deteriorate the ability of the unit to get the mission done.
So, I really like the Air Force's sort of methodology there in that it's only if, sort of, there was this one time, one person said something and then OSI sort of brings them in and says, do you want to move forward and they say, no I don't, but then OSI has the obligation if additional evidence comes forward.

Or if the command provides additional evidence, where I assume it mostly comes from. That they would still move forward with the investigation.

Again, I would just like the way that everybody else does restricted reports, to be for the Coast Guard. That would be a success for me.

MS. GARVIN: So, I think it was you, Colonel Clay, but forgive me if I'm wrong, but had mentioned, so I'm going back to 32 for a second, you had mentioned, I think, that during the 32 both the victim can be there but also the SVC or VLC can be there. And if a victim's rights issue comes up, most likely a 412 or a 513, but maybe a different Article 6b right could
present in that moment. But the SVC, VLC participates.

So, a two-part question. What does that actually look like and do you think that the SVCs and VLCs have sufficient standing to protect rights that might arise or violations of rights that might arise in a 32, both in the moment and then any possible appellate moment out of that?

COL. CLAY: Generally, the way it looks, is if an issue arises during the hearing, the SVC will stand up, be recognized and then have an opportunity to object or make an oral argument.

In some cases, this is the ideal situation. Trial counsel has talked to the SVC prior to the hearing, so those issues have been resolved before they walk in.

Sometimes, as we all know, things don't go according to plan and the SVC has to stand up and object to make their argument as to why a particular issue is affecting their client's rights and their ability to argue on
behalf their client, to protect their client's rights.

That's typically the way it looks. At trial, obviously, that's going to be a little bit more formal with written motions and everything else. But at the 32 hearing it's usually oral argument.

And I'm sorry, what was the second part of your question?

MS. GARVIN: Just whether it was sufficient standing that they have right now to protect the rights in a 32.

COL. CLAY: As a 32, yes. We believe that it is sufficient.

And that we haven't really had any issues that have risen to the point where we have to actually file an appeal through that avenue. So we haven't actually tried to do that or exceed what happens to the courts if that type of issue has risen.

MS. GARVIN: Do you have concerns, if you had a case, that you would be well received
at the appellate court or do you think you could
move forward?

COL. CLAY: I think we could move
forward --

MS. GARVIN: Okay.

COL. CLAY: -- if we had the right
case, with the right facts and aligned with what
the law says.

MS. GARVIN: Okay. I'd like to hear
from others too about this.

LT. COL. SCHRANTZ: Similar for us,
ma'am. I don't have anything to add to that.

CAPT SULLIVAN: Ma'am, the process is
the same.

COL HAMILTON: I'm tracking the
process to be the same for us. I think the
standing piece is a larger issue the closer you
move to trial and the control being more in the
judge's as far as whether or not, how, just
speaking to some of the Military judges, the
judge's course, and the role of the SVC is not,
you know, under case law and statute, the actual
party in interest there for the SVC to stand and 
make an objection from behind the bar. So that 
is an issue that's still being resolved.

And through case law or statutory 
change then maybe there would be more of an 
opportunity for SVC to object and interject at 
trial. But as far as a 32, I think we're okay 
right now.

MS. SPECHT: Very similar in the Coast 
Guard. I think practically speaking, some of it 
is dependent on the experience level of the PHO 
as to how comfortable they feel with the SVC 
standing up and making argument extemporaneously. 
It may come after the fact and potentially 
append to the PHO's report.

MS. GARVIN: Thank you.

MR. MARKEY: Well, thank you for being 
here, thank you for your service, taking time out 
of your day to really give us some great 
information to help this, can we kind of look, 
are there areas and gaps that we can improve the 
process. Kind of along the same vein of victim
participation, Article 32.

We heard about collateral misconduct.

And I guess I was looking for some clarity on when that comes up it usually, probably I would assume comes up in the investigative process initially, so I'm wondering, what is your experience with how that's managed, what does that look like and is that considered a factor, or have you seen that considered as a factor for victims who don't want to move forward or don't want to participate?

And I know there's a lot of things wrapped up in there, but basically I'm looking to see some clarity about the collateral misconduct and how is that, what does that look like, you know, is it a formal identification of an investigation, is it running up the chain of command that we're going to have to report this and what impact does that have on your clients?

LT. COL. SCHRANTZ: Sir, thank you.

And in the case of where a line VLC will meet with and consult with and have the initial
meeting with the victim, if information is presented that there could be collateral misconduct, that VLC will arrange for representation from the defense counsel there in the region locally.

And the communication and interaction for the line VLCs that are out there representing their clients doesn't exist just between them and the government and the trial counsel, but with the defense bar as well.

And so, in the case where there would be a potential exposure for that individual, it's not for the victim's legal counsel to represent and advise on potential collateral misconduct, it's going to be for that victim's defense counsel if one is ultimately made available.

MR. MARKEY: Sure.

CAPT SULLIVAN: To answer, the process is similar in the Navy. And as far as your question regarding how that's dealt with, it really depends on the victim on the collateral misconduct and the duty.
Sometimes the convening authorities, as you heard earlier, will dispose of it prior to the court-martial. Some will hold it until after the court-martial.

Some victim's prefer to have it adjudicated prior if they're going to captain's mast or if they're going to begin some type of formal reprimand, have it taken care of ahead of the time that they're going to testify. The potential to be cross examined on it. It's just really dependent on the victim and the misconduct that's involved.

And the same thing with the factor as far as whether it's determined for whether they move forward or not. It depends on the victim, the type of, kind of misconduct.

Their, just their, I guess their job, right, because they're looking at the job. If they have this misconduct that's adjudicated that's their future in the Military.

But again, we do have them consult with defense counsel on those issues if there is
anything under the military justice misconduct system that they're going to be facing charges for.

COL HAMILTON: Similarly, TDS, Trial Defense Services, will take in for the collateral misconduct. And the SVC will refer the client over to trial defense services.

But the protections that I think you're alluding to also are built in, in the sense that if the offense was something along the line of underage drinking but there was a serious aggravated sexual assault in addition to the underage drinking, we'll deal with the collateral misconduct so that the strength for the victim, if he or she chooses to go forward, will then be able to say yes, that was dealt with.

So, at the time of trial, during the cross examination, you know, oh, you're only here because you were involved in some other offense and you're not getting prosecuted or charged with that. Now, I've already made, received my reprimand or my Article 15 for the under aged
drinking, but what happened to me is even more
egregious and that provides some of the
protections in there.

But yes, we do separate the special
victim's counsel advice to when there's
collateral misconduct and send them over to trial
defense services.

MR. MARKEY: And I'll just interrupt
real quick, is that automatic?

As soon as there is information that's
received of collateral misconduct, they're
automatically giving that information to TDS for
them to manage that?

COL HAMILTON: Well, I mean, that
would be, depending on how, once we, the special
victim's counsel gets information about
collateral misconduct or the victim starts
raising other collateral misconduct to the
special victim's counsel, the victim's counsel
are trained, go through the training so that they
understand, when you hear information of another
UCMJ, uniform code of military justice violation
or something else that the victim may have done, you say, okay, it is best for you to seek trial defense services in the event the chain of command choose to come after you or to prosecute or move to some other adverse administrative action for the victim because of the collateral misconduct.

So it's up to the SVC to then look at that. From the SJA side, if we hear of the collateral misconduct then we're going to look to the chain of command and say, what are you recommending for this person who, although a victim, also engaged in some other type of violation. Did I answer your question, sir?

MR. MARKEY: What kind of impact does SVC have in your relationship with your client?

COL HAMILTON: I think if the SVC is doing his or her job, I don't think it impacts it. It's like, hey, I need to protect you. I'm going to protect the, what your result of the sexual assault, but hey, now to look at added protection for you, let's go over and meet with
trial defense services because they're going to
discuss things with you that are outside of my
scope of representation for the sexual assault.

COL. CLAY: And very similar in the
Air Force. Often it comes up during the
investigation, but it could be, come from other
sources, including the victim in their protected
corner with their SVC.

If the SVC becomes aware of collateral
misconduct, they will talk to their client. And
with the client's consent, make a referral to the
area defense counsel so they can be represented
for those matters by defense counsel.

MS. SPECHT: Similar in the Coast
Guard to the Air Force. It's more of a
conversation with the client and the SVC because
generally, when we're talking about collateral
misconduct in the Coast Guard, at least it's
going to be underage drinking.

So it's a fairly low-level offense and
it's going to come out because everybody was at
the party, everybody saw everybody drinking. So
it's not something that necessarily needs to be referred to the defense counsel at that stage.

However, if it's something more serious, if it's something that we think is potentially a court-martial offense, they're definitely going to be referring over to our defense counsel. We have a --

MR. MARKEY: It sounds like it's a low-level offense you may not.

MS. SPECHT: I mean, that would be with the client's consent if they saw --

MR. MARKEY: Is there any guidance on that?

MS. SPECHT: No, it's within our instruction itself.

CAPT SULLIVAN: And it's with the client's consent because to seek advice of defense counsel, that is the client's decision whether they wanted to seek the advice of defense counsel. We can't force them to speak with defense counsel.

CHAIR BASHFORD: Apart from collateral
misconduct, have you personally seen or have you, just more broadly seen, any instances of retaliation in the chain of command against somebody or, I supposed what a client perceived as retaliation, apart from social consequences which I don't think people can really control all that well, but have you seen retaliation?

MS. SPECHT: I'm wracking my brain because I would say we see retaliation frequently. Or not frequently, what the victim perceives as retaliation.

And I think it's difficult because they're in a situation where they don't feel super connected with a command, so everything feels like retaliation. Like anything that might have been just normal in the normal course of business.

But I would say, yes, we've seen retaliation in the sense that if they don't have a supportive command, I'll use the cadet at the academy, maybe they don't get to go on their first, second, third order of where they wanted
to go over the summer, they may feel like that's
retaliation in and of itself.

I'm trying to think, we had one very,
very formal retaliation claim and that ended up
getting investigated by CGIS and was
substantiated and was acted upon by the command
at that time.

COL. CLAY: Similar, as far as
official chain of command, professional
retaliation is extremely rare. In fact, nothing
is coming to mind as an example, but I'm sure it
has come up, I'm just not aware of it. But it is
extremely rare to have actual professional
retaliation through the chain of command.

LT. COL. SCHRANTZ: I'm not aware of
any at this time, ma'am.

CAPT SULLIVAN: My answer is similar
to the Air Force, where it's very rare to see the
senior level professional retaliation. Sometimes
what we've seen is members of the command think
they're doing something good for the victim that
then the victim perceives as retaliation.
Changing a work schedule or something that really isn't necessary from the victim's perspective and the victim thinks that that's retaliation or punishment whereas the command was trying to do something to help without communicating effectively. So we always encourage our VLCs and our victims talk with the VLCs and work with the command on that as far as working out those issues.

Sometimes in the mid-level senior enlisted arena, again, not to the level of retaliation but sometimes with the idea that they're protecting the victim or their assisting the victim, they do certain things that may be perceived as retaliation. And then with communication and education, our VLC have been able to resolve those issues.

COL HAMILTON: Very similar to what Captain Sullivan is saying, I've not been a party to or experienced any professional retaliation but the perceived retaliation usually gets dealt with, with a phone call or two. And once you
hear that information, you talk to the chain of
command or send the trial team back to make sure
that it's taken care of.

And I've yet to hear anything further
from it.

MS. LONG: Hi, thank you for being
here. I wanted to go back to the Article 32 and
the usefulness of it.

And thinking about some of the
comments this morning and your very unique
position, I'm wondering if you think that,
understanding it's been changed, that it is
stronger when the victim testifies and that it's
useful for preparing the victim for trial when
victim testimony is involved in that process?

And Colonel Hamilton, I guess I would
start with you.

COL HAMILTON: Ma'am, I must
apologize, could you rephrase the question --

MS. LONG: Sure. Whether at the
Article 32, having a victim testify, I know it's
their choice, but having that testimony, does it
make the Article 32 hearing stronger, the
evidence that goes in stronger, and is it useful
for the victim to get experience testifying?

From your perspectives now as an SVC
and others.

COL HAMILTON: Ma'am, from the SJA
perspective, I'll answer that first, I would
prefer more information. We're learning more
about the SVC program and victims and the trauma
they go through. I think we're doing the best
ting by leaving it up to the victim to go

The experience of, yes, everyone wants
a little bit more experience, but it's one thing
when you're putting your personal trauma out
there for that experience. I don't know that you
learn from having said it multiple times at the
32 or through the investigation and then the 32
and then at trial and subject to cross

I'm not sure that's beneficial. So
what we train and we teach is, leave it up to the
victim, discuss the process. The SVC needs to
discuss the process with the victim and let it be
the victim's decision at that point so long as
they fully understand and appreciate what the
process is about, and if the SVC are doing their
job, the victims, I believe, are making informed
decisions on that.

CAPT SULLIVAN: And I have the same
cconcern regarding the, having the victim tell the
story again, yet again and again.

And the parameters of the 32
previously where we had the instances where the
victims were on the stands for days. And I think
procedures and processes would need to be changed
to ensure that there are protections of the
victim during that process.

Again, I was chief of defense for a
while and so from that perspective, from the
accused, definitely like to have that opportunity
to talk to the victim prior to the court-martial,
as well as the trial counsel. You can get an
idea of how the victim is going to react or hold
up on the stand.

But I don't think testing the victim in that capacity is really useful for the purposes of the ultimate trier of fact at a court-martial. And the dangers and just everything that's involved with re-victimizing the client.

Re-victimizing the victim in that setting with the, what we've seen in the past, I do not think it's a good idea.

LT. COL. SCHRANTZ: Agree, ma'am. I would like to continue to allow it to be what the victim would prefer to do.

One, as part of our training a few weeks ago, one instance that really stuck with me from hearing from an actual victim of a case that was successfully prosecuted, she flat out said that the actual act of testifying at the trial was worse, felt worst to her and that the anxiety and pain and suffering of having to retell it was worse than the assault. And it just stuck with me for hearing her.
So having that type of action imposed again on them to add in Article 32, I would not want to see that in terms of victims.

As far as getting them ready, I think the victim's legal counsel and the trial counsel, you can only do the best that they can in preparing that victim to testify through preparation and assurances and education and just trying as best they can to support that victim through the process so that they are as ready as they can possibly be during such a difficult event, as testifying is.

COL. CLAY: And to really kind of echo what was already said, it should be a victim's choice and a case-by-case basis. They will have an opportunity to have the advice of their SVC or VLC, an opportunity to consult with trial counsel ahead of time.

So the victim, in consultation with their SVC, is in the best position to make a decision whether they should or should not testify at an Article 32.
And, again, depending on the victim and the nature of the alleged assault, it may be more emotionally damaging to them to testify twice versus just at the trial itself.

MS. SPECHT: Just pretty much the same as what everybody else has said. It's going to be a conversation between the SVC and the client. And it will depend on the specifics of the case.

MS. TOKASH: So --

MS. GARVIN: Oh, I'm sorry, I didn't see you Meg.

So, we've talked a little bit about collateral misconduct. And then, I don't know if everyone was here this morning when we had the panel talking about it, but one of the things that we discussed was the definitional differences in the reports that came from each of the services as they were trying to collect the data. And as we were unpacking that a little bit we talked a little bit about the definitional differences in adverse action.

And so, I'm just curious what your
opinions, if you have them, it might be something you need to think about, about if we're going to try and help folks come up with definitions in order to respond to those types of queries, and maybe even encourage Congress to be a little more specific when they give certain things.

Would you all from the SVC, VLC perspective, have a recommended definition of adverse action that a survivor might suffer in response to collateral misconduct?

And because what we were talking about this morning is formal adverse action and informal adverse action. I'm seeing lots of furrowed brows --

(Laughter.)

MS. GARVIN: -- which probably means that either my question was inarticulate or you'll be graceful and say you need time to think about it.

LT. COL. SCHRANTZ: Ma'am, an excellent question and --

(Laughter.)
LT. COL. SCHRANTZ: -- I was here this morning and --

BRIG. GEN. SCHWENK: You weren't paying attention.

(Laughter.)

LT. COL. SCHRANTZ: Sir, I was, I promise. But it is something, ma'am, honestly that I'd like to think a little bit more about.

Thank you.

CAPT SULLIVAN: Yes, ma'am, the same, to think about it. Because it could be very broad so we would need time to think about it.

BRIG. GEN. SCHWENK: Let me help a little bit. So, this morning, it seemed like there was a general consensus, a court-martial is adverse.

(Laughter.)

MS. GARVIN: Correct.

BRIG. GEN. SCHWENK: And NJP is adverse and an administrative discharge is adverse. And so then, you get to other measures that could be labeled non-punitive measures.
MS. GARVIN: Yes.

BRIG. GEN. SCHWENK: So, I'm going to give you a letter.

MS. GARVIN: Right.

BRIG. GEN. SCHWENK: Okay. If I'm going to give you a letter and send you a copy for your official file, that might look awfully adverse.

If I'm going to give you a fitness report or whatever you call it, and in it I'm going to be less than glowing, I haven't said anything bad but I just haven't glowed very much like we normally lie and, oh, I mean embellish, some people might perceive that as adverse, others might not.

If I'm going to give you a letter and stick it in my drawer, because it's a non-punitive letter and it's more a corrective measure, maybe you don't consider that adverse. Although, as a recipient of two of those, I considered them adverse at the time.

(Laughter.)
BRIG. GEN. SCHWENK: So, I think we're really looking at the low end of things. At the top end of things probably pretty easy but we're getting towards the low end of any thoughts you have on that. Right?

COL HAMILTON: Yes. So, that's exactly where I jump to looking at the reprimand --

BRIG. GEN. SCHWENK: Well, then you're screwed up. If you're at my level, we've got problems.

COL HAMILTON: I'm sorry, sir. The reprimand, whether it be an official file, a local file, which is basically in the drawer as far as where adverse and for, especially for the victim as a form of the collateral misconduct.

But what I'm hesitant to do, which I would ask for more time to really look at is having something directed put out regarding that. I'm always fearful of when you take that option away from commanders to figure out what is best for good order and discipline within the unit at
that time. And also considering the victim and
the trauma that he or she has already endured,
what is the best way to ensure and enforce good
order discipline across the formation as to what
degree.

Because, some would say that if you're
junior enough in rank even an Article 15 may be
survivable as a, because it's non-judicial
punishment. However, like you said, sir, it's
adverse. An official reprimand is adverse.

In a drawer, it's a reprimand so it
adverse, but it may be able to survive so that he
or she may have a successful career thereafter.

CAPT SULLIVAN: And, sir, I'm thinking
of even other things like deeper into the weeds
as far as possible, if you're up for a certain
school and because you were found guilty of
drinking under, underage drinking, you lose that
school so that then affects your whole career
path.

Or not extra Military instruction as
much, but the other thing I'm thinking is deeper
into the weeds as far as losing some opportunity that you may have had to progress on your career path because of that collateral misconduct.

BRIG. GEN. SCHWENK: Thrown out of the special whatever program --

CAPT SULLIVAN: Yes, sir.

BRIG. GEN. SCHWENK: -- that you have.

CAPT SULLIVAN: Yes, sir. Or even being set back for a couple of months or so, so that you're not on the same track now as your peers.

BRIG. GEN. SCHWENK: So like what happens to the accused?

CAPT SULLIVAN: Absolutely, sir.

BRIG. GEN. SCHWENK: -- record.

CAPT SULLIVAN: Absolutely, sir.

LT. COL. SCHRANTZ: That's right, sir.

And so, like Captain Sullivan mentioned, regardless of the outcome of the military justice proceedings there is the potential of certain hang-up and delay and awkwardness that a Service Member's record will look like.
Even with no adverse material in it at all formally. If someone on a promotion board or a school board is looking at that individual's record, there may be consequences because the board member doesn't have the benefit of knowing what happened but it just looks odd. It's the odd career progression. And it could just potentially be due to delay.

It could also be that that individual victim felt that in addition to an expedited transfer just to avoid this local geographic area that they were in a particular MOS or field of practice that really required them to get out of that field. It's too small.

Everyone knows so they do a lateral move into an additional MOS. Well then you get into the situation to where, as career advisors would recommend is, you know, how would you get that victim with a new MOS into a position to get MOS job credibility in a completely new and different job.

And so, those are the type of
challenging adverse actions that aren't adverse
in terms of formal written counselings that's in
someone's record, but in terms of a victim's
career progression and overall standing over a 20
year career, it could be a one to two year blip
that looks very odd that could have negative
impacts on them.

Just something that until this morning
hadn't thought about much, sir.

MS. TOKASH: In the responses by SVCs
and VLCs to the request for information for this
particular speaker group, there was an indication
that even though the reaction of victims vary
case-by-case, many of them expressed devastation
at an acquittal.

So, my question is, do you think,
based on the very high acquittal rate in the
Military that we're seeing as a group through the
case review working group and the actual raw data
that we're seeing from analyzing cases in the
field, do you think given the very high acquittal
rate in the Military coupled with the
devastation, the feelings of devastation from the victim, that there should be a higher standard for referral of cases to trial?

If so, what do you think that should be?

BRIG. GEN. SCHWENK: We almost had somebody down here, but if you had just waited you could have gone last.

(Laughter.)

BRIG. GEN. SCHWENK: But too late, the red light is on.

COL HAMILTON: Sir, like you said, we're similar in some ways.

(Laughter.)

COL HAMILTON: Ma'am, I do not think it should be a higher standard. I obviously feel for, empathize with victims who feel devastated. And who wouldn't?

However, I think the process there, I think some victims, although devastated, at least feel through the process, if the SVC was doing their job, the chain of command and everyone, the
resources, the treatment to care was there for
the victim, at least I think there is some
healing in the fact that they, their story was
heard, their trauma was heard.

And while it may not have reached to
the level of beyond a reasonable doubt for a
conviction, there was some empathy through the
process for the victims. So while they're
disappointed with the result, I think that they
have taken a giant step toward healing by having
had the opportunity to tell their story.

And I think if we just look at
conviction rates for these victims as a means of
success or making it more of a challenge to get
them to the opportunity to have that healing, I
think we're missing the boat on the trauma that
these victims experience through the sexual
assault.

CAPT SULLIVAN: And, ma'am, I'm
thinking back to, I read through the responses
from our military justice folks and as far as the
acquittal rate really is difficult to judge on
because every case is different and the reason
for the acquittal is different.

And these cases are tough. I mean,
these many times are two people in a room,
something happens and there are different reports
of what happened. So I think it would be very,
changing the standard I don't know would fix
that.

And I don't think that basing the
decision on the acquittal rate would just really
help the system. But again, I defer to the,
think back to the answers that I read to this
question from our military justice folks, I would
defer to them.

MS. TOKASH: Because in theory,
changing the standard to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt at referral, could kill a lot of
cases right there.

CAPT SULLIVAN: Yes.

MS. TOKASH: True?

CAPT SULLIVAN: It could, yes.

MS. TOKASH: It could, right.
CAPT SULLIVAN: Yes.

LT. COL. SCHRANTZ: That's right, ma'am, it could. And you would, although it might not be to the same level, and I agree Colonel Hamilton's feedback up to this point, or comments to this point, but you raise the standard, you use the term kill it would sort of expedite the devastation from the victim at that point rather than having them wait till the trial after, saw all the factors were considered by the Article 32 officer at the same standard and then the SJA and the trial counsel and then the convening authority made that determination of which sustaining the conviction is one of the factors to consider.

And so, I think if you made it a higher standard and it precluded it from moving forward at all, much of the benefit that our field VLCs have communicated to us about willing participants who want to go forward, who have the opportunity with their VLC to work through the case, that would be gone at that point.
COL. CLAY: And I would agree that there is a value from the victim's perspective of going through the process, having an opportunity to tell the juror or the judge what they experienced.

It does come back to managing expectations of the client. And as you all know, oftentimes it's not a result that our client wants at the end of the day, but I do believe there is a value to that victim to publicly state that I was wronged and have that made known.

MS. SPECHT: Just to expound on what everybody else has said, and what I was saying to the Chair earlier, there is value in the process itself to victims.

I don't think that, I think they want to have it heard by a panel member. And if the SVC is working well, especially with the TC, they will be aware of the potential problem, you know, consequences of moving forward.

CHAIR BASHFORD: Staff? All right, then thank you so much for coming. And we'll
adjourn for lunch and come back at 2 o'clock. If anybody is going out, out to the courtyard.

(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went off the record at 1:18 p.m. and resumed at 2:03 p.m.)

CHAIR BASHFORD: We're continuing this afternoon with Panel 3, so we're going to get the Perspectives of Services' Trial Defense Service Organization Chiefs Regarding Conviction and Acquittal Rates, the Case Adjudication Process, and Victim Declination.

I suspect we might hear something slightly different than we've heard this morning. But, Staff, can you tee this up please?

MS. SAUNDERS: This is, based on the response to the RFIs we've been putting together, and I'm going to read the first one. It's referred to as the referral process.

The defense RFI responses indicate the victim preference may play an outside role whether or not a sexual assault case is referred to trial. What consideration or weight should be
given to the convening authority given the victim's wishes regarding the disposition of the sexual assault case?

CHAIR BASHFORD: Colonel Bennett,
could you start us off?

(Laughter.)

COL BENNETT: So, obviously the voice of the victim is something that should be considered, but when we give too much weight to it, when the wishes or the desires of a victim are going to overwhelm what the evidence should support, if you have a no PC but, hey, the victim wants to go and the SJA is looking at what the victim wants and deciding, no, there really is PC, I think that's problematic.

If you have PC but you're looking at it and saying, you know, the chances of a conviction are either slim or, you know what, the evidence really doesn't even support a conviction but still the thought that we should go forward because a victim wants their day in court,
and beyond that of the rights of the accused.

And at the end of the day, there is
one person who potentially is facing confinement,
loss of liberty. And that's the accused in the
case.

So while there's a place to understand
what the victim wants, there should be some
consideration. At the end of the day, the
evidence and the analysis by whether it's the
PHO, this morning they said the SJA is the right
person, the analysis of the evidence, in and of
itself, should actually carry the day not the
request or the wishes of the victim.

CDR KIRKBY: Thank you. I would
agree. I believe the standard we should use is,
can we obtain and sustain the conviction at
court-martial.

If we, cannot based upon the evidence,
then there should be no, nothing else should make
us go forward. The desire of a victim to have
their, quote, day in court, should be a
consideration.
But really I believe it should be a consideration if they don't want to participate. Then no matter what the other evidence, then maybe the commander needs to take that into mind and say, without the participation of a victim, under policy, we don't go forward because if a victim doesn't want to participate, we're not going to force them to come in and testify and go through that process.

But to say, well, they want their day in court therefore regardless of the evidence, the state of the evidence, the best interest of the PHO, the best judgment of the PHO, the best judgement of everybody else, the legal process to say, we should go forward anyway I think is the wrong decision.

So, I think it has some weight, but it shouldn't overcome the obtain to same standard that we should be using.

CDR KING: I agree with my colleagues. What really matters is whether or not the victim is willing to participate. And past that point
the evidence and the rest of the military justice process should lead on the charging decision and whether we go forward after a 32.

So, again, I think it's, we really have to pay attention to whether or not the victim is willing to participate, because without the victim it's going to be very hard to get a conviction without lots of independent evidence.

But after that question is answered then I think that we need to rely on the rest of the process.

COL. MORGAN: Good afternoon again. I agree with my colleagues. I believe that the desire of the victim should be fully and fairly considered but should not necessarily override legal standards.

The PHO's determination of probable cause, the Article 33 guidance as to the likelihood of conviction. And I would also just like to take a moment to discuss the fairly profound impact that a Military member goes facing a type sexual assault allegation.
There's the stress associated with a fairly lengthy process. I believe the last number I had for the average general court-martial for 120 offense was something like 508 days.

During this time frame --

BGEN SCHWENK: From what to what?

COL. MORGAN: I believe from the beginning of the investigation until --

BGEN SCHWENK: Yes, from the allegation to the --

COL. MORGAN: Yes.

BGEN SCHWENK: -- until the MCIO till a final decision at the court-martial?

COL. MORGAN: Yes, sir. During this time period, frequently, not always, but typically, the member is removed from their normal duties. Oftentimes has their security clearance pulled, may have access to certain areas restricted, be subject to a protective or restraining order further limiting their access.

They're placed on a control roster,
they can't test, they can't PCS. Or, sometimes
they're actually transferred to another
installation during the pending trial.

We've seen that even if they're
acquitted at that point they're typically eager
to administratively separate, which parallels
oftentimes what we see when there is a conviction
with respect to the victim. They're both eager
and frustrated with the process to separate.

(Off microphone comment.)

COL. DANYLUK: -- about the victim's
desires to go to a consideration, to the
convening authority about whether or not perhaps
they desire the Military to be involved at all or
if it's possible that the civilians take it if
there's a civilian jurisdiction.

And then as it is to the weight, it's
really, I agree with all my colleagues, about
whether or not they are going to be a willing
participant in the process.

I'm sure the prosecutors would all
agree that having a willing victim that wants to
participate makes their job a little bit easier as they go through the process.

And we haven't always respected the rights or the voice of the victim in that decision making. We've, in my Marine Corps career, ordered sexual assault victims to testify. We don't do that anymore I'm happy to say.

But I am aware of how important it is that people feel heard in the process. And so, I think having the voice in the process, having their desires made known to the convening authority whether or not at the end of the day they follow that choice that's being advocated for, is the convening authority's decision.

MR. KRAMER: Thank you. I have a question that by the time I get through may have eight or ten parts to it --

(Laughter.)

MR. KRAMER: -- but I hope you can keep track.

So, we heard --
(Laughter.)

MR. KRAMER: I'm just winding up here.

We've heard testimony about how, that if there is
a recommendation of probable cause that's
essentially never overturned or extremely rare.

But what I don't know is if there is
statistics or at least anecdotal -- of how often,
how often is a finding of no probable cause at
the Article 32.

And then the second step is, how often
that's overturned if there's statistics about
that or anecdotal information about that.

And then the second part of that
question is, if it's overturned is it done, we've
heard about a process where additional evidence
can be submitted and we also heard, I think that
defense counsel can do that also.

So I'm curious again how often that
the SJA recommends overturning it just on the
basis of the evidence, disagreement with the
Article 32 with the PHO based on just
disagreement or based on new evidence, how often
it occurs that there's new evidence and they disagree with the finding of no probable cause?

And how often, and the bigger question I guess is, how often is defense counsel, do you participant in this procedure to funnel information to the SJA after the Article 32 proceeding?

COL. DANYLUK: I think the Marine Corps is a little different just based on the responses that I, I was saying that the Marine Corps, I think, is a little bit different based on the responses provided from all the services in that we see a higher degree of cases maybe that don't go to court because of the prosecutorial merits memo recommends to the SJA that they not go forward on a case.

Or if at the Article 32 hearing the PHO recommends that it not go forward. Whether or not they find that there's no, they say there's no probable cause or if they say there is probable cause but there is like zero chance of success on the merits at a court-martial.
Some cases are successfully then dismissed. And I think that that's reflected probably by the conviction rates.

Based on just my conversations with my colleagues, are higher in the Marine Corps. So I think they're taking less of the very weakest cases to trial.

The idea that the SJA is providing to the convening authority all this additional information that's not presented at the 32 is a little perplexing to me. We would like the PHO's recommendation, if there is no probable cause for that to be binding.

We feel like the government should present their evidence. I don't understand why they would be hiding that from anybody. And I don't know why they would be funneling it through the SJA to then overturn the PHO's recommendation that there is no probable cause.

I don't think any of us opposed the ability for the government to go back for another hearing, subsequent if there was a finding of no
probable cause. But I think we all agree that it should be binding.

CHAIR BASHFORD: Go ahead.

CDR KIRKBY: I don't think we have statistics to answer Parts 1, 2 and 4.

(Laughter.)

MR. KRAMER: I don't even remember what those were.

CDR KIRKBY: But I think by analogy, we do have some cases where we find, where the PHO finds no probable cause. And those cases are not continued, those are killed at that stage.

We also have cases where we know that the PHO has recommended no, who has found no probable cause, those cases have gone forward. And we've challenged that finding through motions saying, hey, wait a second, there is no probable cause, how did we even get to the court.

Judges have, based upon the recommendation nature of the 32, simply not allowed those motions to succeed.

How many have been overturned, again,
I don't know. The concept of the defense putting in evidence to try and convince the convening authority of a position, the SJA has now weighed in on.

I can't think of a case where the defense would ever want to play that game. Unless there is such overwhelming evidence that was clearly prohibited at the 32.

Now, there are rules that prohibit what we can do. There is certain things that the convening authority should know and the complaining witness should know that defense knows about. So we put that stuff forward.

But usually, that's not a good strategic decision to go and put, play all your cards and say, well look, we know you've got this and we know your SJA is disagreeing with us, but what about all this stuff.

Now, we'll hold that back and we'll go to trial and that may contribute to the acquittal rate where we obviously look at a different standard.
The binding nature of this I agree.
And I'm trying to think of a Military reason why
the 32 is not binding, and I simply cannot come
up with one as I've thought about this process
over the last few years.

To your question earlier on, should
there be a difference in our systems between the
federal system, I don't think so. I can't think
of a Military reason.

And that should be the standard we're
looking at. Is there a Military reason.
Difference in members, conviction, you know,
two-thirds or three-quarters versus a unanimous
verdict. That may be a Military thing.

Twelve versus eight versus four. That
may be a Military thing. There's arguments for
those.

But to not have this binding at this
stage where we simple have one person. And I
heard a lot of arguments during the other panel
saying, well, some of the PHOs are not well
trained.
The government gets to pick the PHO. (Laughter.)

CDR KIRKBY: That's not a great argument for them. We pick somebody who doesn't like the standard.

If this is the floor, the government should be required to reach the floor. Or they should be able to go back down, start again. And maybe explain to their bosses how you didn't reach it.

I know in the U.S. Attorney's Office, if they don't find a, if they get a no true bill, they have to go and explain how this happened.

MS. TOKASH: We did hear this morning though that there may be a difference between Military due process and constitutional due process.

CDR KIRKBY: Yes.

MS. TOKASH: So, there's that.

(Laughter.)

CDR KIRKBY: That was a fairly scary answer. I think due process. And now of course
due process is, how much due process do we want
to give people. Military, maybe just a little
bit.

But the standard we've set is probable
cause. Let's at least hold them to that and say,
hey, if you think you can go forward to trial.
This isn't a game. There's no gamesmanship here.

So, that should answer Part 3, 7 and
9.

(Laughter.)

CDR KING: Just so I can jump in, I'm
going to take a step back and explain why the
Coast Guard has decided to move themselves for
this panel.

(Laughter.)

CDR KING: So, for defense counsel, we
have a memorandum of agreement with the Navy and
the Navy handles most of our defense matters.
So, for a lot of these questions we will be
echoing what the Navy says because they have
better first-hand knowledge.

But in this situation, there is a
couple of pieces that I think are slightly
different for the Coast Guard. Especially when
it comes to whether or not it should be binding.

I think we agree with that, but I can
also understand, from the government's
perspective, why there are times that they may go
against the probable cause ruling because the
Coast Guard's military justice bench is not as
deep.

So we may have to assign a PHO who
doesn't have the experience necessary to actually
give a thorough determination. And so, with
further information or further discussion, they
may decide that even though they found that it
wasn't probable cause maybe there was enough to
go forward.

As far as, are there statistics out
there as far as how many times the Coast Guard
does a different finding than what the PHO found,
I don't have statistics, but I know that it
happens. There are times that we will say there
is no probable cause.
But the SJA will recommend that they go forward. And again, I think that has something to do, a little bit to do with just -- how we're still growing when it comes to military justice. Yes, thank you.

COL BENNETT: So, again, no stats, no numbers but there are absolutely times where a PHO has said no PC and the SJA has changed it, said PC and gone forward to the court-martial. Overwhelmingly they end up in acquittal. Eighteen plus months later in many cases.

Does the defense counsel have an opportunity? There is that right, but I am going to go with Commander Kirkby and why would we. Very unique specific cases do we afford.

Right now we have a capital case and I know my lead counsel has afforded himself that opportunity to present directly to the convening authority, not just the SJA. But it's a very unique case. A very different case.

In most cases, the thought that defense is going to get a full hearing, that you
have that neutral detached that will look at the
defense evidence and take it into consideration
and make a different determination that can be,
you'll have the ability to sway.

I don't think we have a lot of
confidence in that so we're going to hold it.
We're going to wait until trial rather than that
information being given to the government and the
government find a way then to counter that while
we'll hold our cards.

It kind of goes to why we don't avail
ourselves with the Article 32. Without the
binding recommendation of a PHO, there is little
or no reason defense would ever put a case on.

Now, in the past it hasn't been
binding and defense would pick those cases and we
would try it at the 32, but we had a little bit
more faith that all of that evidence would be
taken into consideration and we could win a case
at the 32.

There is not the sense within the
defense bar, at least in the Army, that we can
win a case at the 32. It is an absolute paper

case without that binding recommendation. It's

just not worth it.

Going to whether it should be binding

or not, the arguments of the government this

morning is a little bit disingenuous. They pick

the time to prefer the charges.

If you look at from the time an

investigation starts to when we actually prefer

charges in the Military, it is a substantial

length of time. Yes, the preferral of charges

triggers a 120 day clock.

Other than the pretrial confinement

will also do it, I understand that piece. But

they control everything about that 32. They

control when it's preferred, they control the

investigators, they control the amount of

resources that are provided to the case, they

have more paralegal support in order to be ready

and prepared.

So at the preferral of charges, it

doesn't have to be perfected, I get it. I've
been an SJA, but they should be ready to go to
court in a very quick time.

    What if defense comes in and demands

a speedy trial, when you have those cases the
government unbearably says, oh no, no, not quite
ready. Then why did you trigger a court-martial.

    And all of that entails for a soldier,
an airman, a sailor, a Coast, whatever.

    (Laughter.)

    COL BENNETT: Why are you, as the
government, with that incredible prosecutorial
power, triggering something when you're not
ready. And we keep forgetting the accused. We
keep forgetting what they, and our length of time
is 500. Sometimes it's longer.

    We are talking about life altering
events for what, when you can look at it, the
experienced counsel, the ones who have it look at
the fact pattern and say, that's going to be an
acquittal. And yet we have to go through an 18
to 24 month process to get that result.

    Meanwhile, the accused, the family,
the victims, everyone else is going along in this
process simply to go through the process for what
we know the end result is going to be. I think
it's problematic.

COL. MORGAN: Thank you, ma'am. We,
to my knowledge, we do not retain these statics
as well. The trial defense division does not.
If those statistics were maintained it would be
by the military justice policy division, JM.

Anecdotally, we do see cases more
frequently than not where the PHO recommends, or
determines rather, that there's no probable cause
and yet, the government proceeds despite that
recommendation.

I do concur with everything my
colleagues have said. I would add that the
process whereby an SJA can present all of this
unexamined evidence ex parte to the convening
authority, does seem somewhat peculiar.

And it doesn't require that this be
memorialized anywhere. At least the Air Force,
pursuant to its administration military justice
instruction, AFI-51201, simply has a template
that answers in a conclusory fashion the four
questions.

There is probable cause, there is
jurisdiction, there is a basis to go forward.
I've gotten the fourth one.

CHAIR BASHFORD: The charges are in
the appropriate form.

COL. MORGAN: The charges are in the
appropriate form. Thank you.

(Laughter.)

COL. MORGAN: Thank you. But again,
these are highly complex, difficult decisions.
And it seems a little strange that none of this
has memorialized anywhere.

Convening authorities are highly
intelligent individuals. They read everything.
And why this somehow wouldn't be captured
somewhere, for the purposes of transparency and
to make a better-informed decision, is a little
unusual.

With respect to whether the PHOs
determination should be binding, again, I concur with my colleagues, yes. What I would add is that it would be binding but without prejudice.

So there would be a mechanism whereby the government could reopen or re-prefer charges and hold a new 32 if in fact there is new evidence. Or arguably, even if the PHO committed some legal error, applied the wrong standard, perhaps there could be an appeal to a Military judge or take it to the next higher level convening authority, which would leave it in command channels as to make a determination whether charges should in fact be re-preferred.

But a PHO's determination of probable cause should be a condition precedent for referral of charges.

CHAIR BASHFORD: I have a question for you. Several of you have said that although you have the option, at least on paper to bring evidence to the SJA before the commander's decision, you don't, you'd rather hold it. In my practice I call that the Perry Mason option.
And I regularly encourage defense attorneys, both pre and post arrest to, if you think we have it wrong please come in and tell us, don't wait 18 months down the road and do an ah-ha you got it wrong. If we have it wrong, we have it wrong, we can deal with this up front.

So is it that you don't believe you're going to get a fair, if you bring in this evidence that you believe shows they have it wrong, do you think it's not going to get a fair hearing?

COL BENNETT: I think it may be a difference of what type of evidence. Is it truly exculpatory.

It's like, nope, here is a text message that says, after the fact that, yes, it was all consensual, right? I mean, that's a little bit of a difference. You would then bring it over to the trial counsel, to the SJA, have that taken in and hopefully be dispositive of the case.

But I think there's other types of
evidence that maybe you're going to hold the inconsistent statements, some of the character evidence that you're going to kind of withhold that a little bit. You're not going to bring it, again, it depends on the weight of the evidence and that you think it's going to be given.

So the truly exculpatory, I would encourage my counsel, give it over so we can end this system. But the ones where is doesn't quite get us completely on the side of, it just didn't happen to, it makes it more questionable, whether you're going to conviction.

Then I don't know that there's value of giving that over to the government earlier in the process versus waiting.

CDR KIRKBY: No, I would agree. I think there is, in every case the counsel on the case has to decide, is this dispositive, is this the text message that clears my client or is something that the government is going to be surprised by it at trial and if they got it beforehand they can remedy it, they can come up
with something different.

A lot of our cases we do, if we have the evidence, if our investigators, we have DLSS, defense investigators, if they come up with information that is exculpatory, we will put that forward at any stage of, we don't really care if it's 32, post-32, the day before trial, whatever, we will try and get that in. Because, obviously, the best outcome for our clients is, don't go to trial.

Acquittal is not as good as don't go to trial if you're innocent. It's not worth the risk.

So, I think in those cases we would absolutely go forward. But a lot of the times, as the Colonel said, it's evidence that calls into question the accused, the complaining witness' behavior.

Her history, her reaction afterwards. There may be messages that the government is not aware of that call into question the entire story that they're giving.
If we don't think it's going to be
dispositive, we're not going to turn it over,
we're going to wait and do that in cross
examination.

CDR KING: I would agree with what my
colleagues have said. And I don't think that I
have anything additional to add as to why we
wouldn't other than its strategy. Like it's
trial strategy.

And if we can't walk in knowing that
it's going to make the case go away, then we have
to decide when is the best time to bring that
forward and when would we have the best results.

COL. MORGAN: So, I agree with the
question. The premise of the question in theory.
If we were in a position to present evidence
which would paint the case in an entirely
different light and perhaps cause the government
to rethink its prosecution.

Our general default position would be
to do so, but you heard from the Air Force this
morning that the likelihood of a conviction does
not factor into their analysis.

So, at least for our service there is very little point in presenting this evidence. If the government is going to go forward regardless, it merely gives the government an opportunity to perfect its case.

COL. DANYLUK: As I mentioned, I think the Marines handle it a little bit differently. We're more likely to participate in the 32 and not waive it. And we do participate in the post-32 document submission.

We have realized some degree of success. Maybe we're naive in that. But I think as a group we have determined that winning the case at a dismissal is obviously, as we've all said, better than winning it at the court-martial process, if we can do that.

And so far, we have faith that that system is working with some degree of success.

MS. CANNON: Speaking of the 32, I'd like to understand better what it looks like, because we're hearing that it's just a bunch of
paper, 15 minutes. And now that there may be a
different experience across the different
services.

So, I'm wondering, what occurs at a 32
now, what would make it better?

I get the sense unanimously binding
decisions would make it better. So, assuming
short of that, or in addition to that, what else
would make it better and what's happening over in
the Marine Corps that might be different than the
experiences over here.

So, if we could hear all the
experiences of what's going on in the 32
hearings, what would you like to see that's
different that we haven't discussed as binding?

CDR KIRKBY: I think what we're seeing
is many times, especially in sexual assault
cases. Now, sexual assault cases are unique and
I know this panel is here to discuss sexual
assault cases, but changes we make to the Article
32 effect every case not just these.

We recently had a case where the
Article 32 was two and a half days. It was not a sexual assault case. In the sexual assault case it's usually a paper case.

I think if we wanted to make a change we say that can't happen. You can't simply come in and put down a bunch of papers and say, here's your 15 minutes. It takes eight minutes to read the script, it takes, you know, to read the rights and to go through everything that's going on.

So really, what are we talking about? The government presents exhibits 1 through 27. Thank you for your consideration, we think this should go forward to a general court martial.

That's next to useless. In fact, that may be on the same parallel as useless.

What we'd like to see, put the witnesses on the stand. Put some. If you still want to maintain that the victim has a right not to testify, and if that's Congress' position, there are some problems with that but let's just say that is it, put the NCIS agents on, put other
people on to say, this is really what happened.

    Rather than simply here is a report of
investigation, just put the agent on the stand.
The government should have to produce a living
person to allow some kind of cross examination.
To allow some kind cross examination, to allow
some kind of involvement by the defense.

    Rather than simply saying, defense, so
you can put anybody you want on but we're not
going to give you anybody to put on. Which
essentially means, you can put the accused on if
you really want to.

    And no defense counsel in their right
mind is going to do that. So, I think if we were
looking at a change, that would be one.

    The other thing I think we probably,
as we go through this process and we see the
equivalent rates and we see everything else
that's playing into this, we need to consider
whether the complaining witness not testifying is
a good idea.

    In many cases, we used to do it in the
old system, we would have the complaining witness
come in, they would testify and you would turn to
your client and say, that went really badly for
us. That was terrible.

We need a deal. We need to never make
that happen again. If she gets up there up or he
gets up there and testifies, you are going down.
So let's make a deal.

So I think what we've given up is that
demonstration to the defense, this is how strong
the government's case is.

MS. CANNON: Well, and just to
interrupt for a moment, in the private sector
there is, at least where I come from in
California, there is Prop 1, whatever, 114. And
they come in through testimony of investigators.

CDR KIRKBY: Yes.

MS. CANNON: Not bring in the victims.
But there is still prelims. There is still
hearings. And is that what, that is also what
you're talking about?

CDR KIRKBY: I do. And I think,
earlier I mentioned, is there a Military
necessity to the reason we have a 32 as not being
binding.

    I think there are lots of things that
we can take from state court proceedings and
federal proceedings that we can box into what we
term the Article 32 process without going through
these additional steps.

    Because really in the Military process
there is a reason not to keep doing all these
other steps. But if we could have the same
foundational issues resolve at this Article 32, I
think that's beneficial for everybody,

    Looking at the black and white on the
paper you may say, oh, well, we don't want this
thing to happen. We don't want an investigation
is what Congress has said.

    But at some stage everybody does an
investigation. Every state, every federal entity
does an investigation. We've simply obliterated
that and now our conviction rates have tanked.

    MS. CANNON: Okay. Can I hear from
the other services.

CDR KING: I think I agree with everything that the Navy said because they do our cases.

(Laughter.)

CDR KING: But one of the things that I think would help the Coast Guard specifically is, to work on a system to increase, or to get PHOs qualified.

Whether that's some type of training before they're allowed to be a PHO or you have to have a certain amount of experience. Because that's part of the investigation.

So they're going to ask the informed questions and they're going to help draw out some of the information. And if they don't have the background knowledge to ask those right questions, then it's, I think, worse than just a paper case. So, that's the additional piece for the Coast Guard.

CHAIR BASHFORD: Okay.

COL. MORGAN: We're largely seeing the
same thing in the Air Force that Commander Kirkby described. We're largely seeing perfunctory Article 32s where select pieces of the report of investigation are offered for the 32 PHO, along with perhaps video recordings. And no live witnesses are called.

So, to answer your question, the calling of live witnesses would certainly be beneficial to the truth finding process. Expanded powers of the preliminary hearing officer to direct that the government actually produce evidence and perhaps empower the PHO to issue some sort of sanctions if the government fails to comply.

The binding determination of course.

And I would echo the comments with respect to some sort of robust training, perhaps certification process for preliminary hearing officers. That's what I would add.

I'm not sure that our actual 32 process is any different than the other services. It's mostly paper. They don't call live
witnesses.

I think the outcomes, it sounds like the outcomes are just sometimes different in the Marine Corps.

We would like to have live witnesses too and we would like to have better trained PHOs. If that's what's holding the SJAs back from relying more on the PHOs then we feel like, then maybe they should be better trained or have different qualifications. Maybe they should be magistrates or judges.

But other than that, I don't think the actual execution of it is any different for us.

COL BENNETT: Your question was, what other than making it a binding recommendation, and I hesitate because I think really if you make it binding, a lot of the changes that we would advocate for would happen because the government would have to put thought, care and preparation into the 32.

They're not going to sit there and put, unless it's an incredibly strong, here is
the victim's statement, here is the accused

confession, right? Oh, by the way, those
generally don't go with 32.

But everything we're talking about,
right, if I was the government trial counsel and
this is going to be, this was going to make or
break my case, I'm going to either go forward or
not, I'm going to put the live witnesses on. I'm
going to assess my case.

I'm going to make sure that I am

providing that PHO with all the information. And
if that PHO says I have this question and I need
this, this and this, the government is going to
get it to them.

So, a lot of the changes that are made
I think would almost be taken care of by making
it binding, enforcing the government to resource
the article 32 the way it should be so they can't
say, well, the PHOs aren't all that experienced.

Well, give us your experienced
individuals to your PHOs then. Train them.

You know, probable cause, we had the
conversation that's law school 101. That's your first year of law school, you get what probable cause is.

So to say, typically for sexual assaults for the Army, our PHOs are majors. So to say a major judge advocate in the Army cannot make a probable cause determination, which would be binding, that's kind of questionable.

But if we make it binding, the government then has all of the reasons to do what we're saying to make it more of a true preliminary hearing and really put in that constitutional protection for the accused.

CHAIR BASHFORD: Given the increased number of waivers of the 32 that we are seeing, and if it were to stay in its current posture of a lack of a PC not being binding and no live witnesses, it seems like the Marine Corps at least thinks there still is some utility to it. What about the rest of the services?

CDR KIRKBY: I would say there's still some utility to it. We still would like to see
what the government is going to present.

   It gives us another opportunity to
file a motion with the court. And hopefully one
day the court listens and says, we agree, this
was misleading, they didn't put in the entire ROI
even though it was a 200 page paper case that
they put in, they did not put in this exculpatory
things that the convening authority should have,
should have done.

   So, I think there is still utility in
it, I just, I think it's the exception rather
than the rule. If the rule is there should be a
hearing that has some benefit across the board,
then I think we need to change it. We need to
modify it. I'm not sure how much we need to
change it.

   I echo Captain Monahan's comments from
earlier. We've had a lot of changes over the
last ten years. I would be reticent to suggest
we need wholesale change.

   But there are some certain
modifications that would benefit the system,
benefit the victims, the accused and the system as a whole.

MS. TOKASH: I'm curious about your motions that you talked about before, Commander Kirkby.

So, in a case where there was a no probable cause determination made by the preliminary hearing officer yet the staff judge advocate recommends to the CG to refer and the CG does so, now you're sitting at defense counsel table representing a service member accused of a crime, in a general court-martial. And you filed a motion to dismiss with the Military judge.

Is your dismissal motion based on the threshold constitutional issue that is that probable cause has already been determined and the SJA and convening authority are summarily ignoring that constitutional issue, and might that be one of the differences that was alluded to between Military due process and constitutional due process?

CDR KIRKBY: I hate to agree that
there is a difference. I think due process is
due process. We still have some constitutional
rights.

But I think that's -- because of the
language used in the statute for the Article 32,
it is a recommendation. It is not binding.
Therefore, we lose the motion fairly, almost
every time.

We win on the fringes of some other
misconduct or other happenings by the government.
But generally speaking, we lose the motion based
upon our argument that the PHO, the neutral and
impartial person hearing this determined there
was no probable cause and the judges say, that's
great, your absolutely right, move on. Because
it's just not binding.

MS. TOKASH: And if you think it were
binding, then maybe the military judges might
view the issue differently and rule on your
motions differently?

CDR KIRKBY: Oh, I believe so. I
think, but I think also the SJAs and the
convening authorities would understand more. And
I think this goes back to the whole argument that
Colonel Bennett was making.

If you make this binding, I think
everybody's game is upped. I think everybody
steps up.

A lot of the issues we're talking
about, that we need to improve this and we need
to do this.

I think all of those have to follow
suit in order to meet that threshold, in order to
avoid the risk of, no, we're going to do this
again if you think you've got more evidence.

MS. TOKASH: And do you think that
making that binding would have an impact on, what
I think Judge Grimm might have characterized it
before as the abysmal conviction rate that the
military has currently?

CDR KIRKBY: I think fewer cases would
go forward. I think therefore if the good cases,
government version of the good case is one, I
think the conviction rate goes up, right?
The acquittal rate goes down because the terrible cases for the government are simply not being prosecuted, they are dying an appropriate death out in 32. There's no PC and we're not going forward.

MS. TOKASH: Can I hear from the other services please?

COL BENNETT: I would agree that it would have an impact of being able, one, as an SJA, having served as an SJA twice now, if I had that no PC, I would not go forward.

But if it's a binding decision, it really takes some pressure from the victim of we can't go forward. You refused to testify, your statement had inconsistencies.

That ability then to fairly easily dispose of cases based on the binding recommendation of a 32 officer would be crucial in order to get rid of the really bad cases.

Even on the ones where it says, hey, you have PC but recommendation, disposition not going forward, that wouldn't be binding.
However, once you invite the 32 with the
authority in the PC, say this is a binding
recommendation, this is someone who we trust to
make this very basic, that even would allow me to
go back to an SVC saying, we're not going
forward, this is where it's going to end up.

You're providing more information to
the SJA, to the convening authority to help them
make proper disposition of the really hard cases
rather than saying, we're going to take all these
cases to trial regardless and we'll let the court
figure it out.

And then we'll also go back, if it's
a binding, then from a defense point of view do
we offer more information. Do we go to a little
bit more of a trust, that if we bring out all
these prior inconsistent statements of the victim
at the 32 and they really look at what that case
is about versus just what the victim statement
says, then maybe defense brings more information
sooner in the process and we can now get rid of
this case and then look at using all of our
resources at the other cases that are going to go forward.

    COL. MORGAN: So we have had defense counsel motion the court to dismiss the charges. Looking at the historical and legislative history behind Articles 32 and Article 34, that Article 32 was principally designed to function as a protection against baseless charges, that Article 34 is an additional protection that's designed to, again, screen out merit-less cases, even despite a probable cause determination.

    And then the other piece is based on the statutory construction of Article 32 itself. It actually uses the term determination. So the PHO makes a probable cause determination whereas in other places in the statute it uses the term recommendation, and that utilization of the term determination actually is a legal term of art. Which requires that it be honored as a final, the finality, given finality to the action.

    And we have had no luck with this
motion.

COL. DANYLUK: I would just add that
if we're not going to get there where it's
binding, we would like to know why the SJA is
finding that there's probable cause when a PHO
has already determined that there's not probable
cause.

So we think that that is something
that should be part of the Article 34 advice
letter when they are finding probable cause when
there's been a determination about probable
cause.

MS. TOKASH: Well, your colleagues in
the military justice division chiefs panel
referenced that one of the factors might be this
additional evidence. And I'm not talking about
the additional evidence that's noted in the
R.C.M. 405.

It sounds like they're talking about
even further additional evidence that's almost
like ex parte with the, I mean, that's what I was
left, the impression I was left with that it's
this ex parte presentation of evidence to the convening authority without defense counsel there to overwhelm the prior no PC determination made by the PHO.

Do you have any comment on that and would you recommend maybe adding a rule for court-martial between the preliminary hearing rule and 405 and Rule 406 pretrial advice that talks about this mysterious additional evidence procedure that we've heard about today?

COL. DANYLUK: So, Colonel King, I think, disavowed this finding of new evidence in the interim. I think that you had asked him about.

But instead, the SJA was providing, not new information to the government, but information that wasn't contained in the, maybe presented at the 32. I mean, I guess I don't really know exactly what it is because we don't get a copy of it and we don't know what they've told them.

So if it's part of this prosecutorial
merits memo system or something like that, that's not provided to us so I'm not sure.

CHAIR BASHFORD: I think that I have a question on -- we've seen several reports from the 32 officer that says, sort of the equivalent of, well, there is probable cause but there is serious credibility issues. On the other hand, that's not for me to determine, that's for the court-martial.

Obviously, it's hard to make determinations on credibility based on papers, but sometimes it's not. Do you think that the 32, to the limited extent they're able to, do you think credibility should be a consideration or should that be something referred downstream to a court-martial?

COL BENNETT: I think it should absolutely be part of a 32 determination. Especially when you look at the sexual assault and when you look at those classic he said, she said, which is so many of our cases, it comes down to the credibility. And to have a 32
officer being able to look and make that
determination.

We do it for 15-6 investigating
officers. One of the things we want them to do
is a credibility of the witnesses that they've
interviewed.

And if there's a change --

CHAIR BASHFORD: I'm sorry, what's a
15-6?

COL BENNETT: I'm sorry, that's our
administrative investigation. So non-criminal
typically.

But we require that if there's a
difference between two witnesses, that the IO
really take a look at those two statements and
come up with a determination where he thinks is
truth or where is the credibility issues between
those witnesses.

So to have an Article 32, we're at the
probable cause determination, not, to be able to
just defer credibility down to the court-martial,
we are, again, missing an opportunity to
foreclose proceedings.

And the time between a 32 and a trial, I don't know the average time. But it can go up to 12, 18 months from a 32 actually getting into a court-martial and not being able to have a truly neutral detached party look at the credibility issues when they're evident.

When there's inconsistent statements within the victims primary, we're not even talking any consistent statements outside of the primary statement but within the statement itself and yet we're not having credibility determinations by all the PHOs.

I don't know how you can get to a probable cause without thinking about the credibility of those witnesses and those statements.

CDR KIRKBY: Ma'am, that's a very interesting question because I think if we made it binding, if we said, if we said you have to make a credibility determination and we didn't change anything else, so that was the only in a
vacuum thing we changed, my fear would be the
government would simply be able to put in
statements that were from NCIS or CGIS or
whatever, investigative service that had none of
that information in there. So they would simply
be able to avoid the credibility issue.

The onus would then fall to the
defense to say, wait, there are these other
inconsistent things which would essentially mean
we would be forced to show our hand.

And I don't know that the consequence
of that is what we would want to see. That's an
interesting question I think we need to think
further on how we would specifically do it and
what the governments, you know, what's the fourth
order of effect of what that change would do
without any other changes.

CDR KING: I think one of the
difficult things with the question is, is to
create a blanket rule. Credibility issues are
not all created equally.

So, if it's a clear situation where we
have a piece of evidence that says one thing and
another that says exactly the opposite, well
maybe they can make a determination and present
that to the convening authority so that they can
make a final determination.

But some of the other credibility
issues, it's not as easy to say, absolutely, this
person doesn't have credibility or absolutely
they do. So, I would probably resist the urge to
give a blanket rule but to work in some kind of
guidance so that the PHO is thinking about it and
presenting evidence that would help the convening
authority see what happened during that hearing.

Because they were the eyes and the
ears. So help make sure that you are detailing
it in such a way that when the convening
authority is making a decision, they have all of
the evidence and all of the information so that
in the end it's the best decision for the
military justice process.

And I think sometimes we lose sight of
the military justice process and we really are
trying to figure out how to serve justice, right? And sometimes justice is not a conviction. We do the best that we can.

And the convening authority needs the information so that they can do the best they can to make the best decision for the service as a whole.

COL. MORGAN: So, credibility in these situations is often times the central issue where alcohol is involved and there is the absence of physical evidence, sometimes there is a prior relationship between the accused and the victim.

Collateral misconduct, as we know often times comes into play, which may provide the motive. And so, these things are often times critical to a determination.

So, I would certainly empower the PHO to consider these factors in making a recommendation.

But to Colonel Bennett's point, our IG investigations as well, often times perform a credibility determination when there is
conflicting testimony. So we have case law, we have guidance, we have a panel instruction for determining credibility.

So, I would also second the recommendation that perhaps this be formalized and actually included as factors that the PHO is to consider.

CDR KING: Agreed. I think it should be a factor the PHO can consider. I'm not sure it should be mandated that he consider it. Because, as you mentioned, maybe it's impossible for them to determine.

My only concern is that it might have the unintended consequence of now they are often times putting in the video interviews of the alleged victims and it could be then that they stop putting the videos in. And so then the SJA and the convening authority have less information then they're having now if the PHO is making a credibility determination based on a video tape.

CHAIR BASHFORD: I don't actually know if this is a question as much as an observation,
but you have -- obviously, it's an adversarial process, but we see and hear from the prosecutors that if they write down their advice to the convening authority and then have to give that over, that's like a roadmap of possible weaknesses to their case.

In my experience, defense attorneys know very well the weaknesses of my case. You on the other hand are saying if we show our cards, that's a roadmap to the prosecutors to fix the weaknesses of their case.

I know the weaknesses of my case, I don't need defense attorneys usually to tell me about something unless there's really something outlying there.

And I guess this is why this is more of an observation. Despite it being an adversarial process, it would be nice if people came to it more in an atmosphere of trust. That you don't think the prosecution is hiding the information or the parts of the interviews that make the witnesses subject to, you know, raised
eyebrows and the, so I guess that's really more
of an observation.

If that were a goal, that would be
where I would like to see everybody get to.
Despite recognizing it as an adversarial process.
So, I don't actually have a question.

MS. LONG: I have a -- maybe this is
also an observation/question. Because I have
heard over and over again, and as a prosecutor
doing these cases, it's something I've probably
heard for over 20 years, credibility, it's all
about victim credibility, alcohol matters.

Prior relationship, collateral
misconduct, inconsistent statements. All of the
things that exist in sexual violence cases.

You've all been trial counsel you
know, as well as anyone else. And so, if you are
trying to make credibility, so, I'm going to
take, at this point knowing you're sitting in the
defense seat, I understand that you're not going
to acquiesce to a lot of these things.

And there certainly is a difference
between a material or an immaterial inconsistency, but to have then a credibility assessment made based on those things when we know that this is what offenders can exploit, it seems a little early in the system with total and complete information of the 32.

But it does make me wonder perhaps, and I also think it's too early to draw any conclusions about conviction rates, besides the fact that it's somewhat misleading when you say there's a 20 percent conviction rate when you're just looking at the lead charge and you're not understanding what's happening.

I also wonder if maybe this is why the military judges are giving a better conviction rate on the bench trials, depending on wherever we look versus the panel. Because there's more of an understanding.

And so, I guess what I would just caution against is that knowing how complex these cases are and knowing how, for decades these cases, there are --- and we never want to see an
innocent person being dragged through them, I mean, I think we're all on the same page, but there are guilty people that their cases will not progress because of all the barriers.

Finding an area where we're protecting defendants' rights but remembering fairness to the accused is due the accuser also.

And really trying to keep the balance, to plagiarize a justice. But to keep the balance true when we're trying to figure out a system that does both of those things.

That certainly allows for defendant or an accused not to have their life derailed inappropriately, but not to try and make pretend right now that a conviction or an acquittal rate is a representation of innocent people being brought to the system when we know that there is so much misunderstanding and gaps in the practice.

So, that was more of an observation I think.

MR. KRAMER: So, I have an observation
but a question too.

(Laughter.)

MR. KRAMER: I share Chair Bashford's wish that there would be more trust in the system, but believe me, the civilian system has plenty of mistrust in it as well, so, it would be nice for all systems to have more trust.

But my question is, now I want to move way beyond the Article 32. And Jennifer, Ms. Long talked about it.

We saw what I would call striking difference in conviction and acquittal rights between a judge trial and a member's trial. And I don't think we have the stats to show whether why it went to the judge trial.

Was there some very prejudicial fact that they didn't want the members to know, was there a racial component, was there -- so, the question is, finally, why would, given those numbers, why would defense counsel ever agree to a judge trial?

And is it similar to the civilian
world where a judge can kick the case before it
ever gets to the members?

In other words, in the civilian world
a judge can grant a judgement of acquittal and
the jury will never get the case. Is there a
procedure for that in the military, if so, or
even if not, why would, given the numbers we saw,
why are defense, why would a defendant or the
accused agree to a judge trial?

COL DANYLUK: I'm glad you asked the
question, I've been waiting all day to speak to
this.

(Laughter.)

COL DANYLUK: And I have been a judge
a couple times, but I'm here as a defense
counsel. But what I didn't hear in the stats was
a distinction between a contested case and a
guilty plea case.

All of the guilty plea cases are going
judge alone. So when you see a higher conviction
rate, especially in those middle cases where it's
not the contact but it's some other assault type
of allegation and charge that is a conviction, I
suspect if they broke those statistics down more
you would find that the higher rate is not
necessarily because they went judge alone, it's
because it's a guilty plea and so they had to go
judge alone.

          CDR KIRKBY: And so, we do have the
equivalent of a, it's called 917 motion in the
military. Basically the judge, if he finds a
lack of evidence by the government on a specific
element, can kick the case before it ever gets to
all the charge. Can kick the entire case, but
usually the charge, before it ever gets to the
member. So we do have the equivalent.

          COL BENNETT: I would also, I was
curious on, they just gave me the numbers. Quite
honestly, from our perspective, whether our
counsel are recommending to their client to go
judge alone or to the panel is very jurisdiction
specific. It's specific on who are your judges,
who are your panels, what's the composition of
the panels, what have the panels done in the
past.

So there are so many different variables. One, it would be interesting to take out the actual guilty plea.

We have any number of acquittals from our military judges. And I have a number of jurisdictions that pretty much we don't do panel cases and we are very, still very successful at either getting an acquittal or getting the sentence that we think is appropriate from the military judge.

So, again, very specific to the facts, very specific to the jurisdiction, very specific to who the military judge is.

COL. MORGAN: And it's generally a requirement. At least in the Air Force, that a term in the plea agreement include that the member go before a military judge alone. With respect to a guilty plea.

I would just echo the comments that, right, our litigators are expected to know their installations, know the local conditions and to
know their military judges. But additionally, there very well may be an instance where a defense may turn on a particular point of law that may be better received by the military judge than the members.

CDR KING: For the Coast Guard cases, there's a little bit of trust, or an issue of trust for us, I think without panels as well, but we've had some cases recently where the advice that went out to the convening authority to pick their panels was less than transparent and probably less than legal, if I should say.

(Laughter.)

CDR KING: So then there is that trust factor too. So are we getting a fair panel if we select a panel or should we just go with the judge that we already know.

CHAIR BASHFORD: It's been suggested in several of the answers to the RFIs that an acquittal is a demonstration of a process that is fair and just and that acquittals aid in the maintenance of good order and discipline.
At the levels we're seeing here, do you agree with those statements or disagree?

COL. DANYLUK: It seems to be an unfair burden on an accused person to prove that the system works just by putting them through the process. Does that make sense?

Like, if we all know that it's going to be an acquittal at the end of the day, but we feel like we need to send it to the members just to show that the system works, that seems to not really be justice to me.

COL. MORGAN: I --

COL BENNETT: I, oh, I'm sorry. A certain level of acquittals, right? I mean, because if you had a hundred percent conviction rate, then we're absolutely going to question the fairness of our system.

So a certain level of acquittals I think does. It really shows the system works, you're getting that chance, at the court-martial, to put on the full case. And the panel or the judges, the final trier of fact, are really
looking at the evidence.

But when you're looking at the acquittal rates and the sexual assaults going over 50 percent, I think we really then have to say, what is the process. You know, as an SJA I looked really hard at -- what I told my counsel is I don't really care about the end state, I care about the process, how did we get there.

So, if I had ten cases and nine acquittals, I need to be looking at, what is wrong in the process, how we are not evaluating these cases, did we just luck out and we just really had nine really hard cases that had a go?

I kind of think we're missing some steps to really look, analyze. I think one of the panel members earlier this morning said, speculation is taking over analysis. When we don't know what we have.

You know, we had the government up here this morning saying, well, we're not ready at the 32, we shouldn't be bound by the evidence we're able to present because we're continuing to
investigate. Well, how did you prefer charges?

You're having your commanders, you were signing charges and saying, these, the evidence support the charges. How are we getting there if you don't know what's out there.

So, it is problematic where we're sitting. But if we're accepting this over 50 percent acquittal rate of, well, that's just the system and it really shows the system works, we're missing an opportunity to go back and look at our process and look at individuals who are in charge of it saying, where did we miss, how can we get better, how can we keep this 18 to 24 month process of this accused not to happen.

So, some acquittals, right, we've always had them. But the level of acquittals we're having.

And the other thing, I think it has the opposite effect on good order and discipline. So if you have that commander who has had the soldier in his command for 24 months and they've gone through this process and it ends in an
acquittal or you have soldiers sitting in the
court-martial saying, it should end in an
acquittal, I can't believe this happened, we're
losing faith. We're losing faith.

If you have an acquittal rate of 59.4
percent by panel members, how do those panel
members take a look at the cases the government
are presenting and acquittal after acquittal,
we're not taking the right cases so why should we
trust the system? How does that truly support
good order and discipline in the military.

So some yes. I think the numbers that
we have, we need to be doing a really hard look
at what we're doing, what our processes are and
why we, why we are where we are at.

COL. MORGAN: So, Colonel Bennett made
a number of my points, but --

(Laughter.)

COL. MORGAN: -- thank you. But I
think it's a confluence of events looking at the
entire system, beginning with investigations that
are oftentimes incomplete.
We heard that sometimes charges are preferred, they go to the 32 without the evidence, hoping that at some point before trial the evidence will materialize and often times it doesn't.

This is followed by an often times perfunctory, Article 32, with a determination that there is no probable cause which is then disregarded by the convening authority resulting in a foreseeable acquittal, which then has the effect, I think, of hardening some of the members to the process.

CDR KIRKBY: I think in addition, we've got to look at, I mean, other, other victims looking at the process saying, well, that case happened, the government said it had a good case, it moved forward through all of these steps.

As a victim, if I were saying I have a good case, this actually has really happened to me, but why would I go through that process because if it's a good case and they lost 58.2
percent of the last time, why would I go through this.

And so, I think good order and discipline has a number of different issues. The accused themselves, I don't think they see this as good order and discipline.

It is very difficult to convince somebody, hey, you're facing 20 plus years in jail, but don't worry, it's good order and discipline. That's a difficult sell for a defense counsel.

For a victim, future victim saying, oh, don't worry, the government has lost 50 to 80 percent of the last cases, but yours is a really strong case, don't worry, I don't see how that is beneficial to that victim in the future.

So, I think there is an effect of the acquittal rate. I think it's detrimental, the good order and discipline across the board.

CDR KING: And I hope I don't sound cynical, but our court-martials are usually not happening where the offenses are. So, folks
aren't following it.

So, you will hear that something happened to a member and then that member has disappeared. If you follow back in a year or two when the process is over, they have no idea what happened.

They don't know if they got discharged, they went to a court-martial, were found guilty. And if the crew aren't following the results, I can't image it's having any impact on good order and discipline.

MR. KRAMER: So, is there a sense in the high acquittal rate you talked about, is there a sense that, because of the times or whatever, maybe the publicity going on, that there's pressure, and I don't mean improper pressure, but there's pressure to proceed with the cases that maybe ten years ago would not have proceeded?

Does it seem like there's more, I don't know if pressure is, you know what I'm trying to say, I think, that cases may be now
because of the publicity or proceeding that may
not have in the past?

CDR KIRKBY: Sure. And, sir, somebody
said earlier in a sidebar, no convening authority
has ever been removed for referring a case to
court-martial.

I mean, is there a pressure? Is there
improper command, I don't know, unlawful command
influence, that's not what we're talking about.

MR. KRAMER: Right.

CDR KIRKBY: There is a pressure from
above. The existence of this panel is a
pressure. Everybody who knows about the review
by Congress, by all the changes, suggested to the
military justice process, the changes over the
last ten years.

Yes, there's a pressure, there has to
be. I mean, if, it's naive to think there's not.

To what extent does that go forward,
I don't know. I'm sure there's some science,
there's some algorithm out there that would tell
us exactly what the answer is, but there has to
be. I mean, there is that pressure, it exists.

COL BENNETT: And going back to Ms. Long's comment about the years that we really haven't given the victims a voice, right, and now we're more of a voice for the victims.

A real concern, I think the military system is generally considered with the SVC program and where we put victims in the process to be ahead of most of our civilian counterparts. But then you also have the #metoo movement.

All of the other movements that are out there, that pressure of, no, we have to provide these, the due process and the rights to the victim in order -- to some extent, it's almost we have to make up for our past, but we're doing it at the expense of a Soldier or a Service Member in order to make sure that that victim has all of the rights that, and is heard. Fully heard.

This morning they talked about the, having their day in court. Even a couple of the panel members this morning said, even if they
don't think it's going forward, if the victim wants to, we're going to go forward.

And that's problematic. And I think that goes to the pressure, right?

It's not necessarily a new command influence, but it's societal pressure. It's all around us and we can ignore the elephant in the room, but that is absolutely driving some of the decisions.

And it goes back to, maybe some of the trust or maybe the lack of trust. How can the defense bar overcome some of those societal pressures?

And we'll leave it at societal versus systematic within the military justice system. Victims are our priority. Victims have to be heard.

And again, some of it is simply, we haven't, your comment earlier, ma'am is we haven't given them that voice, we haven't listened to them for 20 years. You're right.

I cannot deny that it crossed our
jurisdiction. Not just in the military jurisdiction, across our jurisdictions, sexual assault, domestic violence has gotten short thrift in our justice systems.

But I think we always have to be careful of raising the rights of the alleged victims. And when you had the SVCs up here and talking about the acquittals, there was an absolute guarantee they were all victims. Right?

Maybe not every acquittal is the acquittal of an innocent man, but there are acquittals out there, when you're looking at it, looking at all the facts, I can look at it and say, he didn't do it or that wasn't a crime.

So, yes, there is absolute pressure, yes, that is driving our system. And we can ignore it or we can try to continue to balance what is right for the victims, what is right for society in order to take care of the sexual assaults and domestic violence.

Let's not go back 20 years. We need to take the hard cases. But we're not just
taking the hard cases, we're taking the
unwinnable cases. And we're doing it at the cost
and the expense of the accused, their families.

And in some cases, the military
itself, because we're taking really good soldiers
out of our formation. So there's a lot of
different issues that are at play, but there is
pressure and it's driving our system.

CHAIR BASHFORD: Did we hear from
everybody on that?

COL. MORGAN: No, ma'am. So, years
ago you may recall we had an issue with sexual
assault at BMT, at Lackland Air Force Base.
There were commanders that years after they had
PCS'd, years after they had left their squadron
commander positions, were then subjected to
adverse actions.

I believe some letters of reprimand
and promotions withheld for the manner in which
they dealt with the sexual assault atmosphere
within their squadrons.

So, I believe that eventually perhaps
some collateral relief was granted, these commanders. But this is not unknown within the Air Force and this definitely has an impact on the way commanders will view whether they should take a case forward.

    As Commander Kirkby mentioned, it's much easier to weather an acquittal as a commander than it is the scrutiny of not referring a case.

    COL DANYLUK: I think our experience, as I have spoken all day, is a little bit different. I think that, and I don't want to speak for the prosecutors, but they seem to be trying to provide, I don't want to call it top cover, but a very detailed analysis that gives the convening authority the support that they might feel that they need if they do decide to not refer a case.

    We still take weak cases to court, we still get lots of acquittals. But I think we are just a little bit more successful in providing the convening authority the support that they
need. Both through the prosecution and the
prosecutorial merit memos, the PHO report and
also the SJA's advice.

CHAIR BASHFORD: I saw questions over
here.

HON. BRISBOIS: So, just to follow-up
on this a little bit. By way of comparators, in
non-Article 120 cases, you've been front line
trial defense lawyers, you've been chiefs of
justice for an SJA, you've been SJAs, you're now
back in trial defenders.

When you go through the Article 32
process as it exists now, get a non-probable
cause determination/recommendation, depending on
your point of view I guess, do you anecdotally
see the same sort of response and pressures to
take non-probable cases to trial like as you do
in the 120 area?

CDR KIRKBY: Sir, I don't. I think
there is, I think in the non-120 arena the
pressure isn't there. I think if the convening
authority doesn't have to report up to his boss
or his bosses' boss or the secretary of the Navy, there is less pressure on it they say.

The juice just isn't worth the squeeze. At the end of the day, in this single spec drug case, it's just not worth it to go forward, we've got other remedies here.

I think there are lots of binding effects once we get to a general court-martial, it's difficult to back out of it. So there is people that are reticent to do that.

Once their case is going forward and once we go through the 32, I don't think in a 120 case there is the same desire to find another resolution. Especially from the accused.

I mean, it's difficult to say, I'm going to plead guilty to a 120 case. The long-term effects of that, which have questions.

So, from both sides there is a different aspect of the pressure that comes in. In a fraud case, it depends on the money amount.

If you're taking money from the government, if it's $1,000, maybe we can find a
way to end somebody's career and get the $1,000 back. Difficult to do that with a victim centric concept like 120. So, there is a difference, sir.

HON. BRISBOIS: Well, what you've been describing though is a difference where there is probable cause and the ability to negotiate a resolution different than court-martial.

My question was, one way to get a handle on whether there is pressure, properly or improperly, but political pressure, as to making decisions is, what is the behavior like in other areas under the punitive articles.

When in the non-probable cause area, do you see if there's no probable cause in a robbery or an assault of a fight nature, not sexual nature, do they refer them, overrule the non-probable cause determination and refer them to the court-martial anyway or do they generally say that sounds good and we'll go on for --

CDR KIRKBY: Well, I think there's two issues. One, the pressure I think comes in in a
much greater -- that would suggest it's only, the pressure is only on the Article 32. I think getting to the Article 32 there is pressure.

So, in the simple assault case, we may not get to a 32. Or a drug case, we may never get there.

So we don't even need to make that. People can say, hey, these are the results, we have other avenues that we're very happy to take. We can administratively discharge people for drugs, we can do all those things.

So, if there is an Article 32 finding of probable cause --

COL DANYLUK: Finding them.

CDR KIRKBY: No probable --

HON. BRISBOIS: No probable cause.

CDR KIRKBY: -- cause. I think, I can't think of cases where there is no probable cause in a non-sexual assault case. It's kind of unique to the 120 charge because it's so subjective.

HON. BRISBOIS: So it sounds like that
lack of creative resolution then, all the tools
to resolve at the lowest level misconduct just do
not apply in Article 120. They will find their
way to, once the charges are preferred, they will
find their way to an Article 32 hearing and then
regardless of the recommendation, likely end up
in courts-martial.

CDR KIRKBY: Sir, I have no statistics
on that, but my anecdotal experience is, that's
exactly what happens is, people are reticent to
take an alleged rape case to a non-judicial
punishment.

COL BENNETT: I would just say, one
other area we're starting to see more pressure
and that's the domestic violence. So, that would
be a caveat but otherwise if you have a case for
going forward, if you don't think you're going to
make PC, you're not taking it to the 32.

And you can dispose of that case,
whether it's alternate disposition or we're just
not going to go forward. But I would just caveat
as, I think we're seeing a little bit more in the
domestic violence arena and a little bit more
pressure there going forward without the victim
cooperation, things like that, would be the only
other area that I see. Not the same level of
pressure, but more pressure.

CHAIR BASHFORD: We're pretty much out
of time but I did see a hand over --

DR. MARKOWITZ: If we have time,
great, if not, that's fine.

CHAIR BASHFORD: We have time for your
question.

DR. MARKOWITZ: Sorry, as brief as
possible. I know both the Air Force and the
Marine Corps mentioned the issue of sexual
assault training as being one aspect of their
concern related to the conviction rates. I don't
know if the other services share that concern.

We see the whole concept of one drink
means you cannot consent often dealt with at voir
dire. For all of the members of this panel, do
you feel like voir dire is the best place to
address that issue, is there another way that you
all would prefer to be able to deal with it and what would that be? Or does voir dire take care of it, in your estimation?

CDR KIRKBY: I think as a final result, voir dire is the appropriate place to take care of it. But I think the training needs to be correct.

And Navy has done a fairly good job of dispelling the concept that one drink means you can't consent. I mean, logically that's irrational.

But we've done a good job of getting away from that training. But training as a whole, I mean, it's good in one respect. The saturation of sexual assault training puts everybody on the defense, on the defense side in the panel.

They're just saturated with this. Oh my God, another sexual assault issue. But the training has to be correct. So I think first up, the training needs to be correct. Second up, if we need to get there, then voir dire is the place
to fix it.

DR. MARKOWITZ: And, sir, does the defense have a look at the training? Are you getting the opportunity to look at training or --

CDR KIRKBY: Actually, Code 20. So, Captain Monahan's team looks at the training from a neutral perspective and says, this is good or bad. I don't, sorry, I just got in the seat on Monday, so I haven't had a look at training recently.

BRIG. GEN. SCHWENK: And you're leaving today?

(Laughter.)

CDR KIRKBY: My boss is at the back, so maybe, sir.

(Laughter.)

COL BENNETT: I'll say just real quick, one of the things that we do, we don't get to look at the overall training, but quite honestly I'm not really concerned that the training from the headquarters is the translation at the local level.
CDR KIRKBY: Right.

COL BENNETT: That is problematic.

So, many of our counsel and our senior defense counsel will actually make sure that they attend the training. Even if that's sending a paralegal over, so we know actually what is being said in that jurisdiction, in that training.

And there have been times when we've been able to go back and said, no, they stated this, that's not correct and that's going to lead to problems. And then it's also been absolute fodder for us at voir dire.

So, there is some proactive nature of us actually going and see what the training is.

At the local level. It's not at the higher headquarters level that I'm most concerned.

CDR KING: My training piece I think would be with the convening authorities and the SJAs and CGIS. Because they're the ones that's going to drill down and make sure that as their investigating and deciding which ones to bring forward as cases, if they understand the
questions to ask the victims, then the end
product works.

So, whether or not one of our young
folks feel like that, hey, I had one drink so now
I can't, well, hopefully that makes them a little
safer. But it's, how does it translate when we
get ready to bring forth a charge.

COL. MORGAN: Our division is not
consulted on the substance of the training. But
I agree that the training is, it has some utility
perhaps as using social standards, but it does
not, to my knowledge, include appropriate legal
standards.

COL. DANYLUK: The way it trickles
down, sometimes even when the accused is
interviewed, because of the training he received,
one and done type training, he will be confessing
to a rape allegation because his understanding of
SAPR training was that, well, she had something
to drink, I shouldn't have touched her. So
that's somewhat problematic.

And then also I've seen records of
trial where the trial counsel is saying, she was
too drunk to sign a recruiting contract so she is
too drunk to consent to have sex, and making
those kind of analogies which then the judge has
to then try to undo.

DR. MARKOWITZ: Okay, thank you.
COL. DANYLUK: Thank you.
CHAIR BASHFORD: Thank you all very
much for appearing as a lively discussion. Thank
you so much.

I don't know how much, do people need
break? Okay.

(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter
went off the record at 3:27 p.m. and resumed at
3:30 p.m.)

CHAIR BASHFORD: Ms. Tagert, Ms.
Gallagher, take it away.

MS. TAGERT: Good afternoon. The
purpose for us being here this afternoon is just
to give a very brief and quick update on the case
review progress to the DAC-IPAD and the public.
We have now completed the review of the 2,000
investigative case files including the preliminary hearing reports that were available for cases where 32 was held. And we have begun the inputting process of the information that was gleaned from those investigations.

We have completed the analysis of the Air Force data, and we will continue to work on the other services to have the data produced so that we can answer the questions that were raised here today about probable cause and whether or not there was an acquittal or further appellate overturn.

And we hope to have the data completed for you by late spring and then for analysis. And then if you vote to go on site visits later today, potentially we'll be drafting questions for those site visits to answer any of the questions that the data has raised for your review.

Pending any questions, that is the update from the case review today.

CHAIR BASHFORD: Thank you. Well put.
Before we start our next which is the data working group presentation, is there anybody -- it's been proposed that members of the DAC-IPAD do site visits. Is there anybody who is opposed to that general idea? Seeing no opposition, then we can go ahead and start planning for those.

It's also been proposed at an earlier meeting that we form an Article 32 working group. I think we already voted in favor of that. So I know Judge Grimm who couldn't be here was interested in that. If other people are interested, please let Colonel Weir or Ms. Carson know that they're interested in participating in that group.

MS. CARSON: By Monday, please, because we'll just start with --

CHAIR BASHFORD: Great.

MS. CARSON: -- contacting you.

CHAIR BASHFORD: Mr. Mason, Dr. Wells, the floor is yours.

MR. MASON: When they get the presentation up, we'll move on to that. But I
did want to just clarify. The question was raised whether we are actually looking at the conviction acquittal rates for contested cases versus those that were just preferred and referred.

We have, and they are in the appendix. We've done it for the past three years. We have data for 15 through 18 breaking it out. Those slides for the report, we've had them actually in the data report body itself. And they're going to go back in.

So we will have them. I apologize. We did a little different by this time around saying that we wanted to look at the referred so that you were looking at the big picture. But just off the top, I can tell you that with a military judge on a contested trial, so they did not plead guilty to the sex offense, convicted of a non-sex offense or acquitted of all charges with 77.6 percent of the time. And the actual flat out acquittal rate was 21.6. And that's very similar to what we were seeing when the plea
deals are included as well.

The presentation is just spinning, so we will continue on. I can tell you about the data without having to show you a pretty chart. One thing that we've been discussing is the rate of cases, how they have fallen year over year.

In FY15, we received 780 cases that were added to the database. This most recent year, we have 574 cases. So that is a rather steep decline over the past four years. And that is for penetrative and contact sexual assault that were preferred. So 574 cases in the database.

We talked this morning about the fact of how many cases we're actually receiving when we do the RFI and what they tell us they believe are the cases. And 75 percent of the cases that they have given to us for this past year were valid. The other 25 percent were because they were the wrong fiscal year or it was a child sex case or there was some other reason of why we could not add it to our database.
So the takeaway from that is that we rely on the services that tell us which cases exist. And the information that we're getting from them is not 100 percent accurate.

BRIG. GEN. SCHWENK: So the 574 -- pardon me for interrupting, but I'm interrupting. So the 574 is the 75 percent or is it 75 percent of 574?

MR. MASON: It's 75 percent of 774. And so the actual cases that are in our database for this year is 574.

BRIG. GEN. SCHWENK: So those are the valid cases?

MR. MASON: Yes sir.

CMSAF MCKINLEY: So the 774, we don't know exactly how many of those are real cases?

MR. MASON: Well, I can tell you. I mean, we track, and I have a tracking sheet for each service when they give us the RFI. I can tell you down to the line whether it was a child case, if it was a duplicate case, if it was the wrong fiscal year. Or we have 90 percent of the
documents but we can't get enough to get it into
the database.

I can tell you down to the line and
number how it breaks out. There is -- with
respect to one service, there were quite a few
that there was just no documents to support. So
we don't know what happened, how that name got on
the list. But we didn't see that with the other
services.

CMSAF McKinley: With that significant
drop from last year to this year, there'll be two
questions. Number one, do we have less sexual
assaults in the military? And number two, or are
there less victims coming forward?

Mr. Mason: And unfortunately what the
data is going to tell you is how many cases were
seen go through the system. It doesn't tell us
if there's less happening, if there are less
victims, if there are victims that are not coming
forward. It doesn't tell us any of that.

One of the conclusions that we can
draw, though, is that the distribution of
penetrative versus contact offenses has remained consistent over the past three years. So even though the number of cases are falling, your distribution is the same.

So we can reasonable say, and Dr. Wells can correct me if I'm wrong, that we're not focusing our attention just on penetrative cases because contact cases are still 25 percent of what's going forward. Or we're not just focusing on contact because penetrative is still 75 percent. So you can see that there is a decline, but your distribution hasn't changed.

And again, I apologize. For the two of you, the presentation is behind you. What this slide tells you is that the percentage of cases within our database for each service. So if you look at the fourth column or the second from the left, FY 2018, you can see that that the Army had 40.4 percent of the cases in our database for FY18.

The column next to that tells you that their percentage of the active duty force is
actually 35 percent. So the Army's cases in our database are an over-representation when compared to what their service is. You can look by looking across the years. You can see how the different services bounce back and forth.

The Coast Guard is fairly consistent. We generally see the same basic number of cases. And just as an aside, last year in FY18, the Coast Guard had 15 cases. So it is a much smaller sample that we're working with.

So we discussed this yesterday a bit, but the charts have changed this year from what we did in the past. We changed the way that we represent it. You look top to bottom. So FY 2018 will be on the top of our tables. And we've included raw numbers as well as percentages so that depending on how you visually receive things, you can get the answers you're looking for.

So for sex of the accused in FY 2018, males were 99.7 percent of the accused, 0.3 percent were female which works out to there are
two females accused of sexual assault in the services that had a preferred penetrative or contact offense last year. And that number has varied always right in that same category. So you're always looking at 99 percent are male and less than one percent are female.

So this chart here represents what the pay grade of the accused was for each case where it was preferred in FY18. In the chart -- or I'm sorry. In the report, you will see that this chart has been replicated four times, one for each fiscal year from '15 to now. And why it's an interesting chart this year compared to the others is previously the peak for the enlisted would've been an E-4 and the peak for officers would've been the O-3 pay grade.

But in FY18 -- and we don't know why this has happened. But in both instances, it shifted to the left. So the peak this year you have is E-3 for enlisted and O-2 for officers. It's something that as the data working group we will look at when we do the FY19 data and see if
this is a new trend that maybe we're getting.

That might've been something with training. We have younger people, though, that are getting in more trouble. Whatever the issue might be, it will be a data point that we can try to track down going forward. But again, we can't tell you right now why that is the case.

CHAIR BASHFORD: And just so I'm clear, the E-3, E-4 as a proportion of the service are very high?

MR. MASON: Yes, E-3, E-4, E-5 are roughly 80 percent of the service for the enlisted. So you're going to see that peak should be in that area. However this year, it's just shifting to the left.

CMSAF McKINLEY: Would it be good in the future possibly to go with what the chair said is when you have the number, you can correlate below it what percentage of the force it is.

MR. MASON: And we can absolutely do that now.
CMSAF McKINLEY: That would be real easy? It'd be very --

MR. MASON: In the text of the report underneath this, it does have a breakout explaining the 80 percent component. But it would not be a problem to add in additional detail.

So the next slide is a representation of the sex of the victims of the cases that we have documented. Nine percent of the victims were male and 91 percent were female. This number has again been very close over the past few years. There isn't a massive variation in the number.

HON. BRISBOIS: With the number of total cases is --

MR. MASON: It's 574.

HON. BRISBOIS: And the number of victims for fiscal year. That means cases with multiple victims.

MR. MASON: Yes sir. We categorize and I took out of the presentation for today but
it's actually in the report. We do know how many
cases were one victim, how many cases were two
victims, and how many cases were three or more as
a percentage.

And in the last fiscal year, I think
the highest victim count that we have in a case
is 13 or 15 victims. And they were -- it was a
male with all female victims.

Stayce just provided to me. So in fiscal year '18, 4 percent of the cases has three
or more victims, 10 percent of the cases had two victims, and 86 percent had one victim. But that
will be in the actual published report.

So the next slide is status of the victim. This is something we've always been
tracking but we didn't put it into a graphical representation. And I'm not sure why I hadn't
done it in the past, so I wanted to include it this year to show that 60.5 percent -- 61 percent
in FY 18 were all military victims, 36 percent
were all civilian, and 3 and a half percent were
military and civilian.
And if you look at the previous years, and again this is another issue or instance of that, the number of cases are falling. But that percentage is staying fairly consistent that 61 percent are all military. So you see you would think again that there might be a shift someplace but it's not happening. We're seeing the number across the same way.

And then victim relationship to accused, why this is interesting and why it's important is we've talked about with the fact that in the past we used SAPRO, their report as a basis for getting information. And then we realized that SAPRO is not reporting all of the cases because they have a different mandate.

Well, in this case when you look, there are 82 cases in FY18 that were spouse or intimate partner. That means those cases would not make it into the SAPRO report because that would fall under FAP. So our project is unique in that we talk about all the sexual assaults that we know of.
This is something I've mentioned already. The penetrative versus contact distribution, 75 percent of the cases last year were penetrative, 25 percent were contact. And that is the same percentage for '18, '17, and '16. So again, cases dropping, percentages staying the same.

Chair, you brought up Article 32 hearings earlier today. Once again, you can see the number of 32 hearings that were held was 373 last year compared to 422 the year before. The number where they were waived, 104 last year versus 117 the year before. But when you look at the percentages, it's 78 percent and 21 percent or 22 percent.

So once again, they're declining. But what are the chances that they're declining at the same exact percentages?

MS. LONG: Can you remind me when were the changes to the 32?

MR. MASON: 2015, and you can see --

MS. LONG: Okay.
MR. MASON: -- where, 2015. It then
jumps to '16 and the numbers skew. That's when
we started tracking. And this is a new version
of an older chart dealing with conviction rate to
give you an idea that when a 32 was waived, what
was the ultimate conviction rate? If they were
found guilty of something, what were we looking
at?

And in the last year, 32 percent,
almost 33 percent were found guilty of a non-SA
offense. A contact offense was only in four
cases which was 3.8 percent. And then they were
found guilty of a penetrative offense 32 times
which is 30.8 percent.

So it just gives you an idea of how
the distribution is, where they're getting
convicted of something, what is it. And this
again is only after they waive the 32. So they
decided it wasn't worth going to a 32 for
whatever reason and these are the conviction
rates you're seeing.

BRIG. GEN. SCHWENK: These are all
contested?

MR. MASON: Some. It's possible they're contested.

BRIG. GEN. SCHWENK: So we don't know whether these are pleas or contested cases?

MR. MASON: Right. We're looking at the fact that the 32 was waived and then there was an ultimate conviction for a non-SA offense. We can tell you. It's just not a way that we've looked at the numbers. We were looking at just what is there a conviction.

BRIG. GEN. SCHWENK: That's fine. I just wondered.

MR. MASON: Yes sir. So this chart will tell you how are cases being resolved. So a case -- a penetrative offense is preferred and ultimately resolved at court martial. So we have removed alternative dispositions from this chart. We've removed the dismissals. It's going to trial at some level.

And we ran into this issue with the report last year, and that's why I'm drawing your
attention to it now. By law, we should not be seeing a penetrative offense being resolved at a summary court martial. And on this chart, you'll see that there are two cases where that is allegedly or possibly the case.

In reality, what has happened in those two cases is that charges were preferred for a penetrative offense. What was ultimately resolved at a summary was not a penetrative offense. It might've been an assault and battery. It could've been anything.

The penetrative offense fell off and it was not resolved at the summary. But they had preferred the charge. Now in order to avoid any miscommunication, any problems, misinterpretation in the future, we've included an appendix to the report that specifically lays out these cases and tells you these were the charges that were preferred. This is what the SJA advice to the convening authority was.

This is what the pretrial agreement was that tells you what happened to the charges.
or what deal they were making. And then it tells
you what was referred, the pleas, and the
findings. So we have done that for all these
special and summary cases that were penetrative
so that if somebody wants to see what's going on,
they can look and see. And it shows that the
services are not resolving these cases at a
summary in violation of the law.

BRIG. GEN. SCHWENK: I guess my
problem is the heading. I would read that
penetrative offenses resolved at court martial.
So I would think that there were two penetrative
offenses that were resolved at a summary court
martial.

So I would recommend that we just
think about if they weren't penetrative when they
got resolved at the summary court martial because
the penetrative offenses were dismissed and it
was something else that ended up at the summary
court. Maybe they shouldn't be on the chart. I
don't know.

MR. MASON: And sir, we had that
conversation. We've tried to go back and forth and we changed the language. And it changed actually in the report last year. And we haven't found the right way to word it. And I will go back and revisit it. It might be the penetrative offense initially preferred and then charges resolved.

I'll find a new way. And when you get the report in a couple weeks for review, I'll draw your attention to where I put it and you can tell me if it works.

BRIG. GEN. SCHWENK: Thank you.

MR. MASON: Absolutely. And that will be the case on the next chart as well, sir, where it says contact offenses resolved at court martial. Because here you have a case where the charge ultimately was a contact offense. And then whether the contact went forward or not, this is how the case ultimately was resolved. And I will figure out the wording for there as well, sir.

That is the snapshot view of the data.
As I said, I want to clarify the earlier point. The appendix to the report is going to be roughly 100 pages, 100-plus pages. And it's every data point you could want and interpretation of it. So we provide that to the services so that they can see all the information that's out there and how we got from A to B.

That is the basis of the next part which is all the data point which we then give to Dr. Wells who does the multi-variate. And he's got a few slides now to explain the multi-variate results for FY18.

MS. GARVIN: Mr. Mason and Dr. Wells, sorry. Before you transition, I believe you have showed this before and I'm sorry for forgetting. Is one of the data points whether the victim had an SVC or VLC? Is that in the data?

MR. MASON: We can tell if they are on record at some point. If we have some sort of a document saying that victim's counsel was involved, we will notate it. And that's just by looking at the record of trial.
When Stayce goes and takes the record apart, if she comes across that, we scan it and add it. But that isn't -- we're not saying that we're 100 percent confident on that. But we do have it as a data point that's in our --

MS. GARVIN: So it could be part of an analysis to see what happened to a case when they did or did not --

MR. MASON: Yes.

MS. GARVIN: -- have one.

MS. ROZELL: Fortunately, the new format for the Air Force is really great at outlining the SVC portion of whether or not they have an SVC available to them or not.

MS. GARVIN: Thank you.

MS. LONG: I have a question. Just I don't know if it was before or not. Of the 574 cases, do we have data comparing that with all of the reports for penetrative or all of the reports that came in that year?

MR. MASON: No, we don't. With the case review, they've been looking at the
investigations for FY17. We can take their
numbers for FY17 and look at them compared to our
numbers of cases that were resolved in FY17. The
problem is they are saying a case that it was
closed -- the investigation was closed in '17.
And we're looking at a court martial. So we can
try to put those together, but we don't have --

MS. LONG: I didn't mean that.

MR. MASON: Oh, I'm sorry.

MS. LONG: I meant reports across this
-- across this service, do we know, let's say,
that there were -- I'm making up a number --
2,000 reports and then 574 cases? Or do we not -
- are we not able to do that?

MR. MASON: We can try to give an idea
based on the SAPRO report. But again because
they don't report FAP, we can't pull that across.
So we have to say that we can give you statistics
based on what we say in a court martial.

MS. LONG: The cases. Okay. Thank
you.

DR. WELLS: So the multi-variate
results that we have to summarize today are very similar to the models that we estimated with the FY16 and '17 data. And it's similar to the models that Dr. Spohn estimated with the FY15 data.

So we built models to understand the relationship between case characteristics and a set of outcomes in that case. So we looked at dismissals, acquittals, conviction on a penetrative offense, any conviction. And then we looked at sanctioning outcomes given that there was some convictions.

So we looked at punitive separation, confinement length, and then a combined sentencing severity scale that combined both of those sanctions together. So what I have for you today is a summary of some of the key results from those multi-variate models.

To cut to the chase, a lot of the results we see here in the FY18 data are very, very similar to what we observed in the '16 and '17 data. So nothing new jumps out here.
We see that four predictor variables are important across several of these models. So service branch, number of charges that were filed in the case, the conviction offense, and then we see two victim variables that jumped out as being important.

So the first thing I note, acquittals have been a part of the discussion of the committee. And we don't find any differences in these multi-variate models between the service branches in terms of the likelihood of an acquittal compared to any other outcome in the case. So no differences between the service branches.

In the FY16 data, we did see that the Air Force differed from the Marines. And in the FY17 data, we saw that the Air Force differed from the Army. But those were the only differences that have emerged over the past three years with acquittals.

The likelihood of being convicted on a penetrative offense was a little bit higher in
the Army and the Marines when we compared them to
the Air Force and we saw the same thing or
similar patterns in '16 and '17.

And then in terms of the likelihood of
being convicted on any charge, it was greater --
it was highest in the Army, the Marines, and the
Navy. And this was statistically different from
the rate in the Air Force and in the Coast Guard.
So we see that.

And then last with regard to a
sanction, the chances of a punitive separation,
they were highest in the Army and in the Air
Force when we compared those two service branches
to the Navy.

The second predictor variable is the
number of charges. And we see here that the
likelihood of any conviction and conviction on a
penetrative offense goes up as the number of
charges increases. And then the chances of an
acquittal or a dismissal are reduced as the
number of charges increase. So an inverse
relationship there.
CHAIR BASHFORD: And just to clarify again, the number of charges doesn't mean number of sexual assault charges. It means number of charges for anything. Is that correct?

DR. WELLS: That's correct.

CHAIR BASHFORD: So adultery, false statement, leaving the base, something like that?

DR. WELLS: Correct. And we see that in the data. We didn't separate out those qualitative -- the qualitative nature of all those different charges. It's just a summary count.

And then last as the number of charges increase, we see an increased chance of a more severe sanction being levied given that there was some conviction in the case.

Next, conviction offense. The highest chances of a confinement sentence stemmed from convictions on a penetrative sexual assault conviction. And there's no difference in the chances of a confinement between contact offenses and non-sexual assault offense convictions.
Punitive separation chances were greatest for penetrative and contact offenses than for non-sex assault convictions. And then the sentencing severity scale that we created is related to the type of conviction offense. So it's highest for penetrative, next for contact offenses, and then lowest for non-sexual assault offenses. And all three of those were statistically significant in terms of their differences.

Last, we see a couple of victim characteristics, and these also were observed in our '16 and '17 data. So the likelihood of case dismissal was higher when the parties involved were intimate or intimate partners, either current or former. And the chances of punitive separation were lower in cases that involved victims who were military Servicemembers compared to those other categories.

MR. KRAMER: Sorry. The first one, dismissal at what stage?

DR. WELLS: Post-preferral. And then
the chances of punitive separation were lower in cases that only involved victims who were military Servicemembers as opposed to civilians and cases with a combination of military and civilian victims. So those are the multi-variate results for the FY18 data.

CHAIR BASHFORD: Thank you.

DR. WELLS: You're welcome.

MS. LONG: I have a question. I'm sorry. When you said that there's no statistically significant difference between military services and acquittals. So before when we heard the Marines saying that they have a different level of screening that's harsher, but their acquittal rate is the same as the other services.

DR. WELLS: That's correct.

MS. LONG: And the second --

CHAIR BASHFORD: But their conviction rate was higher, I believe, right? Marines conviction rate was --

DR. WELLS: Yes, that's correct.
MS. LONG: So how does that happen?

Can you describe that?

DR. WELLS: Yeah, so --

MS. LONG: Because that might be my

next -- okay.

DR. WELLS: Yeah, exactly. So when we

make these comparisons, we are lumping together a

whole variety of outcomes together into one

category and comparing it to a single other

category.

So for instance, the acquittal

comparison is the likelihood of an acquittal

compared to everything else. Dismissal,

conviction on a penetrative offense, conviction

on a contact offense, and conviction on a non-

sexual assault. So we're combining things

together. Now when we go to the conviction on

the penetrative offense, it's that category

versus everything else.

MS. LONG: Okay. So --

DR. WELLS: So that might explain kind

of how they don't always line up.
MS. LONG: Okay. And this is somewhat related which is then when you talk about the conviction rates being higher, likelihood is higher when you have greater charges, are we able to know which service? Is there a difference in how many charges are happening across the services?

DR. WELLS: Right. What we do in that sort of model is we control for the service branch. So it's parsing out the effect of the service branch on that outcome and then isolating the number of charges. So it's just the number of charges.

We could do that analysis where we compare the number of charges across the service branches and then see how that may have differential impacts. I don't know the numbers off the top of my head to know if we would have enough different kinds of combinations to do any meaningful analyses. But if you're interested, that's something we could do.

MR. MASON: And ma'am, I would just
add that in the appendix for last year's report which these numbers have been updated because we received more cases for FY17 in this data pool. But for penetrative, the accused charge for the penetrative offense in the Marine Corps, they were acquitted of all charges 18.2 percent of the time. But then convicted of a non-sex offense was 43.2 percent, and the other services were at 21.5, 23.3, and 9.

So they were not -- they're convicted of a penetrative, convicted of a contact was slightly lower than the other services. But they were much higher on the non-sex offense they found guilty of. So they have a higher guilt rate in that sense or a conviction rate. But yet the acquittal rate is a little bit lower. And that could be looked at, and we have that for '15, '16, '17 as well.

CMSAF McKinley: Do you know what the female population in the Marines is?

MR. Mason: I do not, sir, but I could find out. Absolutely.
CMSAF McKINLEY: The comparison, I think, in the Air Force, 20 percent of the Air Force population is female. And I would guess Marines probably well under 10 percent.

MR. MASON: And it's a great point. These are the types of things we can -- because we have the data, we can show what we have in our database. But then we can also go back to DoD, get the official numbers, and include it in the appendix. But I will get an answer for you.

CMSAF McKINLEY: What do you think, General? Do you think that's about right?

BRIG. GEN. SCHWENK: I don't know.

MR. MASON: Unless you have any other questions, that's all we have for data for you.

CHAIR BASHFORD: Thank you very much, and keep up the good work with a better system. We're now scheduled for deliberations on the collateral misconduct report. Colonel Weir, are you going to lead that?

COL. WEIR: What I recommend is that based upon the guidance we get here today that we
draft a draft letter back to the Secretary of Defense and pointing out some of the problems that we saw today in the report.

And I would recommend that based upon the draft reports -- and I keep saying they're draft reports to us so they're not finalized. So we have an opportunity -- the committee has the opportunity to have input into the Secretary of Defense on how those final reports perhaps are done and before they're sent over to the armed services committees.

So one of my recommendations, and you all discuss whether that makes sense to define some of these terms in a way that across the services will get more consistent information. And that way in the future when the DAC-IPAD is requested to review and analyze the reports, we'll have consistent information across the services.

One of the areas -- and you just heard from Dr. Wells and Chuck -- is you can make comparisons between services that more likely you
get acquitted here in the Army on this or the
Marines. But you have to be coming from the same
basic information.

And right now, we can't tell if you're
more likely to be -- if you've committed
collateral misconduct, are you more likely to be
punished in the Navy, the Marine Corps, the Army?
Because the numbers are different. They didn't
use the same thing.

So one of the areas I think you all
need to discuss and deliberate on right off the
bat is what you would like to do with the false
reporting information that you receive because
that seemed to be an area that was a topic of
conversation. And I think part of this
deliberation on how we kind of draft the report,
we need to cover that area so we know from a
staff where you all stand on that.

CHAIR BASHFORD: It seemed to me that
they were struggling with that, with the
definition of it, with how they came up, with
cross complaints. I think it would be much
easier if they simply -- if we recommend that
they eliminate that category from any analysis of
collateral misconduct.

If it's a truly false report, the
misconduct isn't collateral. It is the
misconduct. And it was impossible to tell. Some
people left it out. Some people put it in. I
think it would be much easier if they all left it
out if that's --

DR. MARKOWITZ: I would like to say
that I agree that it's not collateral misconduct.
I do want to make sure that it doesn't appear
that this committee is somehow hiding the idea
that there may be false reports by having it
taken out.

I think we need to address the fact
that they were brought up. It doesn't appear to
be a collateral misconduct. Because of that, it
wasn't -- I think we need to acknowledge the
existence of that category in some way, shape, or
form and not just pretend we never got that
information so that it doesn't look like we just
pretended we never --

COL. WEIR: Would it be beneficial to get to where you want to be is that the definition of collateral misconduct lays out what they mean by collateral misconduct? Because I think I don't know if we would be hiding the fact that there was a -- and we're not really sure as a committee because we don't have the statement made by the people whether or not it was actually false.

DR. MARKOWITZ: Correct. I mean, I think there are a number of issues related to how people were defining it. Who exactly was being -- where the false allegation was actually falling. Was it the subject as part of a cross complaint? Was it the victim coming forward? I think there were a number of issues related to the false allegation component. So I think there are a number of reasons not to necessarily include it.

My only caution in all of this is I don't want it to seem as though we are just
running away from the notion that false
allegations may exist at all. And so I would
prefer to not just pretend like it never existed
whatsoever, if that make sense.

And it's possible I'm being completely
inartful here after a long day. So if I'm not
making sense, I'm happy to --

BRIG. GEN. SCHWENK: I agree with Jen,
but I think that maybe your concern -- Jen's
concern is satisfied by the fact that we're
expressly going to address false reporting as a
category in our letter which is a public letter
and everybody can read it. So it'll be clear
we're not --

DR. MARKOWITZ: Yes.

BRIG. GEN. SCHWENK: -- sweeping it
under the rug. We're saying, there's
inconsistencies in all these areas. One area
will say false reporting. Here's the
inconsistency. Here's our recommendation.

Now my approach to the false reporting
is as I understand it -- and I'm usually wrong.
But as I understand it, collateral misconduct concerns stemmed years and years ago from the deterrent effect on reporting sexual assaults.

COL. WEIR: Yes sir.

BRIG. GEN. SCHWENK: Because if I say I got sexually assaulted, I'm going to get hammered for collateral misconduct. If that's true, all the definitions should be focused on identifying that kind of collateral misconduct and clearly filing a false report is not one of those things.

COL. WEIR: Yes sir.

BRIG. GEN. SCHWENK: And so it's not collateral misconduct. So I think maybe we can solve that by --

DR. MARKOWITZ: Yeah.

HON. BRISBOIS: So the basic problem from the morning's opening panel is the inconsistency of definitions. And the area where they had the greatest inconsistency was in this false reporting.

So since that's the tone and tenor of
the likely proposed response, that should be
extra highlight that Congress, the committees
should not rely on that data at all because they
were completely -- I think the point was made,
was it the initial victim reporting or was it a
cross claim by the initial suspect?

    I mean, we don't -- there's absolutely
zero consistency. And so that's the sort of most
egregious example of the lack of uniform
definitions.

    COL. WEIR: Yes sir, I agree. Even
after listening to the panel, I still don't
really have a firm grasp on what they meant by a
false report.

    DR. MARKOWITZ: And I think that's
part of the problem here is that I don't know
that we ever got a firm definition of what false
report actually is defined as in any given
service which is potentially another topic
altogether. Well, I'll just leave it at that.

    MS. LONG: But I think something
significant happened, and I don't want to
misstate which service that was. But one of them
counts somebody who sees something that they
perceive as an assault. So it wasn't what we
would normally think of as a false allegation.
And that, because of how loaded this word is,
that definitely needs to be taken out of that.

COL. WEIR: As I recall --

MS. LONG: It may be an incorrect
report.

COL. WEIR: -- it was a third-party
report that the witness saw what he or she
perceived to be a sexual assault and reported it.
And then when the alleged victim was questioned
about that assault, and we don't know whether it
was a he or a she, the victim said, no, I wasn't
assaulted. That was consensual. They counted
that report by the witness as a false report.

Now I think a way to handle this would
be to come up with -- for us as a staff when we
were talking about collateral misconduct and the
case review working group, and some of you have
sat on that, have a pretty good idea what
collateral misconduct is which is some conduct that results or was just prior to or after or during the sexual assault.

So for example, underage drinking. The victim is underage drinking and then there's a sexual assault, and that's collateral to that misconduct. Or there's a fraternization, the disparity in ranks between the two individuals. Adultery is another one. The violation of an Article 92 where the victim didn't sign the suspect into the barracks and therefore she's guilty of a barracks violation.

Those were the kinds of offenses. If they were smoking marijuana right before they had sex, I guess. The sexual assault occurred. That could be considered collateral misconduct because it occurred a time very close to the incident.

I don't know how many weeks went by before the subject in these false official statement cases made that allegation. So I think what we could do is draft the definition of collateral misconduct. Point out in the letter
to the SECDEF about the false swearing cases that were received, and make a recommendation that those not be included in a report to Congress because the services themselves have not defined and it opens up to more questions than they have answers to.

And we can draft it. And obviously when it gets out to you all, you can track change and comment on it. But I think you're absolutely right. I think it needs to be addressed and it needs to be addressed in a way that we know it's there.

As the DAC-IPAD committee, you know it's there. But you also don't think it should be included in the collateral misconduct because it doesn't meet what the definition that you all will eventually approve. I think we can handle it that way to alleviate any concerns.

CHAIR BASHFORD: So although I'm not sure they're the decision makers, they certainly all agree that they are going to, the next report, pull the same types of cases, whether
it'd be only penetrative or penetrative and sexual abuse, the years of cases and have the same definition.

So I think we could really help by suggesting whether they pull just penetrative or penetrative and sexual contact. I think the latter. And if we could provide to them suggested definitions of the terms that they then all use.

COL. WEIR: And it's up to you, but --

I don't want to misstate what you said, ma'am. But you think it should be penetrative and contact offenses, they count all of those?

CHAIR BASHFORD: If you're looking at collateral consequences, I think you should look at the big universe of what does reporting something mean to me.

COL. WEIR: Sure, and I agree. So what we can do is put together the recommendation that these should be the definitions that the services follow across the board. And one is collateral misconduct.
Now another question is some of the services used a closed case. Some used open and closed cases. And I think that's another definition. You can only -- this is up for debate. You can only count those collateral misconduct cases where the case has been closed or action has been taken on the collateral misconduct.

There needs to be some uniformity across the services. And as it was, each counted their misconduct a different way. I believe it was the Air Force that didn't count anything that wasn't a completed case. But that's just something for your consideration.

CHAIR BASHFORD: It gets complicated, I think, because as we heard, some victims want the collateral consequences adjudicated close in time to the report and some want to wait till after the termination of the case.

So what we don't want to do is have something where the collateral consequence comes way after determination of a case and we don't
see it because it wasn't pulled. Because then
you would just lose it forever. I don't know how
you would attach it to anything. I don't know
what the solution is.

MS. MANSFIELD: Yeah, can I just speak
for a minute? So as somebody who had to take a
part of this, the first pool of cases in order to
identify the victims that we were going to look
at is we had to define which subject cases.
Because everything is going to be by subject in
investigative files.

So FY17 closed. Law enforcement
investigations was kind of the starting point.
And then you identified all the victims in those
offenses. And then you went out to the field to
say, for these victims, what happened? So I
think the first place we have to be consistent is
the initial pull of what cases where we're even
identifying the pool of victims.

CHAIR BASHFORD: And I think everybody
agreed that they would be consistent in what they
pulled. But we can give guidance on that too.
COL. WEIR: The legislation in my mind is pretty clear on what the services were required to report. And I think that when the committee -- when you all looked at the draft report, it all looks like one percent, one percent, one percent.

But when you actually compare what the legislation required which was the number of victims who committed collateral misconduct. And then of those victims, the number who received adverse punishment for that collateral misconduct. And then third, what was that percentage?

And clearly, there wasn't specific guidance from Congress on the specificity of that. But when we looked at those numbers, it changed from one percent to the various -- and you saw in the draft, the various percentages. I think the Marine Corps was the highest at 90 percent. If a victim committed collateral misconduct, she was punished 90 percent of the time.
MR. KRAMER: What's it mean, committed collateral misconduct?

COL. WEIR: Well --

MR. KRAMER: There's some adjudication? Because somebody said the -- I forget the exact words. I asked a question and he said --

COL. WEIR: Right, and I'm glad you brought that up, sir, because that's another definition, accused. Us in the military justice system have a specific word for accused. That means a charge sheet has been preferred, and there's charges that that individual has committed. An officer has signed off on that charge sheet, and that starts the process.

So suspect, suspected of committing collateral misconduct. The Army's, potentially. I don't know what -- it's either evidence in the case file that she admitted that I was underage and I was drinking. That's not potential. I mean, she's admitted it. She's suspected of it because she's admitted it. So I think we can do
a better job of the definition of accused because
that means --

MR. KRAMER: Or committed, I guess, is
the -- yeah.

COL. WEIR: Yeah, I mean, we can
wordsmith, the suspect may have committed this
collateral misconduct. But accused to me was
confusing because I'm thinking if you've accused
some way there's an investigation, there's a
charge sheet, and it's going down that path to
some end result.

And the other issue, I think, that we
can help them out is you could -- I mean, me not
making general is an adverse -- I mean, you can
say adverse to anything. But really what adverse
is general court martial, non-judicial
punishment, administrative separation for the
misconduct.

A letter of reprimand whether it goes
in your file or not. I mean, I drafted too many
to count which says, you have embarrassed the
United States Army, this, blah, blah, blah.
You're hereby reprimanded. Now if it gets filed in the local file, it's still adverse. It stays in that file for a period of time till you leave the command. A non-punitive letter is still a reprimand.

Now because I didn't get to go to a school eight months from now that I -- I mean, you can pull the string on this and everything can become adverse to me if I don't think I got what I should get.

So I would recommend that we define adverse to those things I mentioned. Now depending upon what service you're in, a non-punitive letter, a letter of reprimand. We give adverse counseling statements. You have failed to do this. You were underage drinking. You're told not -- don't do it again. If you do it again, there's going to be adverse consequences to you.

That's not a good counseling statements. You get good -- hey, Steve, you did a great job digging this foxhole. Keep up the
good work. That's a different kind of counseling statement than, you screwed up. Don't screw up again.

Because they use those counseling statements to build a packet for the administrative separation. And so you pull out the ten bad counseling statements. You throw out a packet for misconduct and off you go. The person is out of the military.

So I think we can help them narrow their definition. And I don't believe in my experience with being purple that there's a lot of difference between what an adverse action is across the services. So we can help them help themselves to make it clear what the adverse action is.

And I'd recommend that we request that the services specifically say of the ten victims who receive adverse punishment, this is what it was, two Article 15s for adultery or letters of reprimand, and spell it out.

I don't know if we need to get into
the punishment, what they received. But a field
grade Article 15 for underage drinking. A
company grade Article 15 for violation of a
barracks policy.

But we want to fully inform those
people who have requested that this committee
look at this and analyze it and make
recommendations back to the armed services
committee. And that's not a heavy lift for the
services because there's really few numbers.

And if they can't readily pull those
numbers from their systems, then maybe that's a
recommendation that we have a centralized system
where we can pull information.

CHAIR BASHFORD: Document based.

COL. WEIR: Yeah, document based. But
I think that would be important for people to
know what the punishment was. So it may help
inform. You don't know what -- they may think
they all received court martials, they all got
administrative separations. If some of that
happened, well, that's fine. But it needs to be
documented. Do you all have any questions of --

BRIG. GEN. SCHWENK: I think we ought to, right up front, address the 140a issues because that's the overriding issue. And we right up front ought to say, this highlights what we were concerned about in our memorandum to the Secretary of Defense on whatever date, copy attached. And if that gets taken care of, we will not have these kinds of inconsistencies in the future. Meanwhile, let us help you with your immediate tasking.

The other thing when you're working on it, Congress asked for certain things. And it's sort of unusual for DoD to give more than they ask for. But sometimes we do. And they don't ask for much. They ask for numbers.

So when we start providing more, the numbers, especially if the DAC-IPAD is going to ask the services to go spend more time and effort beyond what Congress asked for, we need to be real careful if that's really what we want to do.

COL. WEIR: Yes sir. They've provided
us the adverse action information. But basically
the draft report from the services contain more
information than -- I mean, they didn't ask for
the total number of sexual assault investigations
during this time period. They only asked for the
number of victims in this time period that
committed collateral misconduct.

So we can -- you all can deliberate
over how much or how little information that
should go over back to the Secretary of Defense.

CHAIR BASHFORD: I'm a great believer
that more information is more information. And
if it's susceptible to misinterpretation that
somebody has to choose between reporting a sexual
assault with the understanding they're going to
be kicked out of the service. And really what it
is, is a letter of reprimand.

I think Congress should understand
that there's a whole variety of adverse things
that happen. And most of them seem to be fairly
on the lower end.

BRIG. GEN. SCHWENK: If they already
have the information provided, which they do in their reports, that's fine. But if we're asking them, I thought you were talking about asking to go back out and look for more stuff.

COL. WEIR: I think the good news story for the services' perspective which we'll highlight is the percentage of victims who aren't committing any collateral misconduct. And that kind of got lost in the shuffle in the draft report from the services. But that should be something.

I want to say it's in the 90 percent that that's a good news story that we don't have a lot of victims. Because that clouds the whole prosecution investigation issue. But if you don't have that issue involved in the overwhelming majority of cases, that's good news that we ought to make sure that is projected out to the armed services committees through the Secretary of Defense.

CHAIR BASHFORD: So Colonel, do you need this committee to approve the path forward
of definitions, what to pull, asking about and recommending that they include what the adverse consequence was?

COL. WEIR: And then once -- if that's the way you'd like to go and you vote on that, then what we'll do is put together a draft letter and then provide that to you all. And then on the 12th of September, we will have a public meeting telephonically.

Prior to that, obviously, you'll all be sent the draft that you can -- you cannot discuss it amongst yourselves. But you can send it back to our office and we can compile it. And then on the 12th, we will have all the changes that you've recommended. And then we'll deliberate at that point and vote on the final product.

CHAIR BASHFORD: Does anybody --

HON. BRISBOIS: That's the way forward.

CHAIR BASHFORD: I second that.

Anybody opposed? Seeing no opposition.
COL. WEIR:  Okay. Thank you very much. And I think --

CHAIR BASHFORD:  Mr. Gruber?

MR. GRUBER:  Madam Chair, I'm unaware of anybody requesting to appear before the panel. The Federal Register notice did notify the public of their opportunity to do so. Colonel, are you aware of anyone?

COL. WEIR:  No.

MR. GRUBER:  With that, ma'am, unless you have other matters, it would appear you can conclude the meeting at your discretion.

CHAIR BASHFORD:  This meeting is now concluded. Thank you.

(Whereupon, the above-entitled matter went off the record at 4:28 p.m.)
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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the foregoing transcript

In the matter of: DAC-IPAD Public Meeting

Before: US DOD

Date: 08-23-19

Place: Arlington, VA

was duly recorded and accurately transcribed under my direction; further, that said transcript is a true and accurate record of the proceedings.

[Signature]

Court Reporter